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In the history of Chinese and European philosophy, 
metaphysics has played an outstanding role: it is a 
theoretical framework which provides the basis for a 
philosophical understanding of the world and the self. 
A theory of the self is well integrated in a metaphysical 
understanding of the totality of nature as a dynamic 
process of continuous changes. According to this view, 
the purpose of existence can be conceived of as the  
development and realization of the full potential given to 
the individual by its nature. In regard to human nature 
specifically, this idea of self-realization includes the 
development of all cognitive faculties as well as of the 
moral character.
Metaphysics has, however, suffered a loss of importance 
in current debates, especially in ethics. As a result, we 
observe the emergence of such philosophical views as 
moral skepticism and even nihilism. The consequence 
of this tendency has been the renunciation of a claim 
to understanding and to providing a solid ground for 
ethics.
Yet an intercultural dialogue can provide us with some 
hope as the consolidation of debates on crucial topics 
of our traditions might indeed serve as the basis for a 
more powerful philosophy in the future.
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PREFACE
The Center for Advanced Studies MORPHOMATA investigates how 
cultural knowledge becomes manifest in concrete forms. The focus 
lies on the analysis of the genesis, dynamics and mediality of cultural 
figurations called morphome.1 Their investigation becomes particularly 
valuable by a concentration in comparative cultural studies. Therefore, 
MORPHOMATA invites internationally acclaimed scholars to channel 
expertises and to intensify their studies on cultural figurations in Co-
logne.
During a fellowship in the academic year 2010/11 at the Center for 
Advanced Studies MORPHOMATA I, Guo Yi, was proceeding my philo-
sophical research based on the texts of the Guodian bamboo slips, which 
have been excavated 1993 and are dated back to the time period between 
the first half of the 4th century until the beginning of the 3rd century BC.
The learning and philosophy of the pre-Qin period constitute the 
source of Chinese culture. However, for a variety of reasons not many 
writings from this period have survived, and the authenticity of some 
extant writings are doubted. Fortunately, 804 bamboo strips with more 
than 13,000 characters were excavated at No. 1 Guodian Chu tomb in the 
Hubei province of China.2 They consist of philosophical texts, both con-
fucian and daoist texts. These newly recovered archaeological documents 
required a reinterpretation of the formative period in Chinese philoso-
phy. During an earlier fellowship at the Harvard-Yenching  Institute be-
tween 1999–2001 I, Guo Yi, had the possibility to investigate the bamboo 
slips in detail. Afterwards I paid particular attention to the philosophical 
1 Günter Blamberger / Dietrich Boschung, Morphomata. Kulturelle Figura-
tionen: Genese, Dynamik und Medialität. Morphomata 1 (München 2011). 
See also Jürgen Hammerstaedt, Die antike Verwendung des Begriffs mór-
phoma, in this volume, 91–109. 
2  For the archaeological circumstances on the finding of the bamboo slips 
see Asuman Lätzer-Lasar in this volume.
6interpretations of the texts, but with a view less to the history, and more 
to the contemporary Chinese philosophy.
These newly made philosophical thoughts resulted in a paper that 
formed the basis of the conference Metaphysical Foundations of Know-
ledge and Ethics in Chinese and Western Philosophy.3 The conference was 
organised by me, Asuman Lätzer-Lasar (Center for Advanced Studies 
MORPHOMATA) in cooperation with Sasa Josifovic (Institute of Phi-
losophy) and took place at the University of Cologne from the 24th until 
the 25th of June 2011. Our main aim of the conference was to approach 
the notion of common values – such as knowledge and ethics – from 
a cross-cultural perspective. For this reason we chose a quite unusual 
concept of dialogue: We invited scholars from different areas of Western 
and Chinese philosophy. Every invited scholar had to respond from their 
own perspective on the key text. This concept promoted an intensive ex-
change and furthermore fostered an enriching dialogue between experts 
of Chinese and Western philosophical schools. 
We therefore extend special thanks to the directors of the Center 
for Advanced Studies MORPHOMATA Dietrich Boschung and Günter 
Blamberger for benefitting the concept of the conference and publishing 
the results. Furthermore we would like to thank Sasa Josifovic from the 
Philosophical Institute of the University of Cologne for participating in 
drafting the concept and organising the conference. At last, we would 
like to thank Thierry Greub and Semra Mägele for their meticulous 
corrections.
Guo Y i and Asuman Lätzer-Lasar
3  For the key text see Guo Yi, Metaphysics, Nature and Mind. The Main 
Idea of Daoic Philosophy, in this volume.
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INTRODUCTION 
A title such as “Metaphysical Foundations of Knowledge and Ethics” 
does not suggest an engagement with current debates in epistemol-
ogy and ethics. Metaphysics does not play any substantial role in 
these debates and there are scarcely any prominent philosophers at 
present attempting to ground normativity, claims to knowledge or 
ethical judgements in metaphysics. However, philosophy transcends 
fashions and trends. It is a quest that is deeply rooted in and draws 
its inspiration from the whole history and dynamics of human cul-
ture and civilization.
In contrast to most current theories of rationality, normativity, 
justification and action, the authors represented in this book engage 
with classical philosophical topics and theories typically excluded 
by analytic philosophers. The keynote text by Guo Yi, for example, 
emphasizes the central place of the theory of human nature for Chi-
nese philosophy throughout its history up to the present. Any effort 
to comprehend and engage with Chinese philosophy must accept 
this theme as central. Moreover, Guo Yi claims that such substantial 
philosophical themes should be retained. It is necessary to develop 
a deep understanding of the different theories of human nature that 
have been developed within different traditions and different societ-
ies as the condition for inter-cultural understanding. Furthermore, 
a focus on this topic is required if philosophy is to maintain its 
relevance to humanity and if philosophy is to be advanced. Guo Yi 
himself advocates a theory of human nature that provides a “spiri-
tual home” for humanity based on the notion that every living be-
ing is born with specific potentials, and that the “meaning of life” 
consists in the full realization of these potentials. While focus on the 
question of human nature provides the groundwork for intercultural 
philosophical exchange, defining human nature in turn is grounded 
in metaphysics. Most authors of this book have a deep knowledge 
of the history of philosophy and metaphysics of Chinese civilization 
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or European civilization or both, and like Guo Yi, are engaged with 
these more substantial topics. 
Through this engagement, this book is a contribution to the 
debate between so called Eastern and Western philosophy. While it 
is a debate between authors, some of whom stand in the tradition 
of Chinese philosophy, some of whom have a strong background 
in European philosophy, in contrast to similar projects, we chose 
an authentically Chinese position as a starting point for this de-
bate. We invited Guo Yi to provide one of his texts, in this case an 
introduction to his own concept and theory of “Daoic Philosophy”, 
and invited selected scholars with a strong record in the classical 
tradition of European philosophy: ancient, medieval, and modern, 
to a conference to respond to Guo Yi’s theses. The book is based 
on the papers presented at this conference and the discussions they 
provoked. Many of the participants, while having a strong expertise 
in the traditions of Western culture were encountering a radically 
different tradition of thought for the first time. The inclusion of 
such participants was deliberate. The aim was to initiate a debate 
on topics that are substantial to both traditions, and in doing so, 
to initiate an international and intercultural philosophical dialogue 
that could include those who are not experts in both Western and 
Chinese philosophy. We hope that such a dialogue will generate and 
develop a specific form of global philosophy that goes beyond com-
parativism, a global philosophy that is rooted in the whole history of 
philosophy, not just European philosophy, but at the same time is 
productive, opening new vistas for philosophy, civilization and for 
the future of humanity. 
A project that claims to be open to such an intercultural en-
counter must first of all be open to the topics and methods that are 
important in unfamiliar traditions. An international and intercul-
tural conference that claimed to take the Chinese tradition seriously 
while insisting on the “current standards of philosophy” according to 
which subjects and methods that are crucial to the Chinese scholars 
are disqualified, would fail to advance intercultural philosophy. Yet 
in the past, such prejudice was common. European philosophers 
used to acknowledge that China and India have substantial cultural 
histories of their own, but from a standpoint that can be classified 
as Euro-chauvinistic, they did not acknowledge that these traditions 
are qualified to be recognized as philosophy. 
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The global world has changed, however, and this challenges the way phi-
losophy has traditionally been understood. Chinese and Indian scholars 
especially have refused to acknowledge the claim often raised by Euro-
pean philosophers, typically those in the Heideggerian tradition, that 
philosophy is originally rooted in the Greek language and culture and 
that it therefore represents an exclusively European cultural phenom-
enon, transmitted to other cultures by European philosophers. These 
Heideggerians have claimed, with little justification, that German lan-
guage provides a privileged vocabulary to uphold and continue this origi-
nally Greek tradition. Of course this is nonsense. India and China do 
have strong and substantial traditions of philosophy. A possible reason 
for the incapacity to understand the philosophical quality of classical 
Chinese authors might be that their works have been transmitted to us 
by sinologists and not by philosophers. Consequently, the philosophical 
qualities of these texts were not understood and represented adequately. 
Sinologists were able to read, translate and analyse the cultural signifi-
cance and relevance of classical Chinese texts, but they were rarely suf-
ficiently qualified to raise profound philosophical questions and apply 
philosophical methods to the analysis of the philosophical content of 
these texts. As a result, the Western world acknowledged the quality of 
Chinese cultural history but refused to recognize its philosophical sig-
nificance. At this conference, Guo Yi and Chung-ying Cheng introduced 
some of the philosophical aspects of Chinese traditions of thought. 
We acknowledge there is a major problem in any attempt to engage 
in a dialogue between Chinese and European philosophers in the lack 
of knowledge of the philosophical literature of the other tradition. In 
the Western world most influential philosophers have at best a marginal 
knowledge of Chinese philosophy. It is widely believed that a school of 
Confucianism has competed with Daoism and Buddhism, and Western-
ers might know of classical authors such as Meng Zi, Zhu Xi and Wang 
Yangming; but that is about all. And it is because Western philosophers 
do not know more that, even when sympathetic to Chinese culture, they 
are unable to appreciate the subtleties of these Chinese traditions. Guo 
Yi’s text provides some indication of how much more there is to dis-
cover and, what seems even more striking, shows that there is a specific 
development of the principles of Chinese philosophy with roots in the 
culture of the ancient Zhou Dynasty. With the development of Confucian 
philosophy Chinese philosophy evolved from the unity of the Rituals (li) 
and Commiseration (ren) to Meng Zi’s synthesis of the Four Beginnings 
(ren, yi, li, zhi); but this was only one of a range of developments in an-
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cient Chinese philosophy. Subsequently there was a long and complex 
historical development of ideas up to the work of the philosophers of the 
Qing dynasty. Guo Yi informs us of the specific history and relevance of 
the concept “Dao”. In the West it is assumed that this represents a spe-
cific aspect of so-called “Daoism”. Guo Yi demonstrates that this concept 
is also central to Confucius’ philosophy, although in this context it has 
a specific meaning. In Chung-ying Cheng’s contribution to this book 
we find a specific theory based on classical Chinese philosophy that of-
fers solutions to some highly controversial areas of recent philosophical 
debate in the West such as the Goodman’s new riddle of induction, the 
Gettier problem, and anomalous monism. 
A major challenge for any effort to develop an East West dialogue on 
philosophy is the problem of translating the original texts. As with most 
philosophers, the authors represented in this book have assumed that the 
ability to read a text in its original language is not only very helpful but 
even a necessity for fully understanding its true philosophical substance. 
But only few of the non-Chinese authors can speak or read Chinese. 
In fact, very few if any influential philosophers in the Western World 
speak Chinese, while most experts in classical Chinese philosophy do 
not speak English, German or French. The difficulty of understanding 
philosophical works written in Chinese is far greater for Western phi-
losophers than understanding any European language, whether modern 
or ancient. There are many different versions of Chinese: Mandarin, 
Min, Yue and Wu, yet they are all written in the same script. Chinese is 
ideographic, not phonetic, and not only does it not correspond to any of 
these versions of the language; there is a great difference in the gram-
mar and vocabulary between written texts and spoken language. While 
there has not been the major break in the evolution of Chinese language 
as occurred in Europe with the collapse of Roman civilization and then 
the overthrow of medieval society, Chinese has evolved throughout its 
history from archaic inscriptions on oracle bones, the literary language 
of the Zhou Dynasty sages, the language of Tang and Song poets and 
the vernacular language of classical novelists and modern literature. And 
there has been a break of kinds, and this occurred fairly recently. At the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century a successful effort was made to nar-
row the gap between written language and the “plain speech” (bai hua) of 
everyday life, breaking the monopoly of and subsequently marginalising 
“cultural language” (wen yan). The written form of plain language which 
originated in and had evolved from the twelfth century onwards in novels 
and folk opera, but looked down upon by the literati, was privileged and 
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eclipsed the cultural language of the classic philosophical texts. Cultural 
language is now the preserve of specialists. It is a challenge to even native 
Chinese speakers to comprehend these texts. 
We have not been deterred by this challenge, however. The difficulty 
of dealing with the immense problem of translating and interpreting 
Chinese texts has revealed the limitations of even the most profound 
of previous work on the problem of translation; and it has generated a 
creative response. Understanding ancient Chinese texts involves more 
than bringing to consciousness tacitly held prejudices, as suggested by 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics. To comprehend the efforts of people over mil-
lennia to make sense of the world and our place within it, work out how 
to live and to communicate in a very different context and with very dif-
ferent social conditions, institutions and histories to our own demands 
a great deal of imaginative and creative work. A genuinely productive 
engagement between such radically different traditions requires the de-
velopment of new ways of thinking through which both these Chinese 
texts and Western philosophy and culture can be interpreted in relation 
to each other. This engagement with Chinese texts by Western philoso-
phers thereby involves engaging in and developing a global dialogue 
that is generating a new global philosophy. Just as the contributors to 
this dialogue are presently rooted in their own educational backgrounds, 
such a global philosophy will be rooted in a variety of traditions and 
thereby create a new tradition encompassing all these traditions. We do 
not want to translate. We prefer to create. And since we are engaged in a 
philosophical debate, we intend to create philosophy.
Arran Gare and Sasa Josifovic

GUO Y I  ( SEOUL/BE I J ING) 
METAPHYSICS, NATURE AND MIND
The Main Idea of Daoic Philosophy
INTRODUCT ION
Since the 19th century, both Chinese and Western philosophies have suf-
fered under the impact of modernization and capitalism. The reason 
is that the character of traditional philosophies and that of modernity 
are incompatible with each other. What is the character of traditional 
philosophies and modernity? In a nutshell, if we can say modernity is 
rational, traditional philosophies appear more value-oriented.
Chinese philosophy is primarily concerned with society and people. 
Since its beginning, it has focused on the value and meaning of life. 
Although Chinese philosophy pays attention to knowledge, the aspect of 
knowledge it discusses is the knowledge of virtue. Virtue and the know-
ledge of virtue were addressed as “honoring virtue” (zun de xing 尊德性) 
whereas “following the path of study and inquiry” (dao wen xue 道问学) 
was dealt with separately by ancient Chinese philosophers. Generally 
speaking, what they called knowledge, learning, “following the path of 
study and inquiry” and so on belonged to the study of the knowledge of 
virtue. As the knowledge of natural science, it consisted merely of in-
significant “minor skills”. Therefore, Chinese philosophy is the philoso-
phy of virtue. Influenced by this philosophy of virtue, ancient Chinese 
people did not pay enough attention to natural science, so it was not 
brought into the national education system. From this perspective, it 
is inevitable that capitalism and modernization has not derived from 
Chinese culture itself. 
In Western culture, the original meaning of philosophy is “love of 
wisdom”. This confirms that since the very beginning, Western phi-
losophy was interested in knowledge. Despite this, the key issues in 
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traditional Western philosophy before Kant and traditional Chinese phi-
losophy are very similar. But since modern times, Western philosophers 
have been chiefly concerned with the world of knowledge and have taken 
knowledge as their highest goal. The maxim of Bacon that “knowledge 
is power” has become a symbolic slogan. The knowledge in question is 
natural knowledge; the rationality they revered is instrumental rational-
ity. Meanwhile value left quietly, so that it is not accidental that capital-
ism and modernization derived from western culture. 
We should point out that modernization has brought to our time not 
only dramatic changes and previously unknown material pleasures, but 
also the pollution of the environment, the clash of civilizations and the 
decline of value. At the same time, Modern Philosophy, infiltrated by 
modernity, has lost its way. 
The crisis of humanity and philosophy compels us to rethink, re-
choose and set sail once more. Let us come back to humanity itself. We 
should remember that, as Kant said: “man and generally any rational 
being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily 
used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern him-
self or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as 
an end.”1 All activities of man are for man himself. As a highly intellectual 
activity, Philosophy is not an exception. Therefore, in any reasonable 
philosophical system, a theory of value should occupy the dominant and 
central position, and a theory of knowledge a subordinate position. The 
former is the end, and the latter is the means to realize the former. 
The crisis of humanity and Philosophy is the crisis of value. This 
means there is a need to fortify value in an era of knowledge explosion 
and to rebuild a spiritual home for human beings.
Thus, we need a clear understanding of the defects and tasks of Chi-
nese and Western philosophies. The major flaw of Chinese philosophy 
is the absence of a theory of knowledge, while the major flaw of Western 
philosophy is the breakdown of its theory of value. Therefore the chal-
lenge for Chinese philosophy is to construct a theory of knowledge to 
support its theory of value. The challenge for Western philosophy is to 
reconstruct its theory of value to govern its theory of knowledge. In the 
foreseeable future, world philosophy needs a new philosophical system 
1 Kant, Immanuel, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Great 
Books of the Modern World, 2nd Ed., Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 42, 1952, 
271.
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that places its theory of value in the lead role and its theory of knowledge 
in a supporting role.
This paper tries to move in this direction, taking Chinese philoso-
phy as a starting point. First, we should adopt a correct attitude forward 
metaphysics. metaphysics is the lifeblood of philosophy. Since Aristotle, 
metaphysics has been called the first philosophy. It is obvious that meta-
physics has occupied an important position in western philosophy. But 
in modern times, western philosophy had changed its direction. Follow-
ing the prevalence of the trends of thought such as analytical philosophy, 
Postmodernism, and so on, western philosophy began to turn away from 
metaphysics to concrete science, from substance to phenomenon, from 
the a priori to experience. 
This anti-metaphysics movement is so strong that it has become 
something like the mainstream of philosophy today. Does it really rep-
resent the orientation of future philosophy? According to Stephen Haw-
king, “The people whose business it is to ask why, the philosophers, 
have not been able to keep up with the advance of scientific theories. 
In the eighteenth century, philosophers considered the whole of human 
knowledge, including science, to be their field and discussed questions 
such as: did the universe have a beginning? However, in the 19th and 
20th centuries, science became too technical and mathematical for the 
philosophers, or anyone else except a few specialists. Philosophers re-
duced the scope of their inquiries so much that Wittgenstein, the most 
famous philosopher of this century, said, ‘The sole remaining task for 
Philosophy is the analysis of language.’ What a comedown from the great 
tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to Kant!”2
This anti-metaphysics movement means a comedown from the tra-
dition of philosophy because it changed the nature of philosophy. As a 
matter of fact, this was not accidental. The separation between substance 
and phenomenon is a basic characteristic and also a key limitation of tra-
ditional western metaphysics. It has resulted in the decline of traditional 
western metaphysics. It requires us not to throw metaphysics away, but 
to reform and even to rebuild it. From the point of view of history, it is 
likely that the anti-metaphysics movement will be merely a transition 
period in the whole history of the development of philosophy. Philosophy 
eventually will come back to the track of metaphysics. 
2 Hawking, Stephen, A Brief History of Time, Bantam Dell Publishing 
Group, New York, 1988, 164.
18
Metaphysics also is the foundation and core of Chinese philosophy. I ar-
gue that the traditional Chinese metaphysics concerns itself with three 
levels, namely ontology, human nature and the human mind. Since mod-
ern times, under the influence of western philosophy, Chinese metaphys-
ics was discarded. 
This is the time to reconsider traditional Chinese metaphysics. In 
my view, this metaphysical system has none of the aforementioned draw-
backs of Western philosophy, moreover it could rectify these drawbacks. 
Developing the theories of life, ethics, society and politics by con-
structing or revising metaphysics is a fundamental method in Chinese 
philosophy, including Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism.
An important characteristic of Chinese metaphysics is the combina-
tion of cosmology and ontology. Cosmology is the theory of the origin 
and evolution of the universe. Ontology is the study of the source, nature 
and structure of the world. On the philosophical level, the categories of 
universe and world correspond with each other, so that the objects of 
cosmology and ontology are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, to 
understand the source of the world, the nature of the myriad things and 
the order of society by exploring the origin of the universe is the most 
fundamental and solid way to construct Metaphysics. This is the great 
wisdom of Chinese philosophy and it is worth imitating. 
1 . THE  SPHERE  OF  DAO  —  WHERE  WE  COME  FROM
1 . 1  THE  B IG  BANG  THEORY  AND  THE   PH I LOSOPH ICAL 
COSMOLOGY  IN  ANC IENT  CH INA
In the past, people knew little about the immense universe, and phi-
losophers established their cosmologies based on limited astronomical 
knowledge and their insight into the nature and the universe. Up to 
now, cosmogony has made marked progress and become a notable form 
of learning and it is indispensable a solid foundation for constructing 
a contemporary metaphysics. If Laozi, Confucius, Zhu Xi, Aristotle, 
and Kant lived today, they could not ignore the achievement of modern 
 cosmogony. 
By now, the Big Bang Theory is well-known and has been broadly 
accepted. According to this theory, the universe originated from a sin-
gle point. 14 billion years ago, this single point exploded and expanded 
rapidly and produced the universe. What will be the final stage of the 
universe? Scientists believe that the universe does not expand in an 
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unlimited way. When the expansion stops, as the gravity of its galaxies 
causes the universe to collapse and condense, all galaxies will assem-
ble closer and closer, until finally the universe becomes a single, high- 
density point. Then, this point will explode again and produce a new 
universe. 
Cosmology in ancient China could be divided into two branches, 
namely astronomical cosmology and philosophical cosmology. The for-
mer explored the physical universe and is beyond our discussion; the 
latter was more concerned with the ontological world aside from the 
exploration of the physical universe. While the ancient philosophers un-
doubtedly could not imagine the development of modern cosmogony 
described above, it is nonetheless striking that the cosmological models 
they established are very similar. 
The philosophical cosmology in ancient China could be divided into 
three cosmological models. The first one holds that the universe was 
formed from an original spot, and the myriad things were produced by 
the original spot. The recently excavated Guodian bamboo text Laozi, 
which could have been written by Lao Dan 老聃 in late Spring and Au-
tumn period, represents this model: “there was a state which formed cha-
otically. It existed before the sky and the earth. It is quiet, independent, 
and never changes its nature. It may be considered the mother of the 
myriad things. No one knows its name. I call it Dao. If forced to give it a 
name, I will call it the Great. The Great begins to depart, and then it be-
comes further and further away, and then returns to the original point.” 
Apparently, the Dao that existed before the sky and the earth, and 
was the mother of the myriad things, was the original point of the uni-
verse. It was not a concrete thing but a chaotic state. Since it produced 
the myriad things, it was certainly great, and therefore it deserved to be 
called the Great. The paragraph “The Great begins to depart, and then 
it becomes further and further away, and then returns to the original 
point” describes the evolutive process of the universe. Thus, we can see 
an analogy between the following concepts: we can compare “the Great 
begins to depart” with the process of the Big Bang, “then it becomes fur-
ther and further away” with the expansion of the universe, “then returns 
to the original point” with the collapse and contraction of the universe. 
The second cosmological model not only holds that the universe 
came from an original point, but also explores the matrix that produced 
the original point, consequently leading us into a transcendent and abso-
lute world. For instance, the most accepted version of Laozi which could 
been written by Taishi Dan 太史儋 based on Lao Dan’s text in Warring 
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States period said, “Dao produced the One, the One produced the Two, 
the Two produced the Three, The Three produced the myriad things. 
The myriad things carry the yin and embrace the yang, and through the 
quiet and peaceful Qi, they achieve harmony.”3 From the process from 
Dao to The One, The Two, the Three and the myriad things, we can 
say The One is the producer of the universe, or the original point of the 
universe. It merits attention that as the producer of the universe, The 
One was produced by Dao. Therefore Taishi Dan finds the ultimate basis 
for the original point is Dao. That means the Dao of Taishi Dan differs 
from the Dao of Lao Dan. The latter is the original point of the universe, 
while the former is the transcendent and absolute world of the producer 
of the original point. 
When we talk about cosmology in ancient China, we can always 
remember a paragraph in Xici 系辞, in a section of the Yi Zhuan 易传 (or 
The Commentaries on the Book of Changes): “in the sphere of Yi 易4 there 
is Taiji 太极 (or the Great Ultimate). It generates the Two Forms (yin 
and yang). The Two Forms generate the Four Forms (major and minor 
yin and yang). The Four Forms generate the Eight Trigrams. The Eight 
Trigrams determine good and evil fortunes and good and evil fortunes 
produce the great enterprise.”5 The Eight Trigrams correspond to eight 
cosmological elements, including the sky, the earth, thunder, wind, wa-
ter, fire, mountain and marsh. According to the results of my research, 
the section Xici represents the learning of late Confucius. 
Here Yi is the transcendent and absolute world and it corresponds 
to Dao of Taishi Dan. The character “Ji 极” in “Taiji 太极” has the mean-
ing of the topmost point. Therefore “Taiji” corresponds to “the One” in 
Taishi Dan’s saying “Dao produced the One” and should be the original 
point of the universe. But from the sentence “in the sphere of Yi there is 
Taiji (or the Great Ultimate)”, we do not know if Yi produced Taiji or not. 
This sentence may have two meanings. On the one hand, Yi contains 
Taiji; on the other hand, Taiji and Yi exist simultaneously and they are 
not related in the sense of “production” or “was produced”. This is the 
third cosmological model. 
3 Laozi, ch. 42, Chan, Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princ-
eton, 1969, 160. 
4 “Yi 易” generally has been translated as “change”. But I do not think this 
is a proper translation. 
5 The Commentaries on the Book of Changes, Chan, Wing-tsit, A Source Book 
in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton, 1969, 262 (with change of first sentence). 
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Like the Big Bang Theory, the above philosophical cosmologies in an-
cient China hold that the universe comes from an original point and 
undergoes a process of development or expansion.
Are these similarities coincidence or the result of a forced interpre-
tation? I believe they are neither. They are the result of the similarity 
between the process of generation and development of the universe and 
of the myriad things. Georges Lemaître, who advocated the Big Bang 
Theory first compared the process of the universe expanding from the 
“primeval atom” to the process of a big oak tree growing from a small 
acorn. As a matter of fact, everything goes through a similar process. 
The philosophers in ancient China just constructed their cosmological 
models based on their observations of the generation and growth process 
of the myriad things. Therefore they could deduce cosmological models 
similar to the Big Bang model from studying the phenomenon of myriad 
things. 
What about the inner connection between the single point as the 
“original atom” and the myriad things? Modern biology proved that par-
ents’ genes could be inherited by their children, and most members of 
an ethnic group carry the same genes. Based on this, we can conclude 
that as the mother of the universe, the single point must contain all basic 
information, and all things carry the original information of the single 
point. This is the way of thinking of philosophers in ancient time. They 
believed that in the process of producing, the producer gave its own 
nature to the myriad things. For instance, the received version of Laozi 
said, “When the uncarved wood is broken up, it is turned into concrete 
things.”6 That means when the One is broken up, it is transformed into 
the myriad things. Furthermore, Laozi compares the relation between 
Dao or the One and the myriad things to the one between a mother and 
her children, “There was the beginning of the myriad things. Which may 
considered as the mother of the myriad things. He who has found the 
mother, can thereby understand her children.”7
In summary, philosophical cosmology was very vital in ancient 
China. The metaphysics on which it is based combines cosmology and 
ontology into one and so may be used as a model for revising modern 
philosophy. 
6 Laozi, ch. 28, ibid., 154.
7 Laozi, ch. 52, translated by the author.
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1 .2  THE  COMPOS I T ION  OF  DAO
Following traditional Chinese metaphysics, I would like to reconstruct 
metaphysics into three parts or spheres, namely daoti 道体 (or the sphere 
of Dao), xingti 性体 (or the sphere of nature) and xingti 心体 (or the 
sphere of mind).
What kind of concepts could be used to name the origin of the 
universe and the root of the world? The ancient people believe that the 
myriad things were produced by “Tian” (or sky), so that Tian became the 
earliest concept to name the origin of the universe. As aforementioned, 
at the end of Spring-Autumn period, Laozi and Confucius put forward 
the more philosophical concepts “Dao” and “Yi” to name it separately. 
But from the Warring States period to the Tang dynasty, Confucians 
continued using “Tian” as the original and ontological concept. Since the 
Wei and Jin dynasties, influenced by the prosperous Neo-Daoism, the 
concept “Dao” was accepted by more and more scholars; even the Neo-
Confucians in the Song and Ming dynasties talked about the concept 
“Daoti” (or “the sphere of Dao”). Here I prefer to use “Dao” to name the 
origin of the universe and the root of the world. Thus the new philoso-
phy and metaphysics I will discuss could be called “Daoic philosophy” 
and “Daoic metaphysics”. 
“Daoic philosophy” and “Daoic metaphysics” are different to “Dao-
ist philosophy” and “Daoist metaphysics”, because they integrate and go 
beyond the ideas of Dao in both Daoism and Confucianism. They differ 
from the terms “philosophy of Dao” and “metaphysics of Dao”, since they 
are not constructed for Dao, but are constructed based on Dao. 
The sphere of Dao is a transcendent and absolute world. It is the 
origin of the universe, the root of the world and the mother of the myriad 
things. It is an absolute “great whole” 大全, boundless, ceaseless, all-
embracing, without beginning or end. 
Although ancient philosophers have put forward various concepts 
to refer to the origin of the universe and the root of the world, they have 
not distinguished between their components. It seems to me the sphere 
of Dao is formed by three fundamental elements, namely zhi 值, li 理 
and qi 气. Zhi 值 is the locus of value and meaning. Qi 气 is the locus of 
energy and matter. Li 理 is the locus of form, reason, law and principle. 
Among them, li has no own body. It exists in zhi and qi, so that there are 
two kinds of li. One exists in zhi and could be named as zhili 值理 (or 
the law of value). Another exists in qi and could be named as qili 气理 
(or the law of matter). 
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Zhi, qi and li have different properties. Zhi is absolutely true, good and 
beautiful, or purely true, good and beautiful. Qi itself cannot be desig-
nated as true, good and beautiful, or false, evil and ugly, but it contains 
the tendency or possibility of both. Li itself also cannot be designated as 
true, good and beautiful, or false, evil and ugly, but may have both the 
li (law, form and reason) of truth, good and beauty and the li of false-
hood, evil and ugliness. It is both the root of the highest virtues and the 
source of all evils. 
The different properties of zhi, qi, and li determine their different 
positions in the sphere of Dao. It is evident that zhi is the highest ele-
ment, qi is the lowest, and li is between them.
Dao has ten characteristics, namely heng 恒 (or eternal), pu 朴 (or 
plain), jing 静 (or quiet), xu 虚 (or vacuous), du 独 (or independent), 
cheng 诚 (or factuality), he 和 (or harmonious), sheng 生 (or productive), 
ren 仁 (or benevolent), yi 易 (or change). The general property of them is 
heng (or eternal). They together are called shi de 十德 (or “the ten char-
acteristics”). 
1 .3  FROM WUJ I  (OR  THE  NON-ULT IMATE )  TO 
TA I J I  (OR  THE  GREAT  ULT IMATE )
In the sphere of Dao, zhi 值, li 理 and qi 气 are eternal. They are the thing-
in-itself. So they could be called respectively hengzhi 恒值 (or the eternal 
value), hengli 恒理 (or the eternal reason), and hengqi 恒气 (or the eternal 
matter-energy). This state of Dao is wuji 无极 (or the Non-ultimate). 
“Dao is the mother of the myriad things” is a sweeping phrase, but 
only a metaphor. The immediate origin of the universe is Taiji (or the 
Great Ultimate) which scientists called the single point. So we can say 
that, while Dao is a the mother, Taiji (or the Great Ultimate) is her ovum 
and the universe is her child that came from the ovum. 
In the sphere of Dao, is the Great Ultimate (the single point) unique, 
or does it have companions? We can’t give a definite answer to this 
question. If there are innumerable Great Ultimate (single points) in the 
sphere of Dao, so every one of them could produce a universe, Dao would 
be like a super universe or super mother. 
When the eternal value, the eternal reason, the eternal matter-energy 
come together, they form Taiji 太极 (or the Great Ultimate). This is the 
single point and the direct producer of the universe. 
The eternal value, the eternal reason and the eternal matter-energy 
in Taiji could be called taizhi 太值 (or the primeval value), taili 太理 (or 
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the primeval reason) and taiqi 太气 (or the primeval matter-energy) re-
spectively. Taizhi and taili are in taiqi, and not separate from taiqi.
Inasmuch as Taiqi is one kind of matter-energy, it is a limited being, 
and this determines that taizhi and taili, which contains taiqi, are also 
limited. Therefore when we say the eternal value, the eternal reason and 
eternal matter-energy come together and form Taiji, it does not mean 
Taiji (or the Great Ultimate, the single point) carries the complete infor-
mation of Dao. In other words, Taiji as the producer of Dao is limited. 
This limitation appears in all of the components of Taiji including taizhi, 
taili and taiqi. 
1 .4  TA I J I  (OR THE  GREAT  ULT IMATE)  PRODUCES THE  MYRIAD THINGS
As for the process by which Taiji (or the Great Ultimate) produces the 
universe and the myriad things, I accept Zhou Dunyi’s8 idea in his work 
An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate: “The Great Ultimate 
through movement generates yang. When its activity reaches its limit, it 
becomes tranquil. Through tranquility the Great Ultimate generates yin. 
When tranquility reaches its limit, activity begins again. So movement 
and tranquility alternate and become the root of each other, giving rise 
to the distinction between yin and yang, and the two modes are thus es-
tablished. By the transformation of yang and its union with yin, the Five 
Agents of Water, Fire, Wood, Metal, and Earth arise. When these five 
material forces (qi) are distributed in harmonious order, the four seasons 
run their course. The Five Agents constitute one system of yin and yang, 
and yin and yang constitute one Great Ultimate. The Great Ultimate is 
fundamentally the Non-ultimate. The Five Agents arise, each with its 
specific nature. When the reality of the Non-ultimate and the essence of 
yin, yang, and the Five Agents come into mysterious union, integration 
ensues. Qian (Heaven) constitutes the male element, and Kun (Earth) 
constitutes the female element. The interaction of these two material 
forces engenders and transforms the myriad things. The myriad things 
produce and reproduce, resulting in an unending transformation.”9 
Of course this is not a scientific statement, but a philosophical ex-
pression. In it, Taiji (or the Great Ultimate), corresponds to the single 
point; the Five Agents of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth correspond 
to the elementary particles and various cosmological materials after the 
8 Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), a philosopher in North Song Dynasty. 
9 Zhou Dunyi, An Explanation of the Diagram of the Ultimate, Chan, Wing-
tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton, 1969, 463.
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Big Bang; and the process of the Great Ultimate producing the myriad 
things corresponds to the whole history of the evolution of the universe. 
The only absolutely eternal one is Dao. Taiji (or the Great Ultimate) 
has a beginning and an end. The universe that Taiji produced is also lim-
ited, and will experience a process from generation to growth to death. 
When Taiji (or the Great Ultimate) evolved and became the universe, 
it existed in the universe and the myriad things. So Taiji (or the Great 
Ultimate) could be divided into two levels. One is the producer, which 
could be called the original Great Ultimate, and another is the Taiji 
which was in the myriad things, and could be called the secondary Great 
Ultimate. From the view point of modern science, the so-called original 
Great Ultimate is the single point, and secondary Great Ultimate is the 
primeval information with which the myriad things were endowed from 
that single point. 
Because the Great Ultimate is the product of Dao, when the single 
point evolved into the universe, (or the original Great Ultimate) evolved 
into the secondary Great Ultimate, Dao itself ran through the myriad 
things. 
The secondary Great Ultimate is xing 性 (or the nature) of the myriad 
things. Since the Great Ultimate was formed by zhi, li and qi, xing (or 
nature) as the secondary Great Ultimate could be also divided into three 
kinds, namely the nature of zhi 值之性 (or the value-nature), the nature 
of li 理之性 (or the reason-nature), and the nature of qi 气之性(or the 
physical nature). 
As embodiment of Dao, on the one hand, Taiji is the source of the 
universe, so that it is transcendent and a priori. On the other hand, it 
runs through the myriad things, so that it is internal and experiential. 
As the relation between Taiji and Dao, we can say Dao is transcendent 
and also internal, a priori and also experiential. 
26
Fig. 1 The diagram of Dao generating myriad things
Dao (Non-ultimate)
Dao generates the One (from Non-ultimate to the Great Ultimate)
The One generates the Two (the Great Ultimate generates the two forms)
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hengqihengli
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Five Agents arise
The myriad things were generated
 
 
2 . THE  SPHERE  OF  X ING  (OR  NATURE )  —  WHO WE  ARE
2 . 1  THE  D I F FERENCE  BETWEEN  THE  NATURE  OF  MAN  
AND  THE  NATURE  OF  TH INGS
When we say everything has a Great Ultimate, does it mean the nature 
of the myriad things is the same? Let us examine physical nature first. 
Physical nature, which the myriad things inherited from Taiqi, is en-
ergy and matter, since Taiqi is energy and matter in Taiji. As energy and 
matter, it is partial and limited. As the myriad things inherit their own 
qi from Taiqi in thousands of ways, the physical nature in the myriad 
things is different in thousands of ways. 
As early as the late Warring States period (475–221 B. C.), discussing 
the differences between the myriad things, Xunzi explained, “Water and 
Earth
Wood
Water
Metal
Fire
zhi xing
qixinglixing
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fire have qi but not life, plants have life but not awareness, animals have 
awareness but not the consciousness of yi (or justice). Man has all of qi, 
life, awareness and the consciousness of justice.”10 Here Xunzi divided 
the myriad things into four groups. We can name them respectively as 
that with qi, that with life, that with awareness and that with the con-
sciousness of justice. 
Generally speaking, the so-called xing (or nature) is the totality of 
the properties a thing possesses. The property or properties that repre-
sent the essence of one kind of thing may be called its essential nature. 
The other property or properties may be called its non-essential nature. 
The essential nature of something with life (a plant) is manifest in its 
life. The essential nature of something with awareness (an animal) is 
manifest in its animal mind. The essential nature of something with a 
consciousness of justice (a man) is manifest in the human mind. One 
must even say that different types of properties define the nature of dif-
ferent kinds of things. Non-living is the nature of a thing that has qi, 
living is the nature of a thing that has life. An animal mind is the nature 
of a thing that has awareness, a human mind is the nature of a thing 
that has the consciousness of justice. Therefore animal mind is animal 
nature, human mind is human nature, mind is nature. 
Since mind is nature, can there be any difference between them? It 
seems to me that they are definitions of the same thing from different 
sides. Nature is the definition from the perspective of innate endow-
ment and objectivity, while mind is the definition from the perspective 
of subjectivity. The fundamental difference between the mind as nature 
and other things rests with fact that the former has awareness. 
Does everything among myriad things have value-nature? Is the 
value-nature of the myriad things same? There were three opinions 
about this question. First, Laozi, and later Confucius and Zisi all held 
that everything among the myriad things has a nature, but they did not 
specify whether the value-nature of the myriad things was the same or 
not. Second, from Mencius’ point of view, the term “nature” is value-
nature, he called it “the Four Beginnings”: “A man without the feeling 
of commiseration is not a man; a man without the feeling of shame and 
dislike is not a man; a man without the feeling of difference and compli-
ance is not a man; and a man without the feeling of right and wrong is 
not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity; 
10 Xunzi, ch. 9, translated by the author. 
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the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the 
feeling of difference and compliance is the beginning of propriety; and 
the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Men have 
these Four Beginnings just as they have their four limbs.”11 That means 
only human beings have nature in the world. Third, Zhu Xi believed 
that every one of the myriad things has value-nature, humans have a 
complete value-nature, but things only have a partial value-nature. He 
said, “With respect to qi (or material force), human beings and things 
do not seem to differ in consciousness and movement, but in respect to 
li (or principle), the endowment of humanity, righteousness, propriety, 
and wisdom are necessarily imperfect in things.”12 Furthermore, Zhu Xi 
argued that different things have different endowments: “When human 
beings and things were born or produced, li (or principle) which was en-
dowed by Tian (or Heaven) in them is not different, but what they have 
received from Heaven is different. This is just like if you take water from 
a river. If you use a spoon to take water from the river, you will only get a 
spoonful of water, if you use a bowl you will only get a bowlful, if you use 
a pail or a vat you will get a pailful or a vatful. According to the different 
capacity human beings and things receive different amounts of principle, 
like the different containers hold the different amount of water.”13
From my point of view, qi is the decisive element for the nature of 
the myriad things. The difference between physical nature determines 
differences of value-nature and reason-nature. Among the four elements 
Xunzi used to distinguish the myriad things, qi, life and awareness are 
not value, only the consciousness of justice refers to value. That means 
in Xunzi’s view, only human beings could find value. This is very close 
to Mencius’ idea above that only men have nature — for Mencius, only 
the Four Beginnings are nature. In conclusion, despite the fact all myriad 
things have physical nature, only men have value-nature.
It should be acknowledged that all things with life (a plant), things 
with awareness (an animal) the things with consciousness of justice (a 
man) evolved from things with qi (non-living materials such as water 
and fire). That is to say, life, animal mind and human mind are the result 
of the evolution of things with qi over a long history. On this point, we 
have to say things with qi already possess the seed of value-nature, lives 
11 Mencius, 2A:6, Chan, Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 
Princeton, 1969, 65.
12 Zhu Xi, Mengzi Jizhu, ch. 1, commenting on Mencius, 6A:3, ibid., 622.
13 Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Yulei, translated by the author, ch. 4.
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of things with life have the sprout of value-nature, and the awareness 
of things with awareness have the seedlings of value-nature. But, at any 
rate, all the seeds, sprouts and seedlings of value-nature are not real val-
ue-nature, just as rice comes out of the rice stalk, but the stalk is not rice. 
As li has been divided into the two kinds of zhili (or the law of value) 
and qili (or the law of matter), so too the nature of li (or the reason-
nature) should be correspondingly divided into two kinds, namely zhili 
xing 值理性 (or the reason-nature of value) and qili xing 气理性 (or the 
reason-nature of matter). Thus the difference between physical nature 
and value-nature among the myriad things determines the difference 
between their reason-natures. Things with qi, things with life, things 
with awareness and things with consciousness of justice have their own 
reason-nature of matter, but only man as the thing with an awareness of 
justice has the reason-nature of value. 
That is to say, with respect to the reason-nature, the reason-nature 
of matter is its only reason-nature for things with qi. For things with 
life, the non-essential nature is the reason-nature of matter, while the es-
sential nature is the reason-nature of life. For the things with awareness, 
the elements of non-essential nature are the reason-nature of matter and 
the reason-nature of life, while the essential nature is the reason-nature 
of awareness. For things with consciousness of justice, the non-essential 
nature are the reason-nature of matter, the reason-nature of life, and 
the reason-nature of awareness, while the essential nature is the reason-
nature of consciousness. 
The difference between human beings and animals does not only 
manifest itself as completeness or partialness and high or lowness as al-
ready mentioned, but also in facilitation or obstruction. Facilitation and 
obstruction refer to the ability of self-realization. Animal mind lacks self-
realization, so we say animal nature tends to obstruct. The Human mind 
has strong self-realization, so we say human nature tends to facilitate. 
Here the so-called completeness and partialness, high and lowness, 
facilitation and obstruction are relative. Compared with that of animals, 
we say human nature is complete, high and unimpeded. If there was an 
extraterrestrial and it was more intelligent than human beings, we would 
say human nature is partial, low and obstructed, and animal nature is 
more partial, low and obstructed. In other words, extraterrestrials may 
have a nature higher than value-nature, one that human beings may lack. 
To sum up, in general terms, all things have their own Taiji (or Great 
Ultimate), but because the physical nature they received from the Origi-
nal Great Ultimate is different, their value-nature and reason-nature are 
GUO Y I :  METAPHYS ICS , NATURE  AND  MIND 31
also materially different. This determines the differences between the 
Great Ultimate of the myriad things. On our planet, the Great Ultimate 
of human beings is the most complete and highest, the Great Ultimate 
of animals is second, the Great Ultimate of plants is third. The Great 
Ultimate of water and fire is the most partial and low. Compared with the 
Original Great Ultimate, all the Secondary Great Ultimate, including that 
of human beings, is more partial and lower, as the qi the myriad things 
received is partial and lower. Qi is the decisive and original element 
in the nature of the myriad things, and both value-nature and reason-
nature are based on physical nature. 
Since the Original Great Ultimate received limited information from 
Dao, and the myriad things received limited information from the Origi-
nal Great Ultimate, the Dao in the myriad things is quite limited. 
2 .2  D I F FERENCES  IN  HUMAN NATURE
Since the Great Ultimate has endowed things with qi, things with life, 
things with awareness and things with consciousness of justice in such 
a varying matter, how about what the Great Ultimate has endowed each 
and every individual thing with among the same kind? Is the nature 
that each and every person received from the Great Ultimate the same 
or different? 
Confucius said, “By nature men are similar. Through practice they 
have become far apart.”14 This “nature” is physical nature. Because of 
“practice”, Confucius thinks it is not the same but similar among men. 
He distinguished the endowment of men on four levels: “Those who are 
born with knowledge are the highest type of people. Those who learn 
through study are the next. Those who learn through hard work are still 
the next. Those who work hard and still do not learn are really the lowest 
type.”15 He said again, “Only the most intelligent and the most stupid do 
not change.”16 But Mencius believed each and every person has the Four 
Beginnings and they are same among all persons. He said, “Not only do 
virtuous men have the mind of Four Beginnings, but everybody has it.” 
“The sages realize what is the same in our minds before others.”17 Here 
14 The Analects, 17:2, Chan, Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosphy, 
Princeton, 1969, 45.
15 The Analects, 16:9, ibid., 45.
16 The Analects, 17:3, ibid., 46.
17 Mencius, 6 A, ibid., 78.
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“what is the same in our minds” refers to the Four Beginnings. The Four 
Beginnings, as we mentioned, belong to value-nature. 
Influenced by both Confucius and Mencius, philosophers in the 
Song and Ming Dynasties hold that for every person, physical nature is 
different, but the nature of Heaven and Earth that corresponds to value-
nature is the same. Zhu Xi said, “The nature of all men is good, and yet 
there are those who are more good at their birth and those who are more 
evil at their birth. This is because of the difference in material force with 
which they are endowed. The revolutions of universe consist of count-
less variety and are endless. But these may be seen: if the sun and moon 
are clear and bright, and the climate temperate and seasonable, the man 
born at such a time and endowed with such material force, which is 
clear, bright, well-blended, and strong, should be a good man. But if the 
sun and moon are darkened and gloomy, and the temperature abnormal, 
all this is evidence of violent material force. There is no doubt that if a 
man is endowed with such material force, he will be a bad man.”18 In this 
paragraph, only the first sentence “the nature of all men is good” speaks 
of value-nature, all the rest talks about physical nature. 
In my opinion, qi is also the decisive and initial element for the 
nature of different individuals of the same kind. For every person, both 
value-nature and reason-nature is based on physical nature. Every per-
son inherits his or her physical nature in thousands of different ways. 
The differences between physical nature determine the differences be-
tween value-nature and reason-nature. We can use Zhu Xi’s metaphor 
about the difference between human beings and things to understand 
the differences between people: “This is just like if you take water from 
a river. If you use a spoon to take water from the river, you will only 
get a spoonful of water, if you use a bowl you will only get a bowlful, if 
you use a pail or a vat you will get a pailful or a vatful. According to the 
different capacity human beings and things receive different amounts 
of principle, like the different containers hold the different amount of 
water.” Therefore, everyone’s endowment is different. There are no two 
people completely the same in the world, just as there are no two leaves 
completely the same. 
Does this mean that some are born good, and some are born evil? 
Let us return to the different properties of zhi, qi and li to discuss 
this problem. As already mentioned, zhi is absolutely true, good and 
18 Zhuzi Yulei, chapter 4, ibid., 624. 
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beautiful. Qi itself cannot be designated as true, good and beautiful, or 
false, evil and ugly, but it contains the tendency or possibility of both 
sets of characteristics. Li itself also cannot be designated as true, good 
and beautiful, or false, evil and ugly, but with both li (law, form and 
reason) of truth, good and beauty and li of falsehood, evil and ugliness. 
Therefore, if one looks at it from the perspective of value-nature and 
the reason-nature of value, then man’s nature is absolute truth, good and 
beauty, or pure truth, good and beauty. This is the same, whether for the 
sage or ordinary person. On other hand, restrained by the “containers” of 
the physical nature, there are differences between the value-natures and 
the reason-natures of value in every person in terms of great and small, 
many and few, strong and weak. This is the difference between the sage 
and the ordinary person. So, although the nature of all people is beauti-
ful, the beauty itself can be great or small: like the beauty of a great sea, 
or rivers, or a drop of dew. 
If one looks at it from the perspective of the physical nature and the 
reason-nature of matter, although man’s nature itself has no good or 
evil, it still has the possibility of doing good or bad. On the one hand, 
everybody possesses the physical nature and the reason-nature of mat-
ter, so everybody has the possibility of doing good and evil. This is the 
same whether one is a sage or an ordinary person. Depending on this, no 
matter how intelligent a man is, he is not innately a sage. If the ordinary 
person wants to become a sage, he must do so through cultivation and 
education. Like Confucius said, “I am not one who was born with know-
ledge; I love ancient teaching and earnestly seek it.”19 On the other hand, 
physical natures and the reason-natures of men differ in thousands of 
ways, so that the possibilities of doing good and evil are different in 
thousands of ways. In the course of things, one who is endowed with 
clear qi (or material force) is most likely to do good and least likely to 
do bad, so that it is easy to become a sage for him; while the one who is 
endowed with turbid qi (or material force) is least likely to do good and 
most likely to do bad, so that it is difficult for him to become a sage. The 
great majority of ordinary people are in between. This is the difference 
between the sage and the ordinary person.
Thus, the inherent endowment itself cannot be designated as good or 
evil, but it contains the possibility of doing good and evil. Different en-
dowments play different roles in doing good and evil. Some endowments 
19 The Analects, 7:19, ibid., 32.
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easily lead to good, and some easily lead to evil. As for finally doing good 
or evil, this is decided by nurture and education. It is possible to imitate 
Wang Yangming’s “Four Sentence Teaching”20 to sum up the problem of 
good and evil in the following four sentences: 
In the original substance of nature there is no good and evil.
Being able either to do good or to do evil is the function of nature.
To tend to good or evil depends on endowment.
To do good and remove evil depends on education. 
2 .3  EXAMIN ING  THE  ARGUMENT  THAT  “X ING  IS  L I ” AND  “X IN  I S  L I ” 
FROM THE  D IST INCT ION  BETWEEN  THE   SUBJECT I VE  AND  
OBJECT I VE  M IND
Because the human mind is the bearer of human nature, we can say 
it comprises physical nature, value-nature and reason-nature. In other 
words, the mind has a Taiji (or Great Ultimate). As Taiji in the myriad 
things is nature, and the mind is the nature, so the mind itself is a Taiji. 
From the perspective of nature, the mind has physical nature, value-
nature and reason-nature. From the perspective of mind, the mind could 
be divided into three parts, namely the mind of qi 气之心 (or the physi-
cal mind), the mind of zhi 值之心 (or the value-mind) and the mind of 
li 理之心 (or the reason-mind). Among them, the mind of qi (or the phys-
ical mind) is subjective, active, and has perception. It can be called the 
subjective mind. The mind of zhi (or the value-mind) and the mind of li 
(or the reason-mind) are objective and can be called the objective mind.
During the last 800 years, the main argument in Chinese philosophy 
has been between the school of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi 程朱学派, and the 
school of Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming 陆王学派. The former believed 
that xing is li 性即理 or nature is principle, the latter believed that xin is 
li 心即理 or mind is principle. In my view, xin, xing and li are the same 
thing. There is no difference between xing is li and xin is li. 
What is the real difference between these two schools? We can say 
that the School of Cheng and Zhu 程朱 thought that the objective mind 
20 Wang Yangming (1472–1529) is a philosopher of Ming Dynasty. Here is 
his Four Sentences Teaching: “In the original substance of the mind there 
is no distinction between good and evil. When the will becomes active, 
however, such distinction exists. The faculty of innate knowledge is to 
know good and evil. The investigation of things is to do good and remove 
evil.” — Wang Yangming, Instructions for Practical Living, ibid., 686–687. 
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does not belong to mind; instead, it belongs to nature. The School of 
Lu and Wang 陆王 thought that the objective mind belongs to mind. In 
other words, Cheng and Zhu identified the objective mind as nature, 
meanwhile Lu and Wang named it mind. 
3 . THE  SPHERE  OF  X IN  (OR  M IND)  —  WHAT  WE  CAN  DO
The above discussion treated mind with respect to nature. Now let us 
focus on the subjective mind. According to the views of modern science, 
the so-called subjective mind is the brain and the whole nervous system. 
It has three basic functions, which we can express in three terms: namely 
zhi 知 (or knowing), qing 情 (or emotion) and yi 意 (or intention). 
3 . 1  ZH I 知 (OR  KNOWING)
Zhi (or knowing) is the function of the subjective mind, which is com-
prised of three forms, namely renzhi 认知 (or cognition), ganzhi 感知 (or 
sense perception), and juezhi 觉知 (or illumination). Their subjects are 
 respectively renzhi xin 认知心 (or the mind of cognition), ganzhi xin 感知心 
(or the mind of sense perception), and juezhi xin 觉知心 (or the mind of 
illumination). 
Renzhi (or cognition) is the way to know the world of li (or the world 
of form and Reason), and the way to get knowledge. Ganzhi (or sense 
perception) is the way to know the world of qi (or the physical world), and 
the way to get sensation. Juezhi (or illumination) is the way to know the 
world of zhi (or the world of value), and the way to get the value of the 
universe and the meaning of life. That means the mind of cognition 
takes li (or reason) as its object, the mind of sense perception takes qi 
(or matter) as its object, the mind of illumination takes zhi (or value) as 
its object. 
As the things with awareness (animals) and things with conscious-
ness of justice (man) among the myriad things have mind, so they are 
the only two agents of knowing. Surely their ability and level of knowing 
are different. As animals lack value-nature, they also lack the function 
of juezhi (or illumination). Because of this, an animal’s renzhi (or cogni-
tion) is limited in qili (or the law of matter). That means human beings 
uniquely have the ability of the illumination of value and the cognition 
of the law of value, while animals only have the ability of sense percep-
tion of matter and cognition of the law of matter, and its level cannot be 
said to be equal to human beings. 
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The objects of knowing are Dao and its varied existent forms including 
the Dao in oneself, in the myriad things, in the Great Ultimate and in 
the sphere of Dao. 
For subjects of knowing, to know Dao in their selves is introverted, 
to know Dao in the myriad things, in the Great Ultimate and in the 
sphere of Dao is extroverted. In other words, Dao in their selves is the 
Secondary Great Ultimate they received, and this is an internal world for 
them, while Dao in the myriad things is the Secondary Great Ultimate 
all other things received, and together with the Original Great Ultimate 
and the sphere of Dao forms the external world for them.
Originally Dao is external, but when it has been received by the 
subjects it becomes the internal world. Consistent with this, the internal 
world and the external world coincide with each other. Therefore, to 
know the internal world means to know the external world, since their 
shared object is the Great Ultimate or Dao. This is similar to the fact 
that the moon in the sky is the same moon that must be seen in rivers 
and lakes. On this issue, the school of Cheng and Zhu takes the external 
side, and believes that to investigate things is to understand the principle 
of the external things, while the school of Lu and Wang thinks that to 
investigate things is to understand your own internal mind. In fact, to 
understand the principle of the external things and to understand the 
internal mind are the same thing, and there is no essential difference 
between them. But compared with the complete and limitless Dao, the 
Secondary Great Ultimate is partial and limited, and the object of know-
ing cannot be limited in the internal world. On this point, to investigate 
the law of the external things is not necessarily the process to investigate 
the internal mind.
Considering the correlation between Dao and the myriad things, 
there are two fundamental ways to understand Dao and the nature of 
the myriad things. One is to explore the nature of the myriad things 
according to Dao, as seen above in Laozi’s saying “There was the begin-
ning of the myriad things which may be considered as the mother of the 
myriad things. He who has found the mother, may thereby understand 
her children.” Another way to search Dao is according to the nature of 
the myriad things, as Mencius said, “He who exerts his mind to the 
utmost knows his nature. He who knows his nature knows Heaven.”21 
But sometimes these two ways have been used at the same time, as 
21 Mencius, 7A:1, ibid., 78.
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Zhongyong (or The Doctrine of the Mean) said, “The Dao of the superior 
man functions everywhere and yet is hidden. Men and women of simple 
intelligence can share its knowledge; and yet in its utmost reaches, there 
is something which even the sage does not know. Men and women of 
simple intelligence can put it into practice; and yet in its utmost reaches 
there is something which even the sage is not able to put into practice. 
Great as heaven and earth are, men still find something in them with 
which to be dissatisfied. Thus with the Dao of the superior man, if one 
speaks of its smallness, nothing in the world can split it. Shijing says, 
‘The hawk flies up to sky; the fishes leap in the deep.’ This means that 
the Way should be explored from the top to the bottom, and from the 
bottom to the top. The Dao of the superior man has its simple begin-
nings in the relation between man and woman, but in its utmost reaches, 
it is clearly seen in heaven and on earth.”22
Thus we can say Dao is transcendental and also inherent, a priori 
and also empirical. We can induce an a priori world from the empirical 
world, as well as infer the empirical world from the a priori world. On 
this issue, the Western tradition maintains the opposite view. 
3 .2  Q ING 情 (OR  EMOT ION)
Qing (or emotion) is the reflection of the biological characteristics of 
human beings and animals. It is the inner object of ganzhi (or sense per-
ception). On this point, sense perception and emotion form the structure 
of sense perception-emotion. 
Emotion has three levels. The first level is natural compassion and 
mercy. The second is desire. The third is feeling. 
All these three levels belong to biological instinct. They cannot be 
designated as good or evil, but contain the principle and possibility of 
both. As a rule, the first level leads to altruism easily, the second leads to 
egoism easily, the third has no clear trend to altruism or egoism. 
3 .3  Y I 意 (OR  INTENT ION)
Yi has four connotations, namely the consciousness of the mind, the 
commander of the mind, the direction of the mind and the condition of 
the mind. 
Regarding the consciousness of the mind, Daxue (or the Great Learn-
ing) said, “When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when 
22 The Doctrine of the Mean, ibid., 100.
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knowledge is extended, the consciousness is full; when the conscious-
ness is full, the mind is rectified.” Concerning the commander of the 
mind, Xunzi said, “The mind occupies the cavity in the center to control 
the five organs. This is called the natural ruler.”23 As for the direction of 
the mind, Confucius said, “If you set your mind on humanity, you will 
be free from evil.”24 And in regard to the condition of the mind, Daxue 
(or The Great Learning) said, “Only after knowing what to abide in may 
one be calm. Only after having been calm may one be tranquil. Only 
after having achieved tranquility may one have peaceful repose. Only 
after having peaceful repose may one begin to deliberate. Only after 
deliberation can the end be attained.”25 “What is meant by saying that 
cultivation of the personal life depends on the rectification of the mind 
is that when one is affected by wrath to any extent, his mind will not be 
correct. When one is affected by fear to any extent, his mind will not be 
correct. When he is affected by fondness to any extent, his mind will not 
be correct. When he is affected by worries and anxieties, his mind will 
not be correct. When the mind is not rectified, we look but do not see, 
listen but do not hear, and eat but do not know the taste of the food.”26 
It is not difficult to see that yi (or intention) is also the commander 
of another two functions of the subjective mind namely zhi (or knowing) 
and qing (or emotion). For knowing, yi (or intention) decides its direc-
tion and extent. For qing (or emotion), yi (or intention) decides whether 
it is aroused, and whether it attains due measure and degree when it is 
aroused. 
3 .4  THE  M IND  OF  COGNI T ION  AND  THE  M IND  OF  L I FE
All of the functions of the mind belong to life experience except cogni-
tion. These functions of mind include juezhi (or illumination), ganzhi 
(or sense perception), qing (or emotion) and yi (or intention) and named 
the mind of life. 
The importance of the mind of cognition and the mind of life is 
different depending on the condition and purpose of life. The mind of 
life is the bearer of the purpose of life, but the mind of cognition is the 
means to realize the purpose of life. 
23 Xunzi, Ch. 17, On Nature, ibid., 118.
24 The Analects, 4:3, ibid., 28.
25 The Great Learning, ibid., 86.
26 Ibid., 90.
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Among the four functions of the mind of life, yi (or Intention) plays 
the role of commander, while juezhi (or illumination), ganzhi (or sense 
perception) and qing (or emotion) are the performers of the experience 
of life. So juezhi (or illumination) and the structure of sense perception-
emotion are two fundamental states of life. Since juezhi (or illumination) 
directs the world of zhi (or the world of Value), the structure of sense 
perception-emotion originates from qi and directs the world of qi. So the 
life state of juezhi (or illumination) is named value-life, and the state of 
the structure of sense perception-emotion is named biological life.
3 .5  THE  GOAL  AND  MEAN ING  OF  MYR IAD  TH INGS
The goal and meaning of the myriad things, according to ancient Chi-
nese philosophers, is to fully develop one’s nature. 
Differences in the natures of the myriad things determine differences 
in the goal and purpose of the myriad things. For every kind of thing, to 
fully develop its non-essential nature is the lower goal, and to fully de-
velop its essential nature is the higher goal. If we can say that the higher 
goal determines the meaning of things, so the meaning of plant life is 
to fully develop its vegetable life, the meaning of animal life is to fully 
develop its biological life, the meaning of man is to fully develop his or 
her value-life. The physical bodies of the above living things are merely 
the tools and means to realize their life purpose. 
Obviously, for man, value-life determines the meaning of life, since 
it is the higher state of life, but biological life is the lower state, since it 
has no value and cannot be designated as good or evil. 
It is worth pointing out that also Dao has its own goal, that is, to 
produce and help the universe and the myriad things to fully develop 
their nature. 
3 .6  THE  LEVELS  OF  THE  VALUE - L I FE  AND  THE  SPHERES  OF  L I FE
Relative to li (or the world of form and reason) as the object of cogni-
tion, qi (or the physical world) as the object of sense perception is more 
rich, vivid and varied, and zhi (or the world of value) as the object of 
illumination is the most rich, vivid and varied. There are different levels 
in the physical world and the world of value. Therefore, we can say the 
understanding of the world of form and reason is similar between differ-
ent persons, but the experience of the physical world and realization of 
the world of value are different in thousands of ways and forms various 
states of mind. 
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By illumination one can reach different levels and heights of the world 
of value, this having determined value-life itself has different levels. It 
is known that the world of value, as the object of illumination, covers 
eternal value, primeval value and value-nature (or mind), but between 
the three there is a relationship of part to whole, meaning value-nature 
is a subset of primeval value and primeval value is a subset of eternal 
value. Among these, value-nature is the value in me, it is the most direct 
object of illumination. So the primary aim of illumination is the realiza-
tion of one’s value-nature, and then, a further aim, is the realization of 
primeval value, which is the direct source of value-nature. The high-
est aim of illumination is to achieve the original state of the world of 
value, that is, being with the eternal value in the state of Non-ultimate 
of Dao, and being compatible with it, and thereby fully realizing “the ten 
characteristics” of Dao, attaining the greatest freedom, ease, happiness, 
satisfaction and peace in life. This is the peak state or peak experience 
of life. It can be said to embody life’s final meaning, to reach man’s true 
spiritual homeland. Thus, the endless pursuit of illumination is an un-
ending process of spiritual liberation. 
There are five approaches to the peak state of life: first, realization 
of the mind itself; second, cultivation of mind and body by special tech-
niques; third, morality; fourth, appreciation of beauty; fifth, the gods. 
Among them, the first is the immediate and thorough understanding 
and insight of Dao. The second through the fourth is having the aid of 
practicing special rules, morality and aestheticism respectively, but still 
based on the knowing ability of the life of mind. The fifth has the aid 
of external forces. 
Different civilizations have different emphases on these five ap-
proaches. Generally speaking, every civilization emphasizes the approach 
of aestheticism, Chinese civilization favors the first three, Indian civili-
zation inclines to the first two, Western and Islamic civilizations prefer 
the last. 
It should be pointed out that these are different approaches to the 
peak state of life, but their final goal is the same. It has been given 
different names, for instance, later in life Confucius called it Yi, other 
Confucians called it Tian (or Heaven), Taoists called it Dao, Buddhists 
called it Zhenru (or the unconditioned), Christians called it God, and 
Islamists called it Allah. 
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3 . 7  THE  CORRUPT ION  OF  VALUE - L I FE  BY   B IOLOG ICAL  L I FE  
AND  KNOWLEDGE 
For man, sometimes there is a conflict between fully developing value-
life and fully developing biological life. Moreover, the unrestrained de-
velopment of biological life can corrupt and unsettle value-life, allowing 
man to lose the goal and meaning of life. Mencius said, “one part of the 
body is noble and one is ignoble; one great and one small. We must not 
allow the ignoble to injure the noble, or the small to injure the great. 
Those who nourish the small part will become small men. Those who 
nourish the great part will become great men.”27 What is the noble and 
great part and what is the ignoble and small part? Mencius said again, 
“our senses of sight and hearing cannot think and are thereby obscured 
by material things, the material things act on the material senses and 
lead them astray. The function of the mind is to think. If we think, we 
will develop them (the natural virtues). If we do not think, we will not 
develop them. This is what Heaven has given us. If we first build up 
the noble part of our nature, then the ignoble part cannot overcome 
it. It is simply this that makes a man great.”28 It is clear that the no-
ble and great part is the value-life, the ignoble and small part is the 
biological life. 
Conflict between knowledge and value-life means the infinite devel-
opment of the mind of cognition and the infinite pursuit of knowledge 
leads to decline in the value of life. Laozi said, “The pursuit of knowledge 
increases day after day. The pursuit of Dao decreases day after day. It de-
creases and further decreases until one reaches the point of taking no ac-
tion (meaning one attains Dao). No action is undertaken, and yet noth-
ing is left undone. Abandon knowledge and there will be no sorrow.”29 
Zhuangzi said, “One who employs a machine (designed by knowledge) 
will use tricks in shortcuts and finesse. When he uses tricks in shortcuts 
and finesse, he has the idea of using tricks in his mind. When he has the 
idea of using tricks in his mind, his spirit cannot be quiet and pure. If 
his spirit cannot be quiet and pure, his nature will be not restful. If his 
nature is not restful, he cannot bear the Dao.”30 
27 Mencius, 6 A, translated by the author. 
28 Mencius, 6 A, Chan, Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 
Princeton, 1969, 59.
29 Laozi (Guodian bamboo version), translated by the author.
30 Zhuangzi, ch. 12, translated by the author.
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In summary, among the mind of illumination, the mind of sense percep-
tion and the mind of cognition, it is the mind of illumination that oc-
cupies the leading position. The mind of sense perception and the mind 
of cognition take the assisting position. When they conflict, the last two 
are subordinate to the first. 
3 .8  MUTUAL  INTERACT ION  BETWEEN   VALUE - L I FE  
AND  B IOLOG ICAL  L I FE
The two fundamental states of life, value-life and the biological life, in-
fluence and interact with each other. On the one hand, because of the 
influence of emotion, value-life becomes more active and colorful. On the 
other hand, the influence of value-life gives meaning to emotion. 
Emotion with value can be called the value-emotion, value with 
emotion can be called emotional value. In fact, they are the same thing, 
although they have different names. The so-called moral emotion, aes-
thetic emotion and religious emotion belong to them. Accordingly, emo-
tion without value could be called biological emotion, and value without 
emotion could be called pure value. 
The transition patterns from biological emotion to value emotion 
between the three levels of emotion are different. The tendency is for 
natural compassion and mercy to lead to altruism. This means it is easy 
becoming value emotion without obstacles. Desire leads to egoism. This 
means only through moral cultivation could it become value emotion; as 
feeling, it is between the above two. 
Whether or not one kind of biological emotion could change into 
value emotion is a matter of the commander of yi (or intention). So we 
can say yi (or intention) commands knowing and emotion. 
4 . THE  HUMAN WAY  —  HOW WE  SHOULD  DO
4 . 1  CULTURE  AND  I TS  SYSTEM 
Knowing the world of value, the world of reason and the world of qi is 
essentially a matter of exploiting Dao, and it is also a matter of Dao’s 
presentation. Dao is infinite, understanding of the infinite Dao is limited. 
As a result, culture is formed. In other words, cultural phenomena are 
the result of use of the mind. The result of use of the mind of life forms 
the life culture or life system of culture, and the result of using the mind 
of cognition forms the system of knowledge. 
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As juezhi (or illumination) manifests the value-life, and ganzhi (or sense 
perception) manifests the biological life, so culture manifested by juezhi 
(or illumination), such as morals, religion, literature, art and so on, can 
be called value culture. The culture manifested by ganzhi (or sense per-
ception), such as sports, entertainment and so on, can be called  biological 
culture. As value-life and biological life interact with each other, value 
culture and biological culture also infiltrate each other. Therefore, as the 
products of mind, value culture contains some elements of non-value 
or even negative value (the false, evil and ugly), while biological culture 
contains some elements of value (the true, good and beautiful). 
Because the world of li (or reason) contains two parts, namely zhili 
(or the law of value) and qili (or the law of matter), knowledge culture 
should also be divided into two kinds, namely value knowledge and nat-
ural or scientific knowledge. The former comes from the world of value, 
and then become the bridge to the world of value; the latter came from 
the world of qi, and then created the new man-made world of qi, that 
is material culture. Once the systems of culture have been formed, they 
became the means, tools and way for mind to know the worlds of value, 
of qi and of reason. On the other hand, once culture has been formed by 
mind, it then becomes the object mind.
In respect to epistemology, we can say mind has the ability to know, 
the worlds of value, of qi and of reason are the prospective objects of 
knowledge, culture is the present object of knowledge, and the remain-
ing part of the worlds of value, of qi and of reason that have not been 
understood by mind are unknown. 
Animals have sense perception and cognition concerning the law of 
matter, so they can create some simple biological and material culture. 
4 .2  F INAL  VALUE  AND  THE  GENERAL  VALUE
As we already know, in value-life and the juezhi xin (or the mind of il-
lumination), the peak state of life manifests the final meaning and ulti-
mate concern of life. This is the final value. It can be named an 安. The 
Chinese term an has the meaning of quiet, peaceful, calm, stable, safe, 
easeful, happy, harmonious, etc. The final value an appears as a firm 
belief and as the norm of conduct in civilizations. 
The three basic value categories, the true, the good and the beautiful, 
are the values manifested by the various approaches to the peak state of 
life, but not the values manifested by the peak state of life itself. In other 
words, they are not the highest and final value. 
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Therefore, the three basic value categories may be expanded to four 
basic value categories, namely the true, the good, the beautiful and an 
(or spiritual quietness). Among them, an is not on the same level with 
the other three, but the final value which is higher than the other three. 
In this value system, values that do not involve the final meaning of 
life, such as ethical values, social values, political values and so on, could 
be called general values.
In this way, culture could be divided into four systems, namely the 
final value system, the general value system, the biological system and 
knowledge system. Of course, the importance of different kinds of cul-
tural phenomena differs for each human being. The final value is most 
important, it decides the fundamental purpose of human beings; follow-
ing this is general value, then biological system, and lastly, the know-
ledge system. 
4 .3  THE  HUMAN WAY  AS  THE  F INAL  VALUE  SYSTEM 
Dao is a core concept in Chinese philosophy, and was held in high esteem 
by Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. But every school interpreted it 
differently. Generally speaking, as a philosophical concept, Dao is used 
in two fundamental senses. One is law, principle and norm, which ex-
tended from its original meaning (namely, road and way); another is the 
source of the universe and the nature of the world. The concept Dao we 
discussed above belongs to the latter. 
In the philosophy of Daoism, Dao 道 is a metaphysical and ontologi-
cal concept used to express the source of the universe and the nature 
of the world. But almost all Confucian philosophers in pre-Qin Period, 
including Confucius, Zisi, Mencius, the author of the bamboo book Xing 
Zi Ming Chu, and Xunzi, took Dao as law, regular pattern and norm. 
Generally speaking, excluding cases where it is explicitly defined — such 
as tiandao 天道 (or the Way of Heaven) and didao 地道 (or the Way of 
Earth) — the concept Dao 道 (or the Way) is rendao 人道 (or the Way of 
Human Beings) in Confucian philosophy in the pre-Qin Period. This 
means the Way that people should behave. 
So what is the Way that people should behave from the point of view 
of Confucianism? As a whole, Dao (or the Way) in Confucianism has 
two dimensions. One is the spiritual spheres of living; another is ethics 
and virtue. The former emphasizes individual cultivation, and the latter 
emphasizes the order of society. They combine into one. Confucius said, 
“At seventy I could follow my heart’s desire without transgressing moral 
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principles.”31 This is the highest spiritual sphere of living, as well as the 
highest moral sentiment. Therefore, in Confucianism, Dao manifested as 
a series of moral categories. According to the Confucian classics in the 
pre-Qin period, Dao could be interpreted as the general term for morals. 
For instance, Confucius said, “The Dao of the superior man is threefold, 
but I have not been able to attain it. The man of ren (or humanity) has 
no worry; the man of zhi (or wisdom) has no perplexities; the man of 
yong (or courage) has no fear.”32 Here Confucius takes humanity, wisdom 
and courage as Dao. 
Throughout the Song and Ming dynasties, Neo-Confucianists ab-
sorbed both fundamental levels of Dao, and further put forward the term 
daoti 道体 (or the Sphere of Dao). Thus, the two fundamental senses of 
Dao were united. The Dao of metaphysics and ontology is the source of 
the Dao of moral norms, while the Dao of moral norms is the manifesta-
tion of the Dao of metaphysics and ontology. 
Therefore, the Dao as the Way that people should behave, is the final 
concern and belief of Confucianism, and also the Dao of daotong 道统 (or 
orthodoxy) in Confucianism. It represented the Confucian final value. 
The so-called daotong is the tradition of the sages and virtuous men who 
search, find, and develop the Way that people should behave through 
ages. Confucius said, “It is man that can enlarge the Dao which he fol-
lows; and not the Dao that can enlarge men.”33 The Dao came into being 
through the agency of ancient sages and virtuous men, and was devel-
oped in endless succession by the continuous work of the sages and 
virtuous men through the ages. 
In my opinion, Dao and daotong (or orthodoxy) as the final value 
and its tradition have universal value. Though the value systems among 
civilizations are different from each other, where they may be generalized 
into a system of behavior standards, that is the Way that people should 
behave. The sphere of Dao is an inexhaustible source of value. Just like 
Confucianism has developed its Dao (or the human way) and orthodoxy, 
other value systems in the world have also developed their own Dao or 
the human way and orthodoxy. Up to now, the various transcendental 
concepts such as Tian (or Heaven) in Confucianism, Dao in Daoism, the 
Unconditioned in Buddhism, God in Christianity and Allah in Islam, are 
31 The Analects, 2:4, translated by the author. 
32 The Analects, 14:30, Chan, Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philoso-
phy, Princeton, 1969, 42 (with some minor changes).
33 Ibid., 15:28, 44.
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all the realization of the sphere of Dao from different standpoints and 
angles by different civilizations, and at last all of them developed into the 
Way that people should behave so as to direct the behavior of human be-
ings. Therefore, approaches to final value by human beings can be called 
rendao (or the human way). 
As the final concern, belief could be divided into two kinds, namely 
religious belief and humanist belief. As the final value of human beings, 
the human way could be correspondingly divided into two kinds, namely 
the human way of religion and the human way of humanism. The belief 
of most of the world is religion, so that their final value is the human 
way of religion; but the belief of most Chinese includes both religion and 
humanism, and inclines to the latter, so that their final value represents 
both the human way of religion and the human way of humanism, and 
inclines to the latter. 
4 .4  A  RE -EST IMAT ION  OF  C I V I L I ZAT ION
In traditional society, material civilization was very backward and the 
political system largely restricted personal freedom. Even more impor-
tant, however, this was a society that revered final value. Just as Mencius 
said, “If we first build up the noble part of our nature, then the ignoble 
part cannot overcome it.”34 If one just protects and lives according to the 
final value then one can protect the place of human meaning and spirit. 
This was then the fundamental source from which people of those times 
gained their feelings of security and belonging.
The basic values of contemporary society are science and democ-
racy. Yet we already know that science is a tool of life and not life itself. 
Although the advance of science has broadened our understanding and 
increased our knowledge, it has not helped our spirit in the least nor 
resolved problems concerning human purpose. 
As for democracy, this is fundamentally a problem of the appearance 
of a system belonging to what I call general value and not final value. 
Today’s notions of freedom, including freedom of faith, political freedom, 
freedom of speech, economic freedom and so on, belong to outside free-
dom and cannot in the same breath be compared to life freedom which 
belongs to internal freedom.
In this way, contemporary people primarily seek not final value but 
rather the tools and methods of life’s existence. The style of contempo-
34 Mencius, 6 A, translated by the author.
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rary thinking is to use the “tool of rationality” to fully establish a point. 
Using the language of Mencius, the key aspect of contemporary society 
is “allowing the ignoble to injure the noble, or the small to injure the 
great”.35 Contemporary people are truly “small men”, intent on “nurtur-
ing the small part”. This means that contemporary man has already 
forgotten life’s value.
Talking this way is not to deny science and democracy, and is not 
to say that contemporary society is unlivable. What I am emphasizing is 
that the science of a so-called knowledge culture needs to obey a value 
culture and that the political system of so called general value needs to 
obey final value, giving true meaning to “If we first build up the noble 
part of our nature, then the ignoble part cannot overcome it”.36 This 
would then be a robust society.
5 . THE  D IAGRAM OF  SUBSTANCE  AND  FUNCT ION
The above discussed sphere of Dao, sphere of nature, sphere of mind and 
human way and so on, make up a chain. Among them, the sphere of Dao 
is the main substance of all other parts, below it, substance and func-
tion alternate. Thus, when the sphere of Dao is substance, the sphere of 
nature is function. When the sphere of nature is substance, the sphere 
of mind is function. When the sphere of mind is substance, culture is 
function. When life is substance, knowledge is function. When value 
is substance, biology is function. When the human way is substance, 
general value is function. A diagram of “substance” and “function” is as 
follows. 
35 Mencius, 6 A, translated by the author.
36 Mencius, 6 A, translated by the author.
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From the diagram, one can see that the sphere of Dao, sphere of nature, 
sphere of mind, culture, value, the human way, substance and function 
are one, above and below link in harmony, just like water flows from a 
high mountain, steadily flowing. 
As Dong Zhongshu said, “The great source of Dao comes from the 
Heaven”.37 One obtains and one sees!
37 Ban Gu, Han Shu (History of Former Han Dynasty), ch. 56, translated by 
the author.
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ONTO-GENERATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY (本体知识论) 
An Inquiry into Source and Structure  
of Knowledge
ABSTRACT
This article pioneers in exploring a new concept of knowledge, know-
ledge as onto-generative system which always involves consideration 
of a root-source and its developing into a body of which knowledge is 
to be claimed. This concept and the philosophy behind it comes from 
the metaphysics of benti (original body or root-body) in Chinese phi-
losophy which takes being to be generated from a source and is gen-
erative of other being or beings. But it also takes into consideration of 
naturalizing epistemology by W. V. Quine as well as the virtue-episte-
mological insights in contemporary Western discussions. The result-
ing epistemology will be onto-generative, macroscopic-mesoscopic-mi-
croscopic,  holistic and openly systemic. Two fundamental principles of 
onto-generative epistemology are discussed and can be seen to give rise 
to two fundamental principles of the benti or onto-generative metaphys-
ics rooted in Yijing. Based on this onto-generative concept of knowledge 
we are able to resolve some epistemological riddles which often trouble 
us when we take a traditional definition of knowledge as justified true 
belief. 
The different sections of the article are 1) Introductory Remarks 
2) Benti-Epistemology Proposed 3) On the Concept of Onto-Generativity 
4) From Quine to Onto-Generativity 5) Methodology of Comprehensive 
Observation and Inner Feeling 6) An Epistemic Analysis of the Yin-Yang 
Binary System 7) Onto-Generative Knowledge as Complex System on 
Five Levels 8) Onto-Generative / Macro-Epistemological Tradition in 
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Chinese Philosophy 9) Onto-Generative System and Onto-Generative 
Resolution of Epistemological Riddles 10) Conclusion.
INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS
In tracing the development of modern epistemology in the West, Quine 
has focused on Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume as providing the 
resources for such a development.1 For Quine Descartes and Berkeley 
evidently have worried about the ontological foundation and guaran-
tee of knowledge whereas Locke and Hume provide empirical resources 
from our senses as stuff forming what we know without explaining how 
identity of the whole world is possible. What is missing is a framework 
in which subject of knowing and object of knowing can be adequately 
and effectively related. 
I notice that apart from this contrast there is also the contrast of 
Descartes and Berkeley speaking of innate ideas of God and Self as ver-
sus Locke and Hume rejecting all innate ideas. In this sense Locke and 
Hume are truly the founders of no foundation theory of knowledge. 
Quine ignores Kant for apparent reason that Kant is an internalistic 
philosopher rather than an externalist philosopher.2 Yet for Quine know-
ledge of our physical world still needs explanation and he then appeals 
to Carnap for developing and using the constructive method of “consti-
tution system” derived from the method of contextual definition, which 
would explain away entities in terms of uses of language about those 
entities. 
1 See W. V. Quine, From Stimulus to Science, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995. In this final work of Quine we see Quine reflecting on how 
contemporary issues in epistemology and scientific methodology develop 
in light of Carnap’s conceptual reconstruction of sensory experience and 
how logic and language play essential roles in shaping up our concepts of 
reality, scientific knowledge, truth, reference and meaning.
2 Only on page 57 Quine refers to Kant for his thing-an-itself. Quine re-
jects such imposition as basically useless since our observation sentences 
and categorical are sufficient for reflecting what nature is about. In a sense 
Quine’s main effort consists in showing that we can make necessary onto-
logical commitments and yet we can also dispense with reference to entities 
by use of logical schemes such as Ramsey sentences. For Quine reference is 
indeterminate and relative to a system of language.
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The turning point is how we come to use language for abstraction, com-
plexization and generalization of ideas from our experience. It then ap-
peared possible to construct a world of physical objects from experience 
and a world of experience from minimal simple ideas which Carnap 
would describe as “unorganized global experiences” of a specious pres-
ent for an individual. Then by introducing primitive relations we can 
eventually construct our concept of a world of quality experience by way 
of logical definition. 
Although Quine does not condone the world construction beyond 
this level, he does show great admiration for the development and use 
of the method of contextual definition as formally introduced first by 
Russell in his explanation of definite description but perhaps first sug-
gested by Jeremy Bentham and used by George Boole the algebraist. The 
mathematical application of this method led to the great achievement 
in defining mathematical truth in logic based on logical operators of 
negation and conjunction. But Quine recognized the limitation of this 
“logical paradigm of philosophical analysis” in light of Goedel 1931 in-
completeness proof to the point that he would like to seek a new starting 
point of knowledge. 
What is Quine’s new starting point? It is to take the world of physi-
cal objects for granted in experience and then see how we actually come 
to develop a language of physical objects which accommodates the ob-
jective and external experiences we have of the world. In doing so he 
comes to famously reject so-called two dogmas, namely the distinction 
between the analytical and synthetic, and the primacy of phenomenalism 
of sense data. He sees that our ideas form a whole which exhibits degrees 
of analyticity as well as degrees of syntheticity at the same time just as 
experiences are inseparable from theory in science. Similarly, sense ex-
perience leads to speeches of physical objects which explain the holistic 
nature of our perception and thinking. It is on the basis of the theoretical 
explanation we come to the world of knowledge, which we may regard 
as forming an open system of interrelated concepts and presuppositions 
based on sense stimulations. The epistemological tasks of description, 
explanation, justification and theorization are just an integral part of our 
construction of science. This constitutes what is broadly called “natu-
ralized epistemology”.3 His purpose is empiricist or scientific-empirical 
3 Quine wishes initially to substitute our reasons for justifying our epis-
temic beliefs on causal grounds based on empirical psychology. But he 
could not deny that epistemology contains request for evaluating how and 
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so that we would come to recognize a world of things significantly and 
articulately represented in a framework of first-order logic of ostensible 
objects, a world eventually open to scientific methodology of observation 
and confirmation.
Quine comes to his holistic view on knowledge: There is no item 
of knowledge which can be absolutely independent of other items of 
knowledge and there is no item of knowledge which we could consider 
absolutely true. Even our logic could be revisable in light of radical expe-
riences. He comes to his famous statement on the holistic confrontation 
of our knowledge as whole with the world of sense experiences which 
are boundaries of reality. The motto is still the same: nihil in mente quod 
non prius in sensu.
BENT I - EP ISTEMOLOGY  PROPOSED
Given Quine’s naturalized system and structure of knowledge, I wish to 
go a step further in light of my reflections on our observational experi-
ence of the world from Chinese Philosophy. I shall develop a theory of 
onto-generative epistemology which would explain and accommodate the 
naturalized epistemology, but which would also take an anti-reductive at-
titude in endorsement of a process of growth and transformation as basis 
for our holistic view of knowledge. It would therefore accommodate what 
has naturally evolved and emerged as experiences of reality and this no 
doubt would include experiences of life and mind. This is what I title 
“onto-generative epistemology” (benti-zhishilun 本体知识论), which would 
allow me to see knowledge as rooted in different layers of experience and 
constructed on different levels of our understanding. As we shall see, the 
term “onto-generative” is given rise to by understanding the Chinese 
metaphysics of generation of a bodied being from a source where the 
concept of source or root (ben 本) is more broadly conceived than cause 
(yin 因)4 This would enable us to dissolve the three famous paradoxes or 
why one epistemic statement is better or more acceptable than another. 
Also confer W. V. Quine’s original paper on epistemology naturalized, in 
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1969.
4 See the item on benti or root-body as written by me in Encyclopedia of Chi-
nese Philosophy, edited by Antonio S. Cua, New York: Routledge Publishing, 
2003. 
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problems in contemporary epistemology, namely, the Gettier Problem, 
the New Riddle of Induciton formulated by Goodman, and finally the 
Anomalous Monism Puzzle advanced by Davidson and Quine himself. 
We shall see that this new approach to contemporary epistemology 
would compensate and complement what has been done by empiricists 
like Hume and logical analysts such as Carnap and Russell, but also 
would allow recognition of Kant as representing a reasonable internalis-
tic position which under proper restraint is required to explain the mind 
phenomena of understanding of self-knowledge and virtues for action 
needed by morality. In this new approach we come to a larger view of 
reality based on our large experience of cosmos and ourselves with an 
emphatic stress on that which allows growth and emergent development 
just as this cosmos of ours allows growth and development from the 
quantum state/stage to the matter state/ stage which gives rise to the life 
state/stage. What remains to be recognized for this cosmic growth and 
development is the state and stage of mind emerging from life in which 
we are called upon to be not only accountable for what experience but 
also responsible for what we come to know and how we may use our 
knowledge for action or how knowledge brings out values and norms of 
action and situating.
Chinese philosophy and its metaphysics recognizes this growth 
and emergent development from the very beginning, and has since then 
elaborated on this growth and development in terms of concepts such 
as taiji and yin-yang and benti, namely, “origination and embodiment of 
being and becoming”, which I have described as “onto-generativity”. The 
Greek tradition has largely failed to recognize this fact of reality in their 
metaphysics which hence makes their metaphysics difficult for under-
standing contemporary science in terms of physics of quantum particles 
and relativity of time and space as a manifold5 which most of us would 
recognize as a fact of our world in which we find ourselves. But for the 
Chinese philosophy of benti, this aspect of growth from quantum inde-
terminacy to emergence of biological world of life can be accommodated 
easily as constituting a partial illustration of the onto-generative cosmol-
ogy it has embraced from the beginning of the Yijing philosophy and 
be seen as not only compatible with but seems to pointing to a creative 
self-understanding of mind actions in moral practice of human develop-
ment. There is no reason why such a metaphysical vision of humanity in 
5 Here we may speak of spacetime as well as timespace.
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a quantum world should be discounted by any scientist dogmatism if not 
considered highly important and inspiring. We may be indeed reminded 
of Charles Peirce’s own speculation on love in a world of chance.6
It must be understood that the benti-epistemology or onto-generative 
epistemology starts with dealing with macroscopic experiences of the 
cosmic heaven and earth as a prevailing creative basis for microscopic 
and mesoscopic phenomena of dynamic change and onto-generativity. 
We may also regard this onto-generative epistemology as holistic and 
holographic in so far as it would incorporate the macro-, the micro-, and 
the meso-epistemology of the early empirical externalists together with 
later analytic internalists such as Kant and twentieth Century virtue-
epistemologists as constitutive parts.7
It will be briefly indicated that the onto-generative epistemology 
has its base in onto-generative metaphysics (本体形上学) and must 
lead to normative onto-generative morality (本体道德) or onto-ethics 
(本体伦理学) and normative onto-generative epistemics (本体知识学). We 
may explain these terms as follows: “onto-generative metaphysics” takes 
things as generated through a process of polaristic forces with intrinsic 
power of change and transformation from an ultimate source of creativ-
ity, and the process of creative and change is by way of differentiation 
and integration in organic and holographic contexts. Hence to be is to 
be generated and form a concrete entity capable of generation of future 
entities. Such a system is described in my work on the philosophy of the 
Yijing.8 Such a system of generative being is to be contrasted with tradi-
tional ontological metaphysics which takes static essences as main con-
cern and consideration of being, apart from a transcendent creator which 
6 See C. S. Peirce, “The Doctrine of Chances.” in: N. Houser/C. Kloesel 
(eds.), The Essential Peirce. Vol. I. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1992.
7 No elaboration is enough to make this link as we shall see, since the 
onto-generative considerations always involve the traits and capabilities / 
abilities of the knowing agents as both knowers and agents. I shall touch 
on this topic again in connection with my description of the solutions of 
the three oddities in contemporary epistemological research.
8 This system can be likened to Whitehead’s Theory of Process and Real-
ity, but has two strengths of its own which the Whiteheadean system lacks: 
first, the simplicity of premises and principles of change, and the second, 
the humanity as creatively identified in an interactive process of engage-
ment with reality. Whitehead’s system is technical and lacks clear guidance 
of how to apply to human experiences.
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either continues sustaining the objective entities or beings or leave it 
sustained by its own inertia. It is the Aristotelian metaphysics of the four 
causes. Such a view eventually becomes exemplified in the Ptolemian 
worldview and in the Newtonian worldview which results from improv-
ing on the Ptolemic worldview. It is interesting to note that while we can 
see how metaphysics of four causes justified the world structure we come 
to describe as Ptolemic or Newtonian, we cannot say that the four causes 
generate our knowledge of life and mind as a complex structure. But in 
the case of onto-generative metaphysics we see how a source -being in 
an ultimate sense is generative of the world in a process of change and 
transformation. Hence our concept of being as benti makes it necessary 
not to separate cosmology from ontology as any ontological being must 
be generative of other beings together with other beings. There is always 
such a process of generation so that ontology is cosmologically processed 
and cosmology reflects an underlying and inherent source of creativity 
and its emerging forces of formation and transformation. 
Another consequence of such an onto-generative view of reality is 
that there is no absolute transcendence beyond immanent transcendence 
in the sense that the moment of transcendence is at the same time the 
moment of immanentizing or integration from the same source of tran-
scendence. God can be defined and considered as the self-transcending 
and yet self-immanentizing power of creation which is continued in the 
continuous creation of things. Humanity can be thus conceived as result-
ing creatively from the self-creative power of transcendent immanentiz-
ing and immanentizing transcendence so that we can say of any thing 
created has a source which transcends and a body which immanentizes 
that source. This is precisely how benti is to be understood. 
Given this understanding of the onto-generative metaphysics, we can 
explore into the onto-generative morality which leads to onto-generative 
ethics which has been described by me simply as onto-ethics.9 To be a 
human being is to be generated from a source and form a human body 
or bodied being (ti) of its own. As benti existence the human person 
is virtually related to all things on a level and his purpose of life is to 
relate to them from his uniquely benti point of view as a human being. 
This means that he has to develop and acquire virtues of humanity and 
act on his virtues. He should practice his human reason in light of an 
9 See my 2002 article. “Integrating the Onto-Ethics of Virtues (East) and 
the Meta-Ethics of Rights (West).” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philoso-
phy, 1, 157–184.
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onto-generative way of hermeneutics so that he reaches a life of fullness 
and significance from which freedom, duty, benefits and even rights can 
be integrated into a working system of interrelatedness and dynamism. 
How is a human being capable of doing this? This is because he has a 
source of creativity from his nature which can be realized and fulfilled 
in his generative activities. His morality is to be considered part of such 
a creativity which gives him ability to self-discipline and self-govern in 
achieving co-humanity or love and sense of duty and responsibility. In 
this manner I have explained not only how but why ethics is a vital part 
of human life whether considered individually or collectively. 
One may query how this onto-ethic view differs from moral meta-
physics of Mou Zongsan, the famous contemporary Neo-Confucian 
philosopher? The difference is that in realizing our natural being gen-
eratively we shall realize our ethics and our morality as part of the par-
ticularization of the onto-generative being of the human person, whereas 
for Mou it is due to our moral experiences that we have to speak of a 
metaphysics which is to be founded on our moral experiences. In actual-
ity this metaphysics which functions as the source and foundation of our 
ethics or morality is precisely the onto-generative creativity which leads 
to humanity and morality as partial fulfillment of humanity. Onto-ethical 
understanding is much straightforward which enables us to understand 
our own actions as a human being as morality-generative. And this is 
so again because the human agent is generated with its motivational 
resources in human mind and human nature which seeks both inner 
harmony and outer harmony altogether. With regard to our knowledge, 
we can indeed say the same thing, our knowledge is generated from our 
ability to know and through experience we are able to apply such know-
ing ability to reality to engender and re-generate our knowledge in so far 
as we have engaged ourselves in an onto-generative contexts of learning, 
observation and inquiry.10
The actual process of acquiring knowledge or achieving epistemic 
values, like the ethical case, can be descried as onto-epistemic and hence 
the creative process and result of knowing can be regarded a matter 
of practices of our benti in knowing and hence we can speak of onto-
epistemics (本体知识学) in analogue to onto-ethics (本体伦理学). The 
important point about this novel idea of epistemics is that we are em-
10 John Dewey has taken this route of thinking as well. See J. Dewey, Logic: 
Theory of Inquiry, New York, 1938.
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phatic about learning and doing, not discoursing and argumentation of 
knowledge which resides in onto-generative epistemology (本体知识论). 
In this framework of understanding we may indeed introduce the 
very idea and concern of virtue-epistemology (as correlated with virtue 
ethics) in update contemporary discussion in America.11 More impor-
tantly we are then able to introduce the distinction between knowledge 
of virtues (德性之知) and knowledge by seeing and hearing (见闻之知) 
in Zhang Zai and develop it into a theory of defining and acquiring 
knowledge by forming intellectual virtues of our minds versus defining 
and acquiring knowledge by experience, 立德以致知 (to reach knowledge 
by establishing virtues) versus 见闻以致知 (to reach knowledge by way 
of seeing and hearing), both of which are made possible by the onto-
generative epistemology as mentioned above. 
ON THE  CONCEPT  OF  ONTO-  GENERAT I V I T Y : 
“本体 发生:  本立道生, 道生万物” 12
The world of things we experience is a world of emergence, becoming, 
formation and transformation of things. Things are in the middle of 
such generation, formation and transformation. We observe how things 
are related by mutual generation and interaction. In a sense our own 
observant awareness of things is a generative response elicited by things 
and ourselves as a body. So are our feelings and reflections. There are 
many contexts from which we have to assume counterfactuality and gen-
erativity, for example, we can speak that should a rain come in time, 
the famine could be avoided. Here we are actually assuming that a rain 
under whatever conditions it may take place could lead to avoidance of a 
famine. This means that the rain has the disposition or power to gener-
ate a condition which is necessary for avoidance of this famine. Or for 
another instance, we may say that should the witness testify in court, 
we could win the suit. This means that the testimony of the witness has 
the power to be generated to prevail over the suit. It is clear that it is 
11 See L. Zagzebski, On Epistemology, Belmont: Wadsworth, 2009.
12 This is the key expression of the meaning of onto-generativity: “The 
root-body takes place when the root is found or founded, the dao will en-
sue naturally and the dao will give rise to all ten thousand things.” These 
key words come from my own synthesis of the insights of the Yijing, the 
Daodejing and the Lunyu of Confucius.
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often the case that it is not a single event but an event in a situation that 
would produce the generative force. Hence we may regard such situation 
as a generative context. In understanding things generatively we need to 
know those generative contexts in which the knowledge can be said to 
be genuine or non-defective and non-reductive. 
In Chinese philosophy there are words like “sheng 生” and “fa 发” 
which indicate such a generative event and process. Specifically we may 
even use the term “creative 创造” or “creativity 创造性” to denote the same 
idea as generative or generativity. Hence we can speak of onto-creativity 
or being onto-creative. The important point is that we need an ontology 
or metaphysics which recognizes this creative and generative factor to 
be a factor of being, not to say becoming. In this context we can speak of 
onto-generativity in five basic forms of onto-generativity as initiated by 
Zou Yan (305–240 BCE) in the fourth Century BCE: namely the genera-
tivity of water from metal, of wood from water, of fire from wood, of earth 
from fire, and of metal from earth. For Laozi we can speak of the mutual 
generation of being and nothing (有无相生), why? DDJ (Daodejing)makes 
it clear that being must come from where there is no being and no-being 
must come from where there is being. Logically it is the only way in 
which onto-generation is to be understood. In terms of particular things 
or events, this is particularly true as well. This is what dao is. But we do 
seem to experience emergence of being from non-being, and the world 
and the dao therefore must be seen as directed to a world of emergence of 
new things. There is no reason why we may not see our world as receding 
and non-being as being generated from being so that we could experi-
ence a world of non-beings with equal potentiality to generate things as 
well. On this basis of mutually of generativity of being and non-being we 
could also speak of mutual activation of the subjective and the subjective 
(主客互发), mutual inducement among and between knowledge and ac-
tion (理气互生: 知知与知行相因), mutual entailment of existence and value 
in human beings (知识与价值互引), and hence an unending generativity 
of generativity (生生不息). The traditional concept of unity in “heyi 合一” 
is better understood as mutual generativity. 
FROM QU INE  TO  ONTO-GENERAT I V I T Y
In a sense Quine started the contemporary epistemology by his rejection 
of the dogma of phenomenalism and liberated epistemological queries 
from sensational and atomist constraints. We are able to face reality and 
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ask questions as to what we know and how do we know about things 
which we know. There is no play of skepticism for we can, like scientists, 
do observation of things and organize our experiences by making our 
conceptual description. Even though there are many ways of describing 
things and events, we do have a sense of knowing in common sense 
world of objects in which we can say we know. Although we are like 
scientists in following a process of learning, there are two differences be-
tween our common sense knowing and the scientific knowing. First, we 
do not always do explanation by appealing to universal laws, for we just 
explain in citing reasons and mention causes we believe to be relevant, 
and yet we do not normally need to cite laws of nature or scientific laws 
to support our explanations or understanding. To explain an automobile 
accident, to explain a financial loss, and even to explain climate change, 
we can cite general regularities as premises of explanation without in-
troducing theoretical entities and for that matter without giving precise 
quantitative precisions. The second difference is that we are set to act 
from what we know ordinarily and in fact to a large measure our ordinary 
knowledge communicated in common sense language is always practical 
and it actually comes from practical experience. Hence we can apply our 
common sense to practical experience and in so applied would learn and 
slowly make changes to what we know so that it would be better fitting 
with our world in our practical life. 
It is Quine and his logical positivist predecessors who add the di-
mensions of the analytical and ontological to what we come to know 
from our practical life. To be analytical is simply to watch out our con-
cepts and their implications in light of logic and language use. On the 
other hand, to be ontological is to be clear about what sort of objects we 
are talking about. Certainly it is also common sense that we pay attention 
to what we talk about. To be ontological is to be able to refer to things 
and to be able to refer to things is to be capable of committing our beliefs 
about existence of things we refer to so that we could be responsible for 
what we do on the basis of what we know in terms of reference we make. 
There are always deep dubious issues on gaps between knowing and be-
ing, and between believing and truth. But in ordinary knowing we can 
be said that if we know what there are, it would be legitimate to speak 
of what there are in the world. On the other side, we may imagine that 
if there are things which we do not know about, but then if we believe 
that there are indeed such things as we imagine, we can make logical or 
linguistic or epistemic reference to them, but we would not say these are 
things we know in the ordinary sense and as common sense. Thus in-
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existential objects from our imagination expressed in poetry and novels 
cannot be said to be known in unrestricted context. What makes science 
different is that we insist on deep level explanation in terms of laws of 
nature or scientific laws which we need to do inquiry by observation and 
experimentation. We need also to use logic to make sure that what we 
claim we know is consistent in meaning, reference and intention and that 
we are able to measure them in quantity and articulate its reference in a 
language which is essentially logical.
It is interesting to note that when Quine introduces his idea of natu-
ralized epistemology, he is actually to break down the gap between the 
scientific epistemology and the ordinary way of knowing and his idea is 
to push our ordinary knowing toward the scientific case: We need to talk 
of objects like scientists do. But my above point is that the gap still ex-
ists as we can still make the distinction: our ordinary way of knowing is 
practical while scientific way of knowing needs not to be. It is not to deny 
that the scientific knowledge does get incorporated into modern man’s 
ordinary language knowing and we can use such knowledge without 
claiming scientific jargon and precision. 
There is no denial that scientific talk of knowledge and ordinary talk 
of knowledge overlap to a large extent for modern man. Perhaps as a so-
ciological fact, the more advanced education we get the more we become 
scientific in our reference and in our knowledge. Since knowledge has 
to make reference to things, even in ordinary talk we cannot avoid refer-
ring to things we know or to things we believe of their existence under 
certain conditions. Hence Quine’s famous motto: To be is to be the value 
of a variable of quantification. But such values need not to be found in 
ordinary knowledge nor in scientific language but from some form of 
language we have to construct on the basis of our interest or needs.
Given such distinction between naturalized knowledge and common 
sense knowledge, what is the knowledge to be said to be onto-generative? 
In the first place, we have also to ask what is there to be for an ontology 
which is generative? The answer is that to be in an onto-generative sense 
is to be generated from a source, in other words, to imitate Quine, it is to 
be generated in a context where its generative source can be identified. Of 
course there is the second requirement, namely, to be generated is to have 
a source which gives rise to a bodied being. The difference between natu-
ralized knowledge and the onto-generative epistemology is that the latter 
can incorporate the former while the former can not incorporate the lat-
ter for the latter uses generativity and organic constitution as its require-
ments and thus is intended to be not only anti-reductive but also support-
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ive of emergence and supervenience. Perhaps we can learn from Quine 
concerning the limitation of logical construction or reconstruction in 
Carnap’s reductive Aufbau of the world so that we can therefore do some-
thing more realistic in confronting the generative nature of this world.
In examining Carnap’s construction of the world from sense expe-
rience, one can see how we need to introduce concepts which require 
presupposition of ordinary objects. Besides, from those basic experiences 
of sensation it is also clear that our ideas of ordinary objects must be 
learned by ostension, that is, by pointing to. As ostension is an experi-
ence which still needs interpretation by oneself, what is pointed out as an 
object by a teacher may not become understood as the same object by the 
learner. But it is still an empirical fact that children do learn what objects 
are specifically by ostension when ostension is seen to generate a term 
for a learner to apply to the same object. In this sense Quine decides to 
make a shift from direct mode of reference by observation sentences to 
ostension in order to give meaning to our concepts or language. It is use-
ful for establishing communication under again presupposition of same 
reference in same contexts. We have seen Quine has strongly argued for 
relativity and hence indeterminacy of reference, but nevertheless we can 
go by in so far we can talk of the same reference in language or by way 
of ostension. What is the content or predication of an object is a matter 
always to be assumed or analytically hypothesized. For him sometimes 
we see that reference is not really important as the truth conditions of 
our sentences which make reference to those things can be substituted by 
complements of what we take to be without changing the truth value of 
those assertions. Again the issue is whether we can trace to a generative 
source from which a body can be identified on whatever level of refer-
ence, predicative, or observation-categorical, or inter-subjective. 
From an onto-generative epistemological point of view, what is im-
portant to see how Quine sought and achieved a new start in identifying 
and ostension of physical world based on some generative notion of 
stimulus and response as origin and a subsequent system of observation. 
We can also see how Quine’s effort provides an insight and for recon-
struing of the identity of a body in terms of relevant generative contexts 
such as observation and ostension or communication and perhaps trans-
lation. He has thus given rooted body or benti 本体 an objective meaning 
in his naturalized epistemology. Yet we must also recognize that benti 
is a term derived from reflection on our onto-generative metaphysics 
of heaven and earth and man. It has a richer meaning than bodies be-
ing generated from observation and ostenson, namely it has retained its 
62
holistic implication in reference to onto-generative formation of things 
as a whole, and this holds similarly for onto-generative formation of 
knowledge as a whole in Chinese Philosophy.
The large difference of reduction versus non-reduction remains: As 
we see that the Quine’s last efforts of a naturalized epistemology is to 
hopefully reduce mind to brain states so that our paraphrase of meaning 
of propositional attitudes (mind sentences) could have a place in the first 
order of logic of concrete objects as material objects. But for the ordinary 
objects in Chinese onto-generative epistemology minds and thoughts still 
can be regarded as concrete events in the world without being necessar-
ily identified with brain states. They are regarded also as onto-generative 
which could lead to scientific discoveries and artistic activities which 
have intrinsic values for their onto-generativity of joy and peace.
METHODOLOGY  OF  COMPREHENS IVE   OBSER VAT ION  (观) 
AND  INNER  FEEL ING  (感)
In the Greek tradition, the idea of onto (ou, on, onto) is the ultimate 
being conceived only in passivity and fixation. In modern Western phi-
losophy there is introduced the idea of Becoming in Whitehead, Bergson 
and Heidegger, but it is not yet an onto-generative concept, a concept 
pointing to the process of creative forming of world and human beings. 
In Chinese philosophy benti 本体, described as “onto-generative”, is in-
tended to describe the emerging and generation of beings in becoming 
which leads to the formation of ten thousands of things and human be-
ings. This concept also implies mutual generation of being and nonbeing 
(有无相生) and “ceaseless generation” (生生不息) as indicated above. 
Given this onto-generative metaphysics (本体形上学), we must come 
to see knowledge as not simply a system of objective description of ob-
jective truth to be constructed by science or special intuitions of reason 
or noesis. We want to avoid to see knowledge as a reductionist structure 
pertaining to the world of matter and energy alone rather than as an 
onto-generative structure in terms of:
1) the sensible and empirical as leading to the conceptual and the ra-
tional
2) the smaller scope as leading to the larger scope which involves par-
adigm and perspective changes such as from Ptolemy to Newton, 
Newton to Einstein and Einstein to Post-Einstein Quantum Physics
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3) the physical as leading to biological and then to humanistic
4) the theoretical as leading to the practical 
5) the source as leading to a full body
Besides, the present approach to knowledge in philosophy is basically 
microscopic (微观, 小观) and mesoscopic (中观) which are derived from 
British empiricism and/ or German transcendentalism in modern times. 
It is hence micro-epistemological and meso-epistemological, but not yet 
macro-epistemological (宏观, 大观) so that it does not have macroscopic 
point of view such as found in the Yizhuan, Laozi and Zhungzi. But we 
need this point of view in order to integrating and grounding our sci-
ences and our humanities. The point is that we need a new approach 
to epistemology which would show rapid changes on both macroscopic 
level and meso-microscopic levels. For this reason, I introduce the meth-
odology of comprehensive observation (观) and inner feeling (感) from 
the tradition of Chinese philosophy. 
The Chinese word “guan 观” has the meaning of looking over things 
at a wide angle so that one can see a whole range of things. It is to look 
and see like a bird which would not do anything in looking carefully 
about the environment in which it finds itself. There is indeed such a 
bird called guan 鹳 which would watch over a pond or a water field with 
the intention to catch a fish, but before it plunges to make its catch, it 
has to inspect the whole field so that it could position itself and act eas-
ily and efficiently in targeting its game. But when we come to the word 
guan 观 there is no such intention of catching a game or doing anything: 
guan is merely to look over and see around so that we may come to know 
a holistic picture or scenario of the world in which one finds one self. 
In fact it is a matter of positioning oneself in the world. As the world is 
large and comprehensive, hence we speak of comprehensive observation 
as it is intended by the use of the word guan 观. Thus we see how in 
the Yizhuan, Fuxi is described as looking up the heaven and watching 
over the land (观天察地) he is able to detect patterns of things and draw 
the trigrams and hexagrams. In fact, in order to reach for an objective 
understanding of the world, one needs to comprehensively observe the 
world with a mind of no desire and no action. 
In other words, one should avoid being influenced by one’s emo-
tion and desire or even prejudice in looking over the world. Hence in 
the DDJ one sees how Laozi holds that: 1) Always emptying one’s mind 
so that one can see the mystery of the dao; always recognizing things so 
that one can watch the boundaries of being (故常无欲, 以观其妙; 常有欲, 
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以观其徼. (DDJ #1)). Here the guan again is comprehensive observation 
for different purposes and in each other the guan reveals the reality of the 
dao and the things. Then when Laozi speaks of “all things co-happen, I 
am ready to observe their return (万物并作, 吾以观复 DDJ #16), it is clear 
that he has opened his eyes widely so that he can see how the things in 
world change and change in a certain direction. This also means that 
the guan is not only comprehensive in space, but comprehensive in time. 
It may take a long while to see things returning to their beginnings or 
a short time. But nevertheless the guan one is engaged with must be 
unrestricted in both time and space so that one can come to know what 
reality is really.13 
Hence we can see that guan is to observe and to observe is to per-
ceive and witness holistically and comprehensively. One may not ob-
serve without any intention or desire to discover something. But one 
must admit that there could be state of comprehensive observation to 
the effect that observation itself is attractive and there needs not any 
explicit purpose motivating the observation. It may be said that this is 
how knowledge of dao is established. When the dao is understood, it is 
understood naturally and that one comes to see that it is the dao which 
is the source and body of all things. In this sense we may also say that 
to recognize the dao is to recognize something so fundamentally and 
ultimately onto-generative so that it can be said to generate all things. In 
this sense guan is important for it is the way in which the cosmic way of 
onto-generation is experienced. It is in the like manner of comprehen-
sive observation that one comes to see dao as non-active wuwei and yet 
capable of doing all. There is the spontaneity of action and transforma-
tion of things. There are also the characters of the dao to be realized, 
namely such as giving rise to things without possessing them, let things 
growing without ruling them, upholding them without dominating them, 
achieving things without claiming credits. One can seen that the whole 
onto-cosmology of the dao is the result of understanding reality by com-
prehensive and selfless observation of the things in the world. It is by 
a comprehensive and perhaps long-enduring process observation, one 
comes to see the ultimate onto-generativity of the dao and things in dao. 
13 A good lesson in history of astronomy is such that without the time-
consuming watch of the movements of the planets Kepler (1571–1630) there 
could be no modern science constructed by Newton. However, special 
watching may not always end up in discoveries as we see in the century-old 
experiment called Michelson-Morley Experiment.
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It is in this process that the human person becomes to be realized as a 
being-in-world, and for Zhuangzi the best mode of existence for human 
person in the world is to roam (xiaoyao 逍遥) in the world so that one 
may experience life-worlds of many small beings such as trees, birds and 
fishes and maintain communication with them. This implies that one 
needs to view world from no fixed perspective and hence transcending 
and yet including any perspective. Of course, still it may involve a pro-
cess of incorporating or reconciling any perspective which contradict the 
“comprehensive view”. For Zhuangzi this is the experience of illumina-
tion (yiming 以明).14 In the Yizhuan the emphasis is laid on the seeing of 
the interpenetration of all things or huidong 会通. Here we speak of the 
huidong of all things through our comprehensive observation and it is in 
the process of our comprehensive observation that things naturally show 
their interpenetratedness and mutual interdependence. The understand-
ing is that there is a comprehensive viewing comprehending both the 
subjective and objective or transcending them and seeing them as parts 
of the holistic view of a dynamic dao and benti. It is to commit oneself to 
a valuable position from which creativity and purposiveness of action is 
to be derived. Hence this viewing is different from the view of Thomas 
Nagel in his book The View from Nowhere (1986) which poses a problem 
of conflict. It is a world without articulation and a world empty of all 
things. But the world of guan as shown by Confucians or by Daoists is 
not such a world. In particular, we need guan not as simply a mirroring 
but as a creative response to the world and a source of insights of reality.
Yijing has shown how viewing progresses to larger and larger, deeper 
and deeper, higher and higher point of view which is not simply no point 
of view. It is this observational viewing which leads Yizhuan to say “to 
observe the meeting and union of all things” (观其会通). This provides 
an open and all -comprehensive view and observation among different 
individuals regarding understanding overlapping identities in a hierar-
chy of differences and identifies of things.15
14 See Zhuangzi, Essay on Equalizing All Things, where he refers to a special 
insight one may have from inborn but which one forgets one has.
15 Quine deals with this problem of shared observation in many places 
in his last book. He sees “perceptual similarity in part innate and in part 
molded by experience”. “Recurrences of it must activate, in each individual, 
global stimuli that are perceptually similar for that individual”, “So we see 
a pre-established harmony of perceptual similarity standards. If two scenes 
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This brings us to the role of subjective and inter-subjective feelings 
(gan 感) and perception (jue 觉) in reflection (si 思) with guan as a com-
prehensive background. Why is feeling or perception or thinking or re-
flection important? Feeling is the way in which any living being comes 
to contact the world. Whether the feeling is conscious or not conscious 
feeling identifies one’s being in the world by responding to whatever is 
world or in the world. It is in this broad sense that feeling defines life 
just as perception defines our mind. For Whitehead feeling even is taken 
to be the defining characteristic of simply existence or actual entity. In 
Chinese philosophy we see this insightful statement from the Tuan Judg-
ment on xian (咸) in the text of the Yijing:
“Tuan says: xian 咸 is feeling. The soft is above and the firm is below. 
The two qi (breath and vital force) respond to each other and find peace 
in joy. When the male is under the female, the situation is prosperous 
and advantageous to hold on. Hence to marry a woman is auspicious. 
Hence we see how heaven and earth feel each other and then ten thou-
sand things become generated and transformed. We see how a sage may 
move the feelings of peoples in their minds and therefore the world 
becomes peaceful. Thus to observe what one comes to have feeling, one 
comes to see the condition and state of being of all things in heaven and 
earth.” (translation mine) (“咸, 感也. 柔上而刚下, 二气感应以相与, 止而悦, 
男下女, 是以亨, 利贞, 娶女吉也. 天地感而万物化生, 圣人感人心而天下和平, 
观其所感而天地万物之请可见矣”.)
In this rich passage we see how feeling has both a cosmic and a hu-
man dimension: as vital energy generated by heaven and earth and as 
feelings-desires for action of self-fulfillment and harmonization. With 
this two levels of reality feeling can be seen as an onto-creative or onto-
generative principle of generation and production. It is how the world 
evolves and becomes and it is also how we come to know the world and 
ourselves and thence how we come to know our positions in the world 
as beings-in-the-world.
We can observe (观) feelings and feel them with our perceptive mind. 
On the other hand, we can feel what we observe. Mutual observation and 
mutual feelings (覌其所感, 感其所观) mutually provide a foundation for 
mutual understanding and a sense of common goal and reality, again 
in an onto-generative manner. We may indeed regard comprehensive 
trigger perceptually similar global stimuli in one witness, they are apt to 
do likewise in another”, W. V. Quine, From Stimulus to Science, 1995, 20–21.
CHUNG-Y ING  CHENG :  ONTO-GENERAT I VE  EP ISTEMOLOGY 67
observation and situational inner feeling as two fundamental principles 
of onto-generativity of any object or subject in the world. It is where 
existence is to be conserved and relationships pertain and new things 
emerge so that we come to have a whole world of life and life-like activi-
ties such as the birth of new stars.
Based on the two onto-generative principles of observation and feel-
ing, we are able to invent symbolic systems such as language and other 
symbols for symbolizing our onto-generative knowledge. This means 
that our symbolization of knowledge has to be onto-generative as well. 
And this is precisely what happens in the formation of language. For 
symbolization is to represent a thing or an idea by a sign which can be 
further related to other signs by way of onto-generative connectedness. 
For the reality of things as root-bodies or generated beings we come to 
see a complex but systematic relationships of generating through the 
interaction of yin and yang in terms of differentiation and integration. 
Similarly, we see our language as a system of signs which shares mean-
ings one way or another and yet maintains a definite or definable refer-
ence in open contexts of transformation and generation of meanings 
as there are always new situations which prompt new uses of the lan-
guage symbols. This amounts to having opportunities to reaffirm or yet 
sometime to vary or innovate meanings in contexts of use. The Chinese 
principles of formation of words are six16, but their combination to gen-
erate new words and new meanings and therefore new references or new 
aspects of references are unlimited. This is because there is the human 
mind which functions as an interpreter which identifies what needs to 
be identified and differentiates what needs to be differentiated in so far 
as the mind has achieved a holistic and comprehensive understanding 
of reality through onto-generative principles of observation and feeling.17
16 See Xu Shen (58–147) the well-known Han scholar has first articulated 
the six principles of word formation for the Chinese language. See his Shuo 
Wen Jie Zhi (说文解字).
17 Specifically, Charles S. Peirce’s theory of signs can be incorporated into 
such a system of generative signs. The following points can be made: Based 
on this system of generative signs language is capable of leading to extend-
ed and transformed meanings because of possibility of translation and in-
terpretation. Interpretation will make the following possible: 1) It preserves 
meaning and extending it; 2) it provides a common and shared medium 
and back/ fore-ground for integrating. In fact this makes clear how we have 
to see knowledge as basically not fixed and must be non-deterministically 
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In Peirce’s theory of signs the distinction among icon, index and symbol 
is significant because it is onto-generative and it is by implicit appeal 
to this principle of onto-generativity that Peirce is able to maintain his 
insight into mind as a interpretant which can always make interpretation 
by introducing or generating new signs or new ideas or both. The hu-
man mind is an infinite interpretant which would respond to the world 
by observation and feeling. This creative mechanism when applied to 
the Chinese Six Principles of Word Formation would explain why Chi-
nese language is a typically onto-generative language which inspires un-
derstanding by its own onto-generativity. With signs and language we 
have come to a way of achieving communication and congruence among 
people in a community or across tongues by way of translation which 
should take place as a type of interpretation.
How do we communicate ideas among individuals so that we get the 
right meaning? It is by way of using language to convey the intended 
meaning based on comprehensive observation and inner feeling. Hence 
the invention and use of language makes communication possible. As 
we have seen, knowledge depends on a symbolic form of language for 
articulation and communication. Hence the importance of a theory of 
signs to be open to interpretation: This is precisely how the Yjing system 
of signs becomes interpretive and opens to interpretation as a result of 
its onto-generativity from comprehensive observation and inner feeling. 
AN  EP ISTEMIC  INTERPRETAT ION  OF  THE  Y IN -YANG  B INARY  SYSTEM
Knowledge can be seen as a system of yin-yang binaries in open develop-
ment and hence onto-generative. Yang can be said to be what we know 
and yin can be said to be what we do not know. The mutual genera-
tion of yin and yang leads to mutual generation of knowledge and non-
knowledge. We must always go back to the common root of knowledge 
and non-knowledge in terms of the observations and feelings so that 
we can expand our knowledge as higher level of knowledge with larger 
given. The fact is that knowledge exists in many forms, but it always exists 
in interpretation which could give you a new knowledge by broadening it 
or by restricting it. Quine even sees more than that, he sees a contextual 
definition and hence elimination of definite notations. But in this manner 
he comes to presuppose in using language a life-world of observations and 
feelings.
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scope. We have to be reminded that the natural disclosure of patterns of 
what we have observed comprehensively in nature signifies something so 
basic and so fundamental that we cannot ignore it because we see it at 
work on any level of existence and in any domain of life activities. This is 
precisely what yin and yang mean to our observational experience as well 
as our feeling experience. In both we see the conjunction and contrast, 
opposition and complementation of yin and yang as the visible and the 
invisible, the bright and the dark, the firm and the soft, and the moving 
and the resting. The Greek sees these too, but for the Chinese Yijing 
tradition these binary states form an onto-generative system which can 
be extended indefinitely. This is because we can see how yang generates 
yin and vice versa and how the combination of yin and yang generates 
a new set of yin and yang under our proper observation, feeling and in-
terpretation. 
It is in this process the whole system of trigram symbols are gener-
ated and they are generated from the basic symbols yin - - (broken line)
and yang — (solid line). Here by both observation and interpretation, 
we come to say, here is heaven, here is earth, and here is man. Each 
can be seen to have two states, which makes a trigram system of eight 
trigrams. With trigrams we come to hexagrams by natural doubling of 
symbols which is also a natural doubling of situations in the world. This 
can continue indefinitely. Interestingly, the ancient Chinese has found 
the natural number sequence of 2 to the nth power as a natural way of 
extending the manifest with all the nodes of the lattices of the binary yin 
and yang to signify hidden points of beginning power thrust or ending 
result achievement. In this manner all natural numbers are involved in 
the generative production of the gua system which nevertheless remains 
open and generative like numbers. 
The traditional notion of the great ultimate is most suggestive and 
instructive for understanding the beginning and sustaining of the yin-
yang (阴阳) binary system.
The central onto-generative principle is that the one gives rise to 
two which in turn gives to new yin-yang binaries in light of the one root. 
One need to know however what it means to say that there is yin in yang 
and yang in yin: Both yin and yang represent the great ultimate and their 
singular presence involves and presupposes the whole of the originating 
taiji (太极) as the ultimate creative source. Hence the yin in yang is that 
there is potential and implicit whole in yang and similarly for yang in 
yin. We have here a natural definition of the benti, as benti is what has 
its source in the taiji and its body in the yin and yang which results from 
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creativity or onto-generativity of the taiji. Hence benti in its metaphysical 
sense is simply an onto-generative entity which has a unity of yin and 
yang based on taiji to be identified with its source or itself as the source 
so to act on itself.
In the following I shall explain two onto-generative principles of the 
ultimate reality which corresponds to the two onto-generative principles 
of the guan and gan, that is, of onto-generative epistemology. The first 
principle is what we have already discussed, namely the principle of bi-
nary generation of the gua or hexagrams. The binary number of yin and 
yang or 0 and 1 could generate to 64 hexagrams, but there is no limitation 
to 64, because theoretically we could have 128 septagrams and 256 octo-
grams and so on and so forth. These generations all depend on the basic 
onto-generative fact of yin and yang relationship with their underlying 
taiji as the source. Although this may appear to be a mathematical fact, 
it is in fact an onto-generative fact which is covered and represented by 
the mathematical induction: Whatever is true of n is true of n+1 because 
of the onto-regeneration of the benti, because whatever body is generated 
from a source will become a source to generate a body. It is represented 
by the series 
1 → (1 → 2) → (1 → 2 → 3) → (… → n → n+1)
Here “→” means “onto-generates”. We assume that this understanding 
of cosmic reality comes from comprehensive observation. For it is in 
reality that we see how things arise from co-causing relationship or how 
life arises from two genders in union. It is this sort of observation which 
leads to the naturalist theory of five generative elements (wuxing 五行). 
Behind the wuxing there is still the yin-yang at work. 
Now one question comes forward: What do all those hexagrams 
mean? Do they refer to any substantial forms or any realistic situations 
at all? The fact is that they do not refer to any realistic situation nor are 
they eternal forms like Platonic eidos. They are just patterns and configu-
rations which would not become realistic or referential because of or on 
account of the process of guan. The reason is that in the process of guan 
there is no existential commitment to any phenomenon in the totality of 
the scenario open to observation. In other words, there is no reification 
entailed by observation. In fact, we must refrain from reification so that 
that we can see the world as a display of entrenched or free possibilities. 
Yet those forms must be seen as free forms as each line needs not to be 
subject to any bonding and quantification such as in Quine’s observa-
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tion categoricals. This makes it possible to have free interpretation on 
the basis of some real experience of the observer or for that matter the 
diviner who tried to see some meaning out of the patterned relationship 
or/ and some of his own beliefs which provide a basis for interpretation.
Corresponding to the onto-generative principle of feeling in the on-
to-generative principle of onto-generative epistemology is the principle 
of prospective or retrospective existential generalization or particular-
ization. The truth is that any gua could change to any other gua by the 
switching of yin by yang or yang by yin. Although the natural numbers 
6, 7, 8, 9 may have their natural reasons for representing changing or 
non-changing lines, it is clear that any gua can transform into another 
gua. I have come to this conclusion by the fact that any gua can be 
transformed on any line or any combination of lines by contingency. 
This amounts to saying that any gua can become any other gua under a 
number of contingent moves. The philosophical meaning of this is the 
following:
Any configured gua in order to presently relevant and meaningful 
has to be determined by a contingent cause represented by a changing 
line. By manipulating the varying line one can arrive at a realistic gua 
intended to capture and represent the current situation. In this sense 
the gua becomes incorporated and realized with full meaning to be de-
termined by whatever is known about a given situation. This point is 
important because no gua will determine what your situation is. You 
always can in this sense reify the gua by existentially instantiating it, 
namely by identifying our meaningful reference with the lines which 
have positional and dynamic meanings independent of your real refer-
ence. But once existentially instantiated, the gua becomes a real situation 
in which you are situated and thus realistic prediction or explanation can 
be made. The question is: what is the occasion for making the existential 
instantiation possible. Again the answer is simple, namely our feelings. 
It is through our feelings that we come to read the gua existentially. Our 
feelings tell the proximate reference and meaning and then we let the 
form be applied to. Hence we can let the second onto-generative prin-
ciple of the ontoprogress in process learning as requiring an extra insight 
for its existential particulation. We may call this principle Principle of 
Onto-ontological Identity and Reification. 
We may now distinguish the system of knowledge based on what we 
have observed from non-system (an implicit system) of what we have 
also observed or not yet observed. The latter could eventually become 
systemized. We need a larger system to integrate them into oneness with 
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coherence and consistency. Given this new larger system, a non-system 
could be again implicitly generated. Again this non-system is again to 
be systemized and then to be integrated with a future explicit system. It 
is up to us to find a way to integrate both. This type of process can recur 
and go on indefinitely. The process is naturally observable and is sub-
ject to a logic of integration as illustrated by integrating the Ptolemian 
System into the Newtonian System which accounts for the Ptolemian 
system. The Newtonian system is later integrated into the Einstein Rela-
tivity Theory. Consequently, there comes the non-system (an implicit 
system) of quantum fields, which is yet to be integrated with the world 
of matter and energy. The ultimate integration is first with biological 
science and phenomena of life, and then with experience of mind and 
human nature. Thus knowledge forms a progressive lattice structure of 
the yin-yang. The interesting thing is that it always remains as yin-yang 
dynamics.
This process is also ontogenetically justified as the yin-yang structure 
but with a dynamic process of becoming and reconstruction. We can see 
how this process embodies a conscientious reflection on the results of 
science development as suggested by Thomas Kuhn in his 1962 book 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. It also provides a method combining 
confirmation and falsification. 
ONTO-GENERAT I VE  KNOWLEDGE  AS   COMPLEX  SYSTEM  
ON  F I VE  LEVELS
A complex system is composed of at least two units of knowing which are 
linked to form and generate more of the same and this lead to a system 
of lattices which has two sets rooted in one root set. A complex system 
is generative if it is open to potential indefinite generation of systems of 
binary systems and their binary sub-content. This system can be gener-
ated in the like manner as the Yijing system of binary yin-yang forces /
states/ stable natures. In fact, this Yijing system provides a model for 
knowledge generation and construction. It seeks out a common root for 
two systems and uses this root to project an overarching system of the 
two systems generated by the root. To illustrate, physics and chemistry 
as two disciplines can be said to be rooted in one source of reality and 
pointing to an overall system of quantum theory of subatomic and mo-
lecular forces capable of explaining the differentiating the physical from 
the chemical in light of the same source or root. 
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In health sciences one could also see the root of differentiating Western 
medicine from the Chinese medicine, yet in tracing their common root 
in the ecology of human body we can see how we may develop a system 
of Western medicine in conjugation with Chinese medicine and vice 
versa when both can be considered onto-generative.
We may now divide the system of onto-generative knowledge on five 
levels of understanding knowledge as onto-generating process:
The level of Source and Foundation (ben 本): The source is not the 
same thing as foundation, but a source or root that generates a system of 
conceptual symbols capable of articulation or existential particulariza-
tion or generalization. 
The Level of Body and System (ti 体): The body is either the yin-
yang existence with underlying principle of unification and generation 
which enables the bodies to go on to give rise to other bodies, or we can 
use the term ti body as a metaphor for system and system building. It 
consists in having a system of capabilities and abilities developed and 
generated from our learning from experience (observations) and cultiva-
tion (reflections) on experience in an effort to coordinate and integrate 
understanding and action. Bodies can range from cosmic wholeness of 
stars and nebulae to living organism of humans. 
The Level of Epistemic Embodiment and Communication (zhi 知): 
As human person we need to become aware and assured of what we 
know as a matter of experience (Erfahrung and Erlebnis) so that the body 
of knowledge becomes embodiment in the human person and thus can 
be functionally acted upon on one hand, and yet on the other hand, to 
be communicated to others in the form of language and discourse. What 
is to be acted upon may not be communicable to others in language and 
discourse. We may then speak of implicit and explicit forms of know-
ledge as Michael Polanyi does.
The Level of Use and Application (yong 用): We can apply what we 
come to know from the above to applying to whatever subject or object 
for whatever purpose and thus generate skills and technology and even 
information: two aspects
The Level of Action and Practice (xing 行): We decide what we ought 
to do on the basis of what we come to know of the world, others and 
ourselves. We have to be able to generate such practical knowledge per-
taining to value and moral goals with regard to others and ourselves or 
the world. We are responsible for what we know and the action based 
from such knowledge. This is what I have called benti or onto-generative 
axiology and onto-generative ethics and morality. 
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ONTO-GENERAT I VE  /  MACRO-  EP ISTEMOLOG ICAL  TRAD I T ION  
IN  CH INESE  PH I LOSOPHY
As we have pointed out, the Chinese philosophy tradition is in reality 
an macro-onto-generative epistemological tradition for it is always con-
cerned with how to know the whole and full truth of being. In the first 
place, as we read in the Yizhuan as commentary of the ancient Yijing, 
the term zhi (知 knowing) always has the connotation of realizing reality. 
Thus one speaks of “the Qian power knows the world by its ability to 
transform, the Kun power enables itself to be receptive by its simplic-
ity” (乾以易知, 坤以简能). Then there are debates on whether knowledge 
in this sense is easy whereas action is difficult. In a sense it is clear 
that we could easily know the world as a benti or ourselves as benti by 
comprehensive observation and deep inner feeling. But once we come to 
know the benti of myself, how to substantiate it by cultivation becomes 
a challenge and this is the reason as to why we can see knowledge as 
easy and action as difficult (知易行难). But when we come to the modern 
world, it is Dr. Sun Yatsen who reverses the order of easy and difficult 
by insisting that knowledge is difficult where action is easy (知难行易). 
What is the reason of reversal? The answer is that Dr. Sun is speaking of 
scientific knowledge which requires a process of investigation and theory 
construction and then confirmation of the theory by observation or inter-
pretation of experience. The two theses need not be incompatible as they 
deal with different ideas of knowledge. There is a third position which 
is represented by Wang Yangming in his thesis that knowledge and ac-
tion are one (知行合一). This thesis could be easily seen as a matter of 
onto-generative epistemology as it also presupposes an onto-generative 
metaphysics like of the Yjing. 
In the wake of the Yijing onto-generative epistemology we have in 
Confucius the claim of knowing the mandate of heaven (zhitianming, 
知天命) and knowing people (zhiren 知人). In Mencius we also read the 
question of knowing one’s nature (zhixing 知性), knowing heaven (zhi-
tian 知天) and perhaps knowing one’s mind (zhixin 知心, so that one 
can fulfill one’s mind, namely jinxin 尽心). All these forms of knowledge 
are possible because we can see knowledge as benti system or onto-gen-
erative system in which we as human minds of understanding have a 
part to play in forming a understanding of a whole system of relation-
ship and practice or value. There is no isolated knowledge which may 
not point to something one could cultivate oneself to know. This is not 
to say that objective investigation is not important, but that investiga-
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tion of things will deepen my intention and mind so that we can know 
more about ourselves and others and thus know about what makes this 
unity of knowledge and practice toward a more developed person pos-
sible. This is how Mencius could argue that once you have fulfill your 
mind you could know your nature and thus to know heaven by fulfilling 
and knowing your nature. Knowledge just emerges or supervenes in the 
process of a web of unifying or integrating theory and practice. It is an 
onto-generative process. 
We may use the Daxue argument from investigation of things to ex-
tension of knowledge and eventually to the fulfilling the goal of bringing 
peace to the world as an classic example of how knowledge can be onto-
generative in generating practice and theory toward an desirable end:
In the Daxue 大学 we read:
“Once things are investigated, knowledge takes place, following ar-
rival of knowledge, one’s intention would become sincere. With sin-
cere intention, one’s mind will be rectified. By rectified mind one 
would achieve a moral character. Moral character leads to good fam-
ily, good family leads to effective ordering of a state, which would 
lead to peace of the world.” (Translation mine) (“物格而后知至, 
知至而后意诚, 意诚而后心正, 心正而后身修, 身修而后家齐, 家齐而后国治, 
国治而后天下平”.)
From this we can indeed define an “onto-generative knowledge” as a 
state of believing which is justified on a ground which would lead to 
fulfilling practical ends of life and community through a process which 
integrates human experiences of world and humanity. One cannot deny 
that knowledge could generate practice while practice would lead to fur-
ther practical knowledge or theoretical knowledge for achieving a goal.18
By the same token, we can argue for Confucian knowledge of li (知礼) 
and knowledge of ren (知仁) in Confucius and the Mencian knowing the 
language (知言), Mozi’s knowing rightness (知义) and Xunzi’s knowing 
the way (知道). I wish to give one more piece of knowledge to do with 
welcoming friend and controlling oneself in the Confucian Analects. We 
have Confucius saying the following: 
18 Contrast this with virtue-epistemological definition of knowledge a state 
of belief arising from acts of intellectual virtue (Sosa and Zagzesbski).
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“To learn and often review what one has learned, is that a joyful 
experience? A friend comes from afar, is this event a pleasant thing? 
Not being known by others and yet not becoming angry, is this 
a worthy attitude of the Junzi?” (Translation mine) (学而时习之, 
不亦悦乎? 有朋自远方来, 不亦乐乎? 不知而不愠, 不亦君子乎? ) 
We are here witnessing three forms of onto-generativity: the intrinsic 
feeling of joy from one’s own action, a feeling of pleasure from an outer 
event, and finally a reflective virtuous self-transcending act of mind. Of 
course there are always other forms of onto-generativity.
When we come to the Neo-Confucian philosophy we are confronted 
with the ideas of knowledge by virtues (德性之知) and knowledge by 
hearing and seeing (见闻之知). It is important to see that the speech of 
knowledge by virtues is intended to generate knowledge of virtues by 
having virtues. In this regard it is not the same as virtue-epistemology 
which declares that we could have reliable or responsible knowledge be-
cause we have certain intellectual virtues. Yet it cannot be excluded that 
for both classical Confucians and Song-Ming Neo-Confucians like the 
Cheng Brothers and Zhang Zai, to be able to know people or oneself it is 
necessary that one be sincere and (诚) and trustworthy (信). Perhaps, un-
der the influence of Daoism and Chan Buddhism, the Neo-Confucians 
like Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi also hold that we come to know heaven the 
ultimate and li and dao by cultivating a concentrated oneness of mind 
without leaning (主一无适). Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming, on the 
other hand, believes by exercising one’s innate knowledge of good (liang-
zhi 良知) one could come to see benti in all things and hence forms one 
body with them. One answer to the question as to how is onto-generative 
epistemology possible is because we are part of an onto-generative cos-
mos in which as we have come to see all things as interlinked in a system 
of existentially instantiating web of relations and mutual implication 
founded on our basic experiences of life. 
On these ground we may see that we could know that we may not 
know because we do not know the sources or the bodies generated from 
the source (知不知), but sometimes we may not know that we know 
something (不知知) because we are prevented from claiming the know-
ledge by bias or prejudice in denying a source or a relevant object. Simi-
larly, we may not know that we do not have knowledge (不知不知) as we 
again can become blind and arrogant in misplacing our understanding or 
losing our clarity of mind. It is of course only when we are clear and fair-
minded that we are able to reflect on what we know and re-certify our 
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knowledge (知知). We must see that like any system of knowledge onto-
generative knowledge seeks consistency and coherence and its onto-gen-
erativity is a matter of internal consistency and coherence, for one has to 
see that one’s idea of a thing or a person and self must be well rooted in 
a source which should also be well-rooted in still a deeper source or in 
an ultimate common source, and that this source must be seen as giving 
rise to the result of what we come to know, namely a body or an object 
which forms itself and give rise to other relations in a system. 
One can finally come to see how a macro-epistemology could relate 
to micro-meso-epistemology by inclusion (包容), comprehension (超容) 
and transcendental integration (超融).
ONTO-GENERAT I VE  SYSTEM AND  ONTO-GENERAT I VE 
RESOLUT ION  OF  EP ISTEMOLOG ICAL  R IDDLES
What is the ultimate source or ground which gives rise to and yet justi-
fies knowledge? We see that in some way time and space forms an open 
system of change and transformation in which all things may take place 
and thus all items of knowledge can be said to be generated and become 
justifiable by reference to its well-formedness and its rootedness. Against 
this generative background which is also their logical ground, all items 
of knowledge would have the following features:
 – All existing items are directly or indirectly connected
 – They form a system which is indeterminate, open and changing
 – There is incompleteness of items
 – There is indeterminateness of items
 – Knowledge changes because of the creative change of the whole 
system
 – Knowledge changes because of reflection and creativity of us as 
knowers
 – Knowledge can give rise to higher forms of knowledge by interpre-
tation19
19 How is knowledge open to translation and interpretation? The function 
of translation is preservative while the function of interpretation is integra-
tive. Thus a sentence as understood is rooted in our experience and yet can 
be extended either to other languages in its attributed original meaning 
or to be enriched by integrating with new experience and understanding 
78
On the other hand, our knowledge can be evaluated in terms of scopes 
of comprehension, simplicity, practical use and moral action. 
We also see human knowledge as an onto-generative order with rich 
content which covers at least the following:
• Experiential – aesthetic and perceptual
• Cognitive – conceptual and analytical 
• Transcendental – categorical and synthetic
• Originative – onto-generative
• Referential – objectual-scientific
• Valuational – evaluative
• Normative – practical-creative
There is no empty space and no empty time, there could be synthetic a 
priori concepts and propositions in onto-generative contexts: for example 
we could mention any law-like statements which we would hold true no 
matter what, for example F=MA, E=MC2 which we can see as examples 
of knowledge as onto-generative. Besides we must see our knowledge as 
an open whole system rooted on some ultimate source-identity.
With our understanding of onto-generative knowledge and episte-
mology we are in a position to tackle a few epistemological riddles or 
puzzles in modern epistemology without the benefit of onto-generative 
epistemology:
GOODMAN ’S  NEW R IDDLE  OF  INDUCT ION
How do we establish inductive validity? Why must the future resemble 
the past? From Hume’s old riddle on matters of fact versus relations of 
ideas, we may not have any knowledge of the world in so far as the world 
is considered independent of our perception without onto-generativity. 
But we do have the knowledge due to our ability to apply understand-
ing to sensible experiences onto-generatively. Then there is the New 
Riddle of Induction proposed by Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and 
Forecast 1963): How do we choose predicates of blue and green instead 
against a new or enlarged horizon of understanding. e. g. the meaning and 
interpretation of “Gavagai”, Observation and feeling have the function of 
identifying, predicating and inter-predicating, which in turn combine to 
give results in interpretation.
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bleen and grue for describing the future events in light of the fact that 
bleen/grue and blue/green are interdefiniable. This question is to be seen 
as a matter of entrenched use of language by Goodman apart from his 
proposal of projectivity. But from the onto-generative epistemology the 
use of predicates have to be founded on experience of some source. If 
we have no actual experience of change of the colors there is no reason 
to introduce predicates of bleen and grue in the first place which brings 
superfluous content of change to the simple quality experience of blue 
and green. The very notion of benti or onto-generativity must conserve 
simplicity and scope as suggested by our onto-generative experience. 
This is the idea and principle of jianyi (简易) suggested in the idea of 
benti from the Zhouyi.
THE  GETT I ER  PROBLEM
This problem shows how reality or truth may not be necessarily revealed 
by true belief with justification or evidence. This is because to say that 
belief P is true is not to say that P is true because of evidence but that the 
belief is justified and it is also true. Hence the truthfulness of a belief has 
no necessary connection with the justification of the belief. There is a 
logical defect in assuming essential relationship between “P is true” and 
“S believes that P is true and S is justified in believing so”. Despite many 
fixings, the Quine analysis remains insightful: the propositional attitude 
of believing that P is opaque and it only represents a relation between S 
and a string of words. This means that knowledge has to remain either 
intuitively true or true as supposition or hypothesis to be indefinitely 
confirmed. We may therefore have to see knowledge as interpretive of 
experience which may have to confront the reality as a whole system of 
beliefs which cohere. This again depends on the notion of a system or 
body or ti 体 as rooted in reality. There is an onto-generative relation 
between truth and knowledge as between ben 本 and ti 体. Perhaps an 
analysis in terms of virtue-epistemology is relevant here for we need to 
reflect on traits of our intellectual character in order to forge a trustwor-
thy relation of onto-generation between our intellectual virtues and the 
knowledge we come to claim.
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ANOMALOUS  MONISM
Anomalous Monism is monism of material substance (token identity) 
and pychophysical dualism (type diversity) of predicates. Its paradoxi-
cality lies in: 1) Each mental state corresponds to a bodily state 2) Mental 
predicates group bodily states under the predicates 3) No possible trans-
lation or reduction of mental terms to bodily terms. This means that 
there is a world of mental activities over and above and yet linked to rel-
evant physical states. Following Davidson, we may call this supervience. 
The question is to explain what, how and why is there supervience of the 
mental over the physical occurs. This means that we have to recognize 
that the mental emerges from the physical in a experienced observational 
framework of onto-generativity over long period of time. It means that 
we have to recognize reality of the mind by way of admitting the hard 
fact of non-reduction and the hard fact of experiencing emergence of 
the mind by simply becoming conscious or self-conscious. We may also 
appeal to empathy and imagination for observing and understanding the 
other person’s unspoken thought. 
Onto-generative epistemology recognizes autonomous activities of 
the mind once it becomes free from physicalistic restraints, yet it also 
requires a physical source for achieving a mental body or mental know-
ledge because there is an onto-generative relationship between the two.
CONCLUS ION
In the above I have pointed out how Quine’s new model for analyzing 
and constructing knowledge as a language system with symbolic mean-
ing subject to interpretations in some very interesting way resembles the 
onto-generative epistemology in Chinese philosophy. I have brought out, 
formulated and discussed this benti-epistemology in Chinese philosophy 
in light of an extension of Quine’s model and what I have developed 
as Onto-generative Metaphysics and Onto-generative Epistemology in 
terms of interpretation based on two onto-generative principles for each. 
However I have not say much about the interpretation involved in the 
formation of each. But certainly we can regard the way that these two 
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disciplines are formed as constituting what I would like to call an onto-
generative hermeneutics 本体诠释学.20
I have illuminated the implicit Chinese view on knowing and know-
ledge and at the same time expanded Quine’s naturalized epistemology 
on the basis of a non-reductive metaphysics of experience, observation.
and reflection to a holistic macro-epistemology which has a onto-gen-
erative structure. Besides, I have indicated how the benti-epistemology 
is needed for generating a benti-axiology (本体价值学) and benti-ethics 
(本体伦理学) which would explain and justify Chinese Philosophy of 
heaven 天, way 道, nature 性, determination 命/ principle 理, vital force 气, 
heart-mind 心, human nature 性 with its axiological and moral contents. 
20 It is to be noticed: the 本体诠释学 has been in the past identified as 
“onto-hermeneutics” which in actuality is a short form for “onto-generative 
hermeneutics.

ASUMAN LÄTZER - LASAR  (COLOGNE)
THE GUODIAN MANUSCRIPTS IN THEIR 
 ARCHAEOLOGICAL-HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The following paper deals with a grave tomb that has been excavated 
in the Hubei Province in 1993, and which contained bamboo slips with 
philosophical writings on them. These bamboo slips and their content 
became tremendously important for Chinese philosophy and its his-
tory, because they seem to contain probably the oldest writings of the 
Laozi Book (Daodejing). Therefore the dating of the manuscripts forms 
a crucial point in the whole dispute about the genesis of the Daodejing 
and its relation to the earlier existing Confucianism. This is why after 
the publication in the year 1998 Allen and Williams immediately or-
ganised an international conference about the Guodian bamboo slips,1 
where various scholars discussed the content of the writings, linguistics 
and style, as well as the possibility of a single or multiple authorship.2 
However, the content of the bamboo slips also served as starting point 
for the philosophical thoughts of Guo Yi which became finally the basis 
for this conference. 
In this context it was the wish of the editors to include a paper that 
provides information about the physical circumstances these writings 
came from. Hence this paper does not present a new analysis, but rather 
a review of the latest publications about the tomb and its findings. My 
aim here can only be to give an impression about the archaeological-
1 S. Allan/C. Williams (eds.), The Guodian Laozi: Proceedings of the In-
ternational Conference, Dartmouth College, May 1998. Early China Special 
Monograph Series, 5 (Berkeley 2000), passim.
2 Ibid.
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historical background the bamboo slips came from. At last, this paper 
should be perceived as an interdisciplinary supplement to the philo-
sophical contributions in this volume.
HISTOR ICAL  BACKGROUND
The state of Chu was a vassal state of the Zhou Dynasty, that, according 
to the myth, was founded by the grandson of the Yellow Emperor. Dur-
ing the Spring and Autumn period in the 7th century BC, the Chu capital 
moved from Danyang to Ying.3 The Chu had several military battles, 
especially in the 6th century, when they expanded into the North, South 
and East. However through the 4th and 3rd century they got besieged from 
the West by the powerful becoming Qin State under the reign of Qin Shi 
Huang Di, the later called “First emperor of China”. In the year 278 BC 
the Chu finally lost their capital to the Qin invaders.4 Though, the Chu 
state remained autonomous until 223 BC, but then it became destroyed 
by the Qin.5
The philosophical-religious orientation of the Chu people was a 
mixture between Daoism, some native shaman folk belief and selected 
Confucian ideals. The territorial expansion additionally fostered the 
mixing of diverse indigenious cultures. Nearly 40 smaller states were 
annexed during the Chu-expansion. In the Chu period especially music 
and songs became the highest artistry, but also literature, as the many 
findings of bamboo slips in many other tombs are showing.
3 B. Q. Li, The Origins of Chu culture, in: S. Allan/C. Williams (eds.), The 
Guodian Laozi: Proceedings of the International Conerence, Dartmouth 
College, May 1998. Early China Special Monograph Series, 5 (Berkeley 
2000), 10. The Spring and Autumn period lasted between 770–476 BC.
4 R. G. Henricks, Lao Tzu´s Tao Te Ching: A Translation of the Startling 
New Documents Found at Guodian (New York 2000), 4; Li 2000, op. cit., 
10.
5 Li 2000, op. cit., 10.
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THE  EXCAVAT ION  OF  THE  GRAVE
The Guodian village is nowadays located 9 km away and as part of the 
Jingmen city in the Hubei province.6 The city Ying functioned as capital 
of the Chu state for about 400 years. In the Warring States period the 
people of Ying frequented the area around mount Ji, which served as a 
cemetery and ritual center.7 The landscape of the cemetery possesses the 
perfect geomantic qualification for building tombs. This belief, called 
fengshui, used astronomical and geographical information, which were 
indispensable for performing any burial. Not surprisingly the archaeolo-
gists could count about 300 grave mounds ordered in more than twenty 
groups that are barely excavated yet.8 Our Guodian manuscripts were 
found in the tomb called 楚墓一号 (Chu mu yi hao) that belongs to group 
I. The tomb is clearly identified as a Chu tomb, because of its orientation, 
style and design.9
The tomb was robbed several times, at least in October 1993. A tun-
nel was digged down to the southeast corner of the grave chamber. Us-
ing a hacksaw the robber cut through the outer coffin to reach to the 
precious grave pieces. As a result, rainwater came easily into the grave 
and destroyed the monument in a severe way. That was the reason why 
in the year 1993 Chinese archaeologists from the Jingmen City Museum 
decided to carry out a rescue excavation of the tomb.10 
The earth-built tomb itself is rectangular and lies in 6.92 m depth. 
A nine m long ramp11, coming from the East, was built to bring the body 
and the grave furniture down into the grave chamber.12 In some graves 
even horses and chariots were brought down the ramp and left in the 
6 Jingmen shi bowuguan 荊門市博物館. Jingmen Guodian yihao Chu-
mu 荊門郭店一號楚墓. Wenwu 文物 1997, 7, 3, 5.
7 L. von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000–250 
BC): The archaeological evidence (University of California Los Angeles 
2006), 4.
8 Henricks 2000, op. cit., 4.
9 Ibid., 4.
10 Jingmen shi bowuguan 1997, op. cit., 7, 3, 5.
11 The ramps occur in graves of the Rank N/O, later of the Rank P, Q 
and R in Zhaojiahu. At Yutaishan and Jiudian are less examples. L. von 
Falkenhausen, Social Ranking in Chu Tombs: The Mortuary Background 
of the Warring States Manuscript Finds. Monumenta Serica, 51, 2003, 474.
12 Z. X. Liu, An Overview of Tomb Number One at Jingmen Guodian, in: 
S. Allan/C. Williams (eds.), The Guodian Laozi: Proceedings of the Inter-
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tomb. But it was not a standard that every grave in the Zhou period had 
one of these ramps.13 The coffin chamber of Chumu yihao is 3.4 m long 
and 2 m wide in total and has two coffin layers14, in which the outer cof-
fin was wooden.15 The corpse was layed down on a sleeping platform in 
the inner coffin with his head directing to the East.16 The chamber was 
also divided in three compartments: one for the inner coffin, one above 
the head and the third at the deceased´s left side.17 The upper comparte-
ment and the one at his side were filled with all the accompanying burial 
objects. This arrangement is typical for the Chu Culture and could not 
be seen in the tombs of the Central Plains region.18 Around the second 
half of the 5th century BC tombs became oriented horizontal and concep-
tualised as room.19 From then on the grave tomb mirrors the occupants 
terrestrial domicile but under earth.20 
F IND INGS 
The grave Chumu yihao comprises 58 individual objects mostly made of 
metal. But it contained also findings made of various other materials like 
wood, jade, lacquer, bamboo, ceramic or textile. Graded sets of ceramic 
and bronze vessels are essential in the ceremonial context.21 Besides, 
the tomb possessed the usual assemblage of bronze vessels, like tripods 
national Conerence, Dartmouth College, May 1998. Early China Special 
Monograph Series, 5 (Berkeley 2000), 24.
13 During the Middle Warring States Period the shape of the entrance to 
the tomb (sloping passageway) was adapted by lower ranks, see von Falken-
hausen 2003 , op. cit., 51.
14 Which was the minimum, see von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 52.
15 Liu 2000, op. cit., 26.
16 See Jingmen shi bowuguan, op. cit., 37, fig. 4.
17 Falkenhausen considers Rank N/O to have lateral compartments, but 
these ranks have only one coffin! See von Falkenhausen 2006, op. cit., 382. 
Tombs with two coffin layers are considered to hold Rank M, mediumsize. 
See von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 464–465, 468 and 473. 
18 Li 2000, op. cit., 11.
19 Von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 444.
20 Ibid., 473; von Falkenhausen, op. cit., 306–316.
21 Ibid., 443 and 452. If ritual vessels are made of different materials and 
also both present, it may be considered that the occupant holds the Rank O, 
see ibid., 479.
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called ding and liquid containers called hu. The style of the vessels that 
we are facing in this tomb is typical for the Chu burials of the middle 
Warring States Period. Li compared the vessels especially with the ones 
of the Baoshan and Xinyang tomb.22 
Weapons, like spears, swords, knifes and halberds,23 take the second 
largest part of the whole material. I can only highlight outstanding items 
like the highly decorated head of a pike or sword-shaped spear that 
shows ornamental spiral designs inlaid in gold. Furthermore there are 
swirling cloud patterns, animal-heads and phoenixes illustrated on the 
sheath. This notably decorated sheath was encased in silk and leather.24 
Besides the grave contained a bronze sword which scabbard was coated 
with black lacquer.25 Swords are found in almost every tomb no matter 
which rank the occupant had.26 Furthermore a bronze halberd with no 
handle bar shows a stylised bird design.27 Worth mentioning is the share 
of agricultural/working tools, like a sickle or a dagger-axe for example, 
as well as the share of horse and chariot paraphernalia.28 
Personal objects that have been used in the daily life or luxury items 
were enclosed to the grave inventary after the mid of the 5th century 
BC.29 In our tomb for example is a bronze mirror painted with red and 
black lacquer, an exceptional fine work.30 The mirror is decorated with 
calyx and cloud patterns as well as illustrations of phoenixes. The mir-
ror was produced out of two bronze castings in which between a piece of 
22 Li 2000, op. cit., 18 and 21, fig. 8. The tombs are dating from the second 
half until the end of the 4th century BC. The deceased in the Baoshan tomb 
No. 2 was a highest-ranking official, while the one from Wangshan tomb 
No. 1 was a member of the royal family; see von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 
451.
23 See also the chart in Jingmen shi bowuguan, op. cit., 7, 48 in the center 
above.
24 Liu 2000, op. cit., 27, fig. 13, 7. 
25 Ibid., 26, fig. 12, 5.
26 Von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 478.
27 Liu 2000, op. cit., 27, fig. 12, 6.
28 Jingmen shi bowuguan, op. cit., 48. After von Falkenhausen horse-and-
chariot fittings are found in tombs of Rank M and N until the Middle 
Springs and Autumn period. In Warring States Period only a small number 
of tombs with paraphernalia occurs. Von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 478.
29 Ibid., 444 and 452.
30 Jingmen shi bowuguan, op. cit., 39, fig. 8, 1.
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silk were put in.31 Bronze mirrors are a common grave gift from the 2nd 
millenium onwards. But only the Chu people painted the mirrors with 
lacquer. At this time lacquer was very expensive. The price was ten times 
that of bronze. A group of wooden objects like the hilt for a knife, a neck-
rest and diverse combs describe also items of daily use which may not 
be expensive, but indispensible for life and therefore for the afterlife.32 
Wooden figurines as no. 4 are only found in grave contexts.33 They are 
considered to function as companion, servant or protector from the evil. 
Outstanding seems a round toilet case made of lacquer, that usually was 
used by women. It should contain different toilet articles. The lid and the 
rims were accentuated with bands of abstract ornaments.34 
Other very personal objects come from the deads clothing, as the 
simply decorated cloth pearls.35 Item no. 5 is a bird-headed walking staff 
made of bronze with splendid gold and silver inlays.36 Liu identified the 
bird-head as a “recumbent dove”.37 Another zoomorphic shape can be 
seen in the belt hook made of jade. While its shape forms a dragon, on 
its body are hybrids — phoenix head and dragon body — illustrated.38 
Normally in tombs of the Zhou Dynasty we find a set of bronze bells. 
These bells take an important role in burial rituals. But none was found 
in our grave. The only music instrument was a seven-stringed zither 
called qin.39
However the major part of the findings are the bamboo slips with 
804 pieces.40 The bamboo slips were aptly found in the head compart-
ment of the coffin. They were covered with mud, that no character could 
be even seen. After a careful documentation and numbering of the slips, 
so that the archaeologist could reconstruct the order of the slips after-
wards, they were brought to conservators who cleaned them for about 
31 Liu 2000, op. cit., 29.
32 Jingmen shi bowuguan, op. cit., 42, fig. 16, 5 and 6–8.
33 Ibid., 42, fig. 16, 4.
34 Ibid., 42, fig. 1, 5, 1.
35 Ibid., 39, fig. 8, 3 and 4; 43, fig. 20.
36 Ibid., 39, fig. 8, 5.
37 Liu 2000, op. cit., 29, fig. 13, 5.
38 Ibid., 29, fig. 13, 2. Jingmen shi bowuguan, op. cit., 43, fig. 17. Intertwined 
supernatural beasts as a new concept of representing the cosmos arises dur-
ing the Warring States period, see von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 472.
39 Jingmen shi bowuguan, op. cit., 41, fig. 13.
40 Ibid., 44, fig. 22 and 48 left side of the chart.
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three months.41 The cleaning process exposed 730 slips with writings on 
them. Thereafter the scientists could separate the texts from each other 
by distinguishing their optic characteristics (shape of the slips and dis-
tance between the binding marks), calligraphic style and also semantic 
content. The optic characteristics are crucial, because ancient bamboo 
slips made by one hand, have the accurately same length, binding dis-
tance and shape. This is how the 71 Laozi slips were sorted into three 
groups.42 Laozi A contains 39 slips, each 32.3 cm long with beveled ends. 
The distance of the binding is about 13 cm wide. Additional the charac-
ters are smaller and near by each other than in the other two groups.43 
Laozi B consists of 18 slips, each 30.6 cm long with flat ends. The bind-
ing is also 13 cm wide.44 The 14 slips of Laozi C are quite smaller: only 
26.5 cm long, and the binding is at 10.8 cm. But the ends have the same 
flat shape as the B-slips.45 Manuscripts made of bamboo slips describes 
the “economic wealth and individual preference”.46
CONTENT  OF  THE  MANUSCR IPTS
First of all we have to admit that the combination and sorting of the 
text slips is honorably done, but also a troublesome work, that finally 
cannot be expected to be without possible mistakes.47 However, the re-
cent sorting is the most accepted version by the scholars until now. The 
scientists could decipher 16 different philosophical texts.48 Beside the 
Laozi texts and the Tai yi sheng shui, which is an cosmological essay, 
the other texts are largely of Confucian nature. The main themes going 
through all texts are self-cultivation (xiushen 修身) and state governance 
41 H. Peng, Post-Excavation Work on the Guodian Bamboo-Slip. Laozi: A 
Few Points of Explanation, in: S. Allan/C. Williams (eds.), The Guodian 
Laozi: Proceedings of the International Conference, Dartmouth College, 
May 1998. Early China Special Monograph Series (Berkeley 2000), 33 and 
37, figures.
42 Peng 2000, op. cit., 33–34.
43 Henricks 2000, op. cit., 6–7.
44 Ibid., 7–8.
45 Ibid., 8.
46 Von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 486.
47 Liu points out, that the sequence of the slips was muddled, see Liu 2000, 
op. cit., 30.
48 Henricks 2000, op. cit., 5.
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(zhiguo 治國). Some scholars postulate to recognize Laozi C and Tai yi 
sheng shui as one philosophical text, because of the same style of the 
characters and slips.49 The content also seems to fit. We will await fur-
ther discussions in the future. Some texts can possibly be ascribed to 
their authors. For example the Ziyi (text no. 3) was regarded as part of 
the classic “book of rites”, although Li Xueqin postulated it as a work of 
master Zi Si, the grandson of Confucius. Li suggested the same author 
for the Wuxing (text no. 6). In the Guodian tomb it happened to be, that 
these two texts were bundled together, which might support Lis theory.50 
In this case altogether 8 texts could now be identified as the formerly lost 
work of Zi Si.51 But we have to be careful with this conclusion, unless 
there is no true evidence.
The Guodian Laozi is a collection of sections from the present 
known Daodejing, the book of the way and virtue. It contains 31 of the 
current 81 chapters.52 Therefore we cannot expect the same concentra-
tion of philosophical content in the bamboo slips as in the present Laozi 
book. Figure 1 shows a list of the distinctive concepts that are included 
or missing in the Guodian slips after Henricks research.53 Textual analy-
sis is still in progress, so it might be incomplete. Béky assumed that the 
early Daoism sympathizes more with Confucianism according to the 
concept of ethics.54 Guo Yis researches are following this direction. He 
states that the Guodian Laozi is an early version/an Ur-text, that was 
written by a first Lao Zi.55 Then he found out that the later version does 
not contain the chapters about the “art of ruling” nor the ones with a 
legalist connotation.56 That is why he supposes them as additions made 
by a second Lao Dan. The historian Sima Qian of the 1st century BC 
mentions the possible second Lao Dan, who had a meeting with the 
Duke Xian of Qin in the year 374 BC.57 Guo Yi comes to the conclusion 
that after this point actually the gap between these two philosophical 
schools became insurmountable.
49 Ibid., 5.
50 Ibid., 5.
51 Ibid., 5.
52 Ibid., 17.
53 Ibid., 17–19.
54 G. Béky, Die Welt des Tao (Freiburg/München 1972), 28.
55 Henricks 2000, op. cit., 20.
56 Ibid., 21.
57 Ibid., 20–21.
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Fig. 1 Occurence of terms used in the Guodian bamboo slips 
in comparison to the Daodejing
included terms in chapters missing terms in chapters
6 of 10 deal with wuwei 
(無為, do nothing)
1 of 8 is discussing the 
Dao (道) in detail
2 of 2 with shiwushi (事無事, serves 
with no concern for affairs)
0 of 5 refer to the Dao as “the One”
5 of 6 with pu (樸, genuine, 
natural, uncarved wood)
1 of 6 mentions tian dao/tian zhi 
dao (天道/天之道, way of heaven)
2 of 3 with zhizhu (知足, be 
content with one’s lot)
0 of 6 about feminine mode of 
behaviour, passive and weak 
overcoming the active and strong
2 of 2 with zhizhi (知止, know 
when it is time to stop)
0 of 4 about water
2 of 5 about the “mother”-metapher
0 of 3 about “mother-infant” like 
“Way — the ten thousand things”
nothing beyond chapter 66 
of the present Laozi
no “anti-aristocracy” chapter
5 of 20 use the phrase 
“therefore the sage …
 
The exceptional fact, that inside the tomb were no divination records, 
but only this philosophical texts, is still an unsolved problem.58 The 
function of the philosophical texts cannot be considered of apotropaic 
service as usual. Explanation can be given by the fact of robbery, and that 
we don´t know, if and which slips were actually stolen. Another indica-
tive argument might have be seen in the enclosed text Ziyi (text no. 3), 
in which there is written that one should “not perform divination, nor 
ritual”! At least this would correlate with the statement about a decline 
of ritual during the Warring States Period.59
58 Ibid., 5.
59 Von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 492.
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DAT ING  OF  THE  GRAVE
The dating is essential for the originality of the Daodejing. The destruc-
tion of the capital Ying by the Qin people in the year 278 BC gives us a 
terminus ante quem for the dating of the tomb. That means, it must be 
errected and sealed at least before 278 BC! The small findings lead to 
further information. Firstly, to accompany bamboo strips into the grave 
has been a development that happened in the Warring States Period.60 
For a narrower time span Li Boqian compared the style of the vessels 
from the Guodian tomb with the ones from the Baoshan tomb No. 2, that 
is dated to the year 316 BC.61 He noticed strong similarities between the 
assemblages. He even thinks that the bronze mirrors may derive from the 
same mould. That is why he added both tombs in his chronology to the 
Middle Warring States Period, called No. 6. His Middle Warring States 
period lasted from about 350 until 280 BC. Unless we have no coins or 
records with precise dates, we finally have to state, that we can only date 
the tomb into a relative chronology during the first half of the 4th century 
until the beginning of the 3rd century BC.
THE  OWNER  OF  THE  GRAVE  SEEN  IN  H IS  H ISTOR ICAL  CONTEXT
The type of the tomb defines the owner as a member of the aristocracy. 
Von Falkenhausen assigned it to Rank N/O.62 However, due to the in-
ventory and the fact, that there are two layers of coffins in the grave 
chamber, the occupant is assumed to hold only the lowest elite rank, the 
shi (士) class.63 During the time of the Warring States Period a new social 
stratum of intellectuals emerged out ot the shi-rank64, so it is not sur-
prising that even a lower elite rank possessed manuscripts in his tomb. 
Though, we also have to emphasize that at this time tomb inventories do 
not serve as parameters for privileges anymore, but for cultural values, 
60 Although bamboo strips as writing surface were known since the Late 
Shang, ibid., 484.
61 Comparisons with the Baoshan tomb no. 2 (316 BC) and Wangshan 
tomb no. 1 (332 BC) lead to a dating into the late 4th century BC, see Hen-
ricks 2000, op. cit., 4; Li 2000, op. cit., 21, fig. 8.
62 Von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 485.
63 Henricks 2000, op. cit., 4.
64 Von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 441.
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prestige and social status.65 It is not sure, if the occupant was a studied 
man. In a “culture of display” it was important to own these manuscripts, 
but not necessarily being able to read them.66
The tomb contains suprisingly no personal records about the occu-
pant, nor any burial inventories or divination texts, though merely philo-
sophical texts. Only one possibly concrete hint is given to the identity of 
the dead, an eared cup (耳杯) with an inscription. The inscription can be 
read as “Teacher of the Eastern Palace” (東宮之師).67 The crown prince 
used to inhabit the Eastern Palace, that is why scholars assume the oc-
cupant to be the tutor of a Crown Prince. Although it is very doubtful 
that the crown prince has been teached by the lowest rank aristocrat.68 
 Education in China was most important, the Emperor would not let 
the teacher of the crown prince escape to war. But the Guodian tomb 
comprises plenty of bronze halberds, swords, pikes and spears as shown 
above. So we may assume that the deceased of the Chu tomb No. 1 par-
ticipated in some of the battles happening at that time. Anthropological 
analyses, that have not been done yet, would generate more knowledge 
about possible injuries or lifestyle of the deceased. Under the circum-
stances of the condition of the grave and the lost findings an absolute 
image of the deceased identity is not fully reconstructable yet. But we 
may state, that it was a male member of the shi-rank with a notion to 
luxury objects.
SUMMARY  AND  MEAN ING  OF  THE  MANUSCR IPTS 
FOR  THE  H ISTORY  OF  CH INESE  PH I LOSOPHY
The Chu tomb No.1 was made for an inhabitant of the city Ying, who 
owned a lower rank in the social elite. Beside the typical grave goods, 
like ritual vessels, weaponry and objects of personal use, the occupant 
of the tomb was buried with a collection of diverse philosophical texts 
written on bamboo slips. In the Zhou period manuscripts as accompa-
nying grave object were most likely found in tombs of close relatives of 
the ruling family, high-ranking aristocrats and magnates. This changed 
65 Ibid., 488.
66 Ibid., 495–496, with footnote 166.
67 Henricks 2000, op. cit., 4.
68 The teachers of a crown prince are normally royal ministers, at least a 
Middle Magnate, see von Falkenhausen 2003, op. cit., 496.
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in the Warring States period, where manuscripts suddenly transformed 
into a prestige object.69 Members of lower ranks usurped the style of the 
tomb and its furnishing of the higher elites.70 It could be possible that 
the occupant even was not aware of the content of the three bundles and 
its sections of the Daodejing. 
But finding these texts reactivated the debate about the authorship 
and originality of the Daodejing, that has lasted for thousands of years in 
Chinese intellectual history. One of the main reasons for this continuing 
debate might be the vanishingly little knowledge about the historical 
person Lao Zi. Even the historian Sima Qian recorded doubtful informa-
tion about the existence of Lao Zi. Besides, Confucius never mentioned 
him, as well as the Daodejing did not bear any testimony to the legendary 
meeting with Confucius. In addition the first historically comprehensible 
citations of the Daodejing are from the 4th century BC. At the Dartmouth 
conference an opinio communis was manifested that Lao Dan wrote the 
Laozi text in the 5th century BC, but then it is still not clear, why the 
Guodian tomb holds not the complete, but only sections of the text.71 
Notwithstanding that the later Mawangdui tomb for example that dates 
to the year 168 BC72 comprises two versions of the full and complete 
Laozi Manuscript. From this point of view it is still not possible to give 
any clear answer to the question wether the Guodian Laozi was copied 
from a complete text or wether it was the first stage of a collection of vari-
ous sections. It is assumed that in ancient times texts were rather orally 
transmitted73 and only written down, not by copying, but from memory. 
In fact, the lower social rank of the deceased makes it justifiable, that 
we are not facing the genuine texts written by their original authors, but 
“copies of copies”.74
Finally we can state, that the discovery of the Guodian bamboo slips 
in the present tomb of the 4th/3rd century enlightened the philosophi-
cal and historical discussion, at the same time made it more complex 
yet. Nevertheless, it seems that the enormous gap between Chinas most 
important philosophical schools, the Confucianism and Daoism, be-
gins to become smaller. Moreover the finding of the Guodian manu-
69 Ibid., 495.
70 Von Falkenhausen 2006, op. cit., chapter 9, 370–399.
71 Henricks 2000, op. cit., 19.
72 Ibid., 1.
73 Béky 1972, op. cit., 31.
74 Henricks 2000, op. cit., 22.
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scripts teaches us, that our handling of Chinese historical texts has to 
become more adjusted.75 Ancient texts have their own transforming and 
dynamic development. They are not static or stiff. Then, from the ar-
chaeological perspective, it is necessary to analyse the circumstances 
and  accompanying grave objects more accurately to gain a clearer image 
about the function and meaning of such documents. Further archae-
ological, anthropological and philological works are expected, so that 
speculations about the originality of the Daodejing and its following con-
troversal debated questions do not remain conjectural.
75 E. Giele, Using Early Chinese Manuscripts as Historical Source Materi-
als, Monumenta Serica, 51, 2003, passim.

HANS-GEORG  MOELLER  (CORK)
EMOTIONS AND MORALITY 
IN  CONFUCIANISM AND DAOISM
In this paper, I intend to discuss connections between emotions, or 
emotionality, and morality in early Confucianism and Daoism. Such 
connections have been explored in many philosophical contexts in East 
and West and at various time periods. Given the limited scope of this 
paper, I will refrain from looking into broader comparative aspects of 
this theme. I do hope, however, that the present collaborative research 
project of which my paper is part, may help in shedding light on some 
larger issues which I cannot consider here.
I . EMOT IONAL  IMMED IACY  AS  THE   FOUNDAT ION 
OF  CONFUC IAN  MORAL I T Y
A major conceptual link between emotionality and morality in Con-
fucianism in general, and in particular in the Analects of Confucius 
and in the Mencius, is xiao or “filial piety” (also translated as “filial 
responsibility”1 or, more broadly, “family reverence”2). Quite famously, 
the Analects state as early as in section 1.2 that “filial and fraternal re-
sponsibility” are “the root of authoritative conduct (ren).” Ren (“authori-
tative conduct,” “humaneness”, “benevolence”) is one of the cardinal vir-
tues in Confucianism, and to be ren means to have achieved a very high 
1 See R. T. Ames and H. Rosemont Jr. in The Analects of Confucius. A Philo-
sophical Translation. New York: Ballantine, 1998. See pp. 58–59. All transla-
tions from the Analects in this paper are taken from this source.
2 See R. Ames and H. Rosemont Jr., Xiao Jing: The Chinese Classic of Family 
Reverence. Honolulu: University of Hawai’I Press, 2009.
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degree of personal cultivation and excellence. As suggested in the just 
quoted maxim, the beginning of this social and moral cultivation process 
is typically identified with exercising one’s role as a son or daughter dur-
ing one’s childhood.3 It is at this very early stage in one’s life that one 
has to begin practicing how to behave well. 
I think that it is not merely a metaphorical or poetical gesture that 
xiao is said to be the “root” of ren in that paradigmatic declaration in the 
Analects. Ancient Chinese notions of personhood and the self4 often in-
tegrate mental and physical connotations and thus it is not unreasonable 
to assume that the Analects indicate here that the project of moral cul-
tivation is not restricted to an intellectual learning of moral principles, 
but also includes biological aspects. It was probably considered as even 
more important to literally embody moral behaviour and virtuous con-
duct; and doing so required the nourishment of the root of morality in 
oneself basically as soon as one was born. Early Confucianism attempted 
to physically establish moral virtue in young human beings by training 
their emotional attachment to their immediate social environment, i. e. 
their family members. The emotional construction of the self is seen as 
the necessary foundation for training us to literally feel what is right and 
thus, quite contrary to Kantian deontic moral philosophy, to act right 
not as an effect of the rational insight into one’s duties, but rather out 
of inclination. If, as a child, one successfully cultivates the root of filial 
piety within one’s emotionality, and, as we learn in the Mencius, then 
succeeds as an adult in preserving it, one will have within one’s physical 
nature all the preconditions for exercising moral excellence in society.
Another famous passage in the Analects5 illustrates this well. When 
Zaiwo, one of Confucius’ disciples, complains to the master that the 
“three-year morning period on the death of one’s parents is already too 
long” and should be abridged to just one year, Confucius asks him back 
if he would feel comfortable with returning to the habit of “eating fine 
rice and wearing colourful brocade.” When Zaiwo then says that, indeed, 
he would, Confucius grudgingly encourages him to do so, but at the 
3 On the notion of xiao and, in particular, on its importance for the Confu-
cian “role ethics” see the Introduction by Henry Rosemont Jr. and Roger 
Ames to their translation of the Xiao Jing. Ibid., 2009. 22–64.
4 D. Summer, “Self and Embodiment in Early Chinese Texts.” Forthcoming 
in J. Dockstader, H.-G. Moeller, and G. Wohlfart (eds.), Deconstructions of 
Identity: East and West. Nordhausen: Bautz.
5 Analects 17.21. 
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same time explains that an “exemplary person”, a junzi, could never do 
this precisely because they would not feel comfortable with eating lavish 
meals and wearing shiny clothes so relatively soon after their parent’s 
death. Confucius then goes on to explain that he considers Zaiwo “per-
verse”—as Ames and Rosemont translate bu ren here —because he is 
unable to feel the need to care for and about his parents for three years 
after their death in reciprocity for the care that he received from them as 
an infant in his first three years of his life.
This passage shows rather clearly that for Confucius moral excel-
lence and its expression in ritually correct behaviour (including such 
basic and everyday aspects as how one dresses and what one wears) has 
to be rooted or physically engrained in one’s feelings or emotionality. 
Exemplary persons have, as it is natural and common, received love 
and care from their parents as infants when they were entirely depen-
dant on them, and they healthily responded to this by developing their 
own reciprocally appropriate feelings of love and care towards them. 
Anyone who, for whatever reason (for instance for the lack of love and 
care received from one’s parents or for personal deficiencies) is unable 
to develop such feelings towards one’s next of kin will be emotionally 
crippled and thus, so to speak, morally disabled. Not so different from 
the present-day tendency to trace sexual perversions back to abuse ex-
periences or deviant inclinations in one’s early years, Confucius in the 
Analects ascribes Zaiwo’s moral perversion to his inability to properly 
cultivate the root of filial piety as a child. We do not know if Zaiwo’s 
moral perversion is ultimately due to neglect by his parents or to his own 
neglect of them, but this is quite irrelevant with respect to the outcome 
that Confucius is facing now, namely the emotionally unhealthy Zaiwo 
who simply does not feel uncomfortable to eat and dress luxuriously only 
one year after the death of his parents.
From a present-day Western perspective, one might sympathize with 
Zaiwo and agree with him that one year after the death of a loved one we 
are usually—and even should be, if we want to function well both socially 
and psychologically—finally able to “get over it” and to “move on.” Most 
people today are able to return to a “normal life” some time after a loved 
one has died; and in our society we tend to advise those who cannot 
do so to look for some psychological consultancy rather than praising 
them morally. Still, even most contemporary Westerners will find it easy 
to personally relate to Confucius’ basic claim, namely that we ought to 
change our ways of dressing and eating for a while after the death of a 
close family member. It is still—though increasingly less—customary to 
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dress in plain black at a Western funeral and to serve only very simple 
food at such an occasion. Even our culture has not yet lost all connec-
tions with what the Analects expressed in China more than two millen-
nia ago, namely that it is a matter of moral decency to alter our behaviour 
when our parents pass away, and that we should do this out of a feeling 
of emotional urgency. Even today, we would find it slightly “perverse” if a 
child would dress fancily and go to a posh party on the night after their 
mother’s or father’s death. Probably most people would react to such 
behavior in a similar way as Confucius did to Zaiwo’s: We would perhaps 
say to such a person: Well, if you really feel comfortable in going to this 
party and dressing like that, then there’s not much we can do—but in 
this case there seems to be something fundamentally wrong with your 
emotions, and your moral constitution seems to be seriously damaged.
There is a huge gap between the temporal extension of the mourn-
ing period that Confucius believed to be “natural” and ethically correct 
and what is considered appropriate by current Western standards, but 
such differences may well be explained as culturally, historically, or so-
ciologically relative. There is probably no “objectively” correct length of 
the mourning period, and, in particular, no objective or correct way of 
dressing or eating habits after the death of a family member. Instead, we 
are obviously dealing here with “social constructs” that vary in different 
social contexts. Notwithstanding such often huge concrete practical dif-
ferences, the basic connection between emotionality and morality that 
is expressed by Confucius in the Analects is not completely alien even 
to modern Western readers—including philosophers.6 Despite the Kan-
tian imperative that morality ought not to be grounded on emotional 
“inclination,” in everyday life, we all are still often “Confucian” in this 
respect, irrespective of us being from the East or West. We would still 
“normally” be appalled by someone who does not react emotionally, and 
consequently behaviourally, to the death of their parents in the ways that 
our culture considers to be decent or appropriate, and thus would tend 
to consider any such person morally wrong.
The book of Mencius continues and expands the Confucian ethics 
of emotionality. While filial piety is still depicted as a cornerstone of 
emotional morality, the appeals to human emotion are extended to a 
larger variety of situations and contexts. The dialogues in the Mencius 
6 Early modern Western “moral sense theory” as introduced by Francis 
Hutcheson, Joseph Butler, and Shaftesbury proposed a connection between 
morality and sensual perception.
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are usually longer and more detailed than those in the Analects and thus 
one can obtain more intricate insights into the Confucian coupling of 
morality and emotionality through this work. In particular, the numer-
ous debates between Mencius and rulers or politicians of his time reveal 
the important role that emotional cultivation was supposed to play in 
what was considered virtuous government or ethical political rulership.
A famous passage in Mencius 1A: 7 relates an exchange Mencius had 
with King Xuan of Qi. Mencius instructs the king on good government, 
on maintaining peace, and on the personal qualities that a “true king” 
needs to have. In this context, he mentions an incident that he had heard 
about and that had happened when the king had been watching an ox 
being led to be killed in a sacrificial rite. The text quite nicely describes 
how the king was emotionally moved when watching the poor animal 
walking to its death. He said “Spare it. I cannot bear to see it shrinking 
with fear, like an innocent man going to the place of execution.” When 
asked by the conductors of the ritual if therefore the ceremony should 
be abandoned, the king replied: “That is out of the question. Use a lamb 
instead.”7
The reaction of the king will most likely surprise modern Western 
readers for its lack of moral coherence. Why should the killing of a sheep 
be less of a reason for pity than the killing of an ox? From the perspective 
of an ethics based on principles and rational reflection the reaction of the 
king seems hardly praiseworthy. Does he not understand that killing an 
ox or a sheep is, morally speaking, equally problematic? However, this 
is not how Mencius looks at the issue—his ethical interest in the king’s 
reaction is not based on an analysis of his moral principles or maxims 
and their rational coherence. Even less, Mencius is interested in develop-
ing the case into a moral discourse on animal rights or vegetarianism. 
While acknowledging the inconsistent reasoning of the king, he refrains 
from criticizing him for this on moral grounds. Instead, he focuses on 
the ethical relevance of the emotional reaction of the king.
Mencius asks the king if the report about his emotional reaction was 
correct, and when the king confirms this, Mencius states: “The heart 
behind your action is sufficient to enable you to become a true king.”8 
And he further explains that the king displayed “the way of a benevolent 
(ren) man” since the “attitude of a gentleman (junzi) is this: once having 
7 D. C. Lau. Mencius. London: Penguin, 1970. 55.
8 Ibid.
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seen them alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once having heard 
their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh. That is why the gentleman 
keeps his distance from the kitchen.”9 Mencius then morally instructs 
the king—not by suggesting he should correct his faulty understanding 
of animal rights—but by encouraging him to extend his sympathy for an 
animal that he saw to the people living in his state. Mencius appreciates 
that the king still possesses the right “heart” (xin), namely the emotional, 
mental, and physical capacities to feel the appropriate feelings and thus 
to act morally correct. For Mencius, this episode shows that the king 
is, unlike Zaiwu, not “morally perverse.” If the king succeeds in further 
cultivating his moral emotions he may eventually become a “true king”, 
i. e. a morally good ruler who will be able to establish good government.
Whereas Confucius in the Analects points out the capacity to feel 
love for one’s family members and thus the urge to care for them in 
life and death as a most important emotional foundation for behaving 
in line with ritual propriety (li) and for developing the “authoritative 
conduct” (ren) of a “gentleman” (junzi), Menicus describes the capac-
ity to feel compassion, pity, and sympathy for any living being in one’s 
presence, be it an animal or a human, as essential for one’s ability to be 
ren and to act as a junzi. Mencius states explicitly that it is exactly this 
emotional set-up that makes it so uncomfortable for a junzi to go the 
kitchen—which at the times before packed and processed food products 
was still a place where animals were slaughtered. Again, Mencius is not 
at all interested in the rational moral inconsistency between eating meat 
and being emotionally appalled by witnessing how animals are killed, 
but rather in the emotional characteristics of the benevolent person of 
authoritative conduct. It is this emotional quality that makes a human 
being moral, and not the consistency of his or her moral reasoning. Simi-
larly, a morally good ruler will be one who feels instantaneous empathy 
for those around him and those under his rule rather than one who 
may have studied some strategies for seemingly efficient government. 
The emotional capacity to immediately feel the right feeling and then 
to more or less automatically act upon it was regarded as the basis of 
morally excellence. This emotional immediacy is, I believe, at the heart 
of the Confucian moral philosophy that appears in the Analects and in 
the Mencius.
9 Ibid.
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I I . EMOT IONAL  EQUAN IM I TY  AND  DAO IST  AMORAL I T Y
A crucial point of disagreement between early Confucianism and early 
Daoism concerns their respective assessments of emotionality. As out-
lined above, Confucian ethics were based on emotional cultivation. To 
achieve a socially and behaviourally correct emotional immediacy was 
believed to be the foundation for moral excellence, personal refinement, 
and social harmony. The Daoists, on the other hand, distrusted this ap-
proach and believed it to be dangerous for both society and individuals. 
They were concerned about the potentially unhealthy effects of emo-
tional cultivation and instead advocated, and apparently also practiced, 
methods for calming one’s feelings.
The most dramatic difference between early Confucians and Daoists 
is, arguably, their attitude towards death. As described above, for the 
Confucians a person’s degree of filial piety (xiao) as the root of benevo-
lence or authoritative conduct (ren) showed itself most conspicuously at 
the occasion of the death of a close family member. The grief and related 
feelings that a person displays when a loved one dies directly shows the 
state of their emotional and thus also their moral cultivation. The strong 
Confucian concern with mourning and funeral rites clearly reflects this. 
These rites and conventions were central to the Confucian project of 
establishing a harmonious society consisting of well-feeling and well-
behaving individuals. One’s performance after the death of one’s par-
ents or spouse, for instance, would visibly indicate to society one’s “true 
heart” and, by extension, also indicate the social health of a community 
or a state. Given this cultural and customary context, many passages in 
the Zhuangzi dealing with death and the reactions to it must have been 
perceived as quite shocking provocations at the time. In stark contrast 
to the Confucian moral exemplars, the Daoist sages in the Zhuangzi do 
not mourn when facing the death of people close to them.
Probably the most famous of these scandalous passages in the 
Zhuangzi describes Zhuangzi’s reaction after the death of his wife. When 
Zhuangzi’s best friend Hui Shi comes to condole, he finds the new wid-
ower drumming and singing.10 Such comportment has a rather appalling 
effect even on today’s Western readers of the text. It must have been even 
more disturbing, though, to Zhuangzi’s contemporaries. In direct viola-
10 See A. C. Graham. Chuang-Tzu. The Inner Chapters. Indianapolis, Cam-
bridge: Hackett, 2001. 123–124.
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tion of all that was taken to constitute decent demeanour, Zhuangzi not 
only shows no signs of grief, but demonstrates very much “in the face” 
of his friend his ease and happiness by making music. This not only 
unconventional but openly anti-conventional behaviour (jubilant music 
was among the last things one was supposed to enjoy at a funeral and for 
a long time after) displeases even Hui Shih greatly, who himself was not 
a Confucian. Quite outraged, he criticizes Zhuangzi for his “most shame-
ful” behaviour. Zhuangzi, however, serenely explains to Hui Shi that the 
customary expressions of grief after the death of a family member only 
indicate a wrong way of life based on a misunderstanding of nature and 
its changes. The contemporary emotional and moral standards in soci-
ety as expressed in the dominating Confucian doctrines thus appear as 
entirely mistaken and unnatural. Zhuangzi justifies his behaviour as in-
deed the correct emotional attitude towards death which, unfortunately, 
is presently disesteemed because of misguided Confucian social norms.
The anti-conventional behaviour displayed by Zhuangzi after the 
death of his wife is apparently meant to be shocking for didactical rea-
sons. People are so much immersed into Confucian standards for emo-
tional behaviour that they no longer question it. For Zhuangzi, however, 
the philosophical assumptions underlying these standards are mistaken, 
and people need to be perplexed so that they will be enabled to return 
from their states of unhealthy emotional excitement to a state of healthy 
emotional equanimity. Other figures in the book of Zhuangzi show in 
a less confrontational way what such equanimity is like. A passage in 
chapter six in the Zhuangzi introduces a Daoist “artist of mourning” 
named Mengsun Cai who “wailed when his mother died but did not shed 
a tear, in his inward heart he did not suffer, conducting the funeral he 
did not grieve.”11 Despite his emotional coldness, Mengsun Cai is con-
sidered to be “the best of mourners” in his community. As in some other 
passages in the Zhuangzi, the Daoist justification of Mengsun Cai is 
ironically put into the mouth of Confucius who explains to his stunned 
disciple Yan Hui why Mengsun Cai is truly a sage.
Mengsun Cai has, just like Zhuangzi and several other personae in 
the text, understood that life and death are equally valuable and neces-
sary phases in the continuous change of nature. There is no reason to 
11 Ibid., 90. For a philosophical analysis of this story that is somewhat sim-
ilar to mine see P. D’Ambrosio, “The Role of a Pretending Tree: Hermits, 
Social Constructs, and ‘Self ’ in the Zhuangzi.” Forthcoming in J. Dock-
stader, H.-G. Moeller, and G. Wohlfart (eds.), op. cit.
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prefer one over the other or to look at life as being better or more au-
thentic than death. If life and death, just like day and night, or Yin and 
Yang for that matter, are two mutually complementary aspects of the way 
of natural change and continuity, than there is absolutely no need for 
making such emotional “fuss” about death as the Confucians usually do. 
Their insistence on feeling grief and sadness, and to express it through 
tears and wailing is an unnecessary exercise at best and a cause of a lot 
of personal and social harm at worst. Mengsun Cai, unlike Zhuangzi 
after the death of his wife, outwardly follows ritual propriety by acting 
in compliance with the rules of decency—and thus he does not shock 
his community—but he still provides the people around him with an ex-
ample of how to remain healthy and emotionally uncorrupted within an 
unhealthy and emotionally corrupted society. By being perfectly at ease 
during a funeral he shows his immunity towards what, from a Daoist 
perspective, may be seen as the emotionally perverting effects of Confu-
cian moral and behavioural standards.
Facing one’s own mortality and the death of loved ones and close 
family members is arguably the most emotionally upsetting experience 
in human life. From a Confucian perspective, funeral rites channel the 
emotions that naturally arise at such an occasion in ways that are mor-
ally appropriate and ultimately beneficial and healthy for both individu-
als and the group. From a Daoist perspective, however, the Confucian 
cultivation of upsetting emotions is not helpful at all. In the Daoist 
view, the cultivation of emotional equanimity is far more appropriate. It 
reflects a correct understanding of the Dao or the course of nature and, 
accordingly, also makes individuals and society emotionally healthier. 
For them, the severe pain and grief that society demands of itself at the 
occasion of death does not at all indicate its emotional and moral right-
ness, but, to the contrary, its state of delusion. The emotional “errors” we 
tend to commit when facing death are, for them, a, or perhaps the, prime 
example for our general emotional and moral corruption. Therefore, the 
only true “artist of mourning” is the one who remains emotionally com-
pletely untouched by a funeral. Rather then showing his moral excellence 
at such an occasion, he gives a striking display of having cultivated equa-
nimity to such perfection that even death cannot upset him.
The Daodejing is less vivid and immediate in style, and operates 
much less with anecdotes and stories than the Zhuangzi and other early 
Daoist works. Philosophically speaking, however, it is very much in line 
with these when advocating emotional equanimity. It expresses this 
view, perhaps even more appropriately, only in a more detached and im-
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personal way. A paradigmatic chapter in the Daodejing articulating the 
Daoist maxim of emotional calm is, at least in my reading, the twelfth: 
“The five colors make one’s eyes blind. Galloping horses and hunting 
in the fields make one’s heart mad. Goods that are difficult to obtain 
obstruct one’s ways. The five tastes make one’s palate obtuse. The five 
tones make one’s ear deaf.”12
Not only when facing death, humans tend to potentially harmful 
emotional excitement. We are constantly exposed to events and objects 
that stimulate and arouse our feelings in every-day life. What we see 
(“the five colors”) can emotionally stir us just as what we eat (“the five 
tastes”) or what we hear (“the five tones”). Similarly our daily activities 
(such as riding or hunting) and cravings (the desire for possessions) can 
easily upset us emotionally. The Daodejing points out in this chapter 
how we are permanently faced with emotional challenges that may, at 
least in the long run, make us suffer. Human life is on a day-to-day basis 
under emotional pressure. What we nowadays call “stress” can, from a 
Daoist perspective, be understood as the mental and physical wear and 
tear resulting from being emotionally overcome by our daily life. What 
we hear, see, and do can become unbearable if we get overexcited by it. 
There is a constant danger that we develop habits of emotional attach-
ment and investment in activities or sensual experiences. In order to 
avoid such harm, Daoist philosophy advocates the cultivation of calm.
In the Daodejing, as in many Confucian texts, correct emotional cul-
tivation is particular important in a political context. Concretely, pres-
ent and future rulers are the main “targets” of emotional education and 
training. In accordance with their general philosophical views on emo-
tions, Confucian texts usually highlight the need for the ruler to cultivate 
the capacity to feel the correct emotions to the correct degree at the cor-
rect time, while Daoism point out that the generally correct emotional 
attitude that a sage ruler should cultivate and practice is equanimity. An 
impressive portrait of the Daoist sage ruler as an example of emotional 
calmness can be found in chapter 20 of the Daodejing. Here, the ruler is 
characterized as having “the heart of an idiot” and, in particular, as be-
ing “like an infant that does not yet smile.”13 The heart (xin) of the sage 
ruler, as it is clear from the thematic context of chapter 20, is “idiotic” 
in the sense that it does not get emotionally excited even during major 
12 H.-G. Moeller, Daodejing (Laozi). A Complete Translation and Commen-
tary. Chicago: Open Court, 2007. 29.
13 Ibid., 51.
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social festivities, celebrations, or “events” as people often say today. The 
sage ruler remains “stupidly” calm in the midst of great popular excite-
ment. Just as Mengsun Cai in the Zhuangzi managed to be emotionally 
unmoved during times of public display of grief, the sage ruler in the 
Daodejing manages to be emotionally unmoved during times of public 
display of joy—as if he did not even understand what was going on. The 
text depicts the ruler as having returned to the pre-emotional state of a 
child that does not yet smile.
Unlike a Confucian sage ruler, the perfect ruler in the Daodejing is 
not empathic, he does not feel with the people, but rather provides soci-
ety with an inner calmness that stabilizes it from within. Very much in 
line with the image of the wheel in chapter eleven of the Daodejing, the 
ruler is, literally speaking, the motionless hub at the center of the spokes 
that allows them to circulate harmoniously and efficaciously. His capac-
ity to remain completely emotionally unmoved serves the function of 
keeping the emotional balance of society intact. Images of stillness and 
immobility abound in Daoist texts, and are in more or less immediate se-
mantic opposition to the very term “emotion” which, derived from Latin, 
literally means “to be moved.” It has to be stressed that in line with the 
basic Daoist maxim wu wei er wu bu wei (“doing nothing and nothing is 
undone”)14 the (e)motionlessness of the sage (just as the motionlessness 
of the wheel) is seen as the intrinsic foundation of orderly and harmoni-
ous (e)motion. The Daoist sage ruler’s emotional calm prevents society 
from falling victim to its own emotional passions. Without force, the 
sage ruler’s equanimity does not erase the people’s feelings and desires, 
but keeps them in check.
The Zhuangzi is particularly outspoken about the dangers of emo-
tional excitement with respect to politics—and in connection with mo-
rality. Emotionally excited rulers typically also display moral excitement. 
If, in line with the Confucian ideal of rulership, the king or emperor is 
one whose emotions are always adequate, then he will also know and do 
what is morally correct. He will thus develop a strong political and moral 
self-confidence and self-righteousness. An emotionally charged ruler will 
feel that he is doing the right thing whenever he acts. This, according to 
the Zhuangzi, can become dangerous and pathological.
The phenomenon of committing most violent and destructive acts 
precisely because one immediately feels that what one does is morally 
14 See chapter 48 in the Daodejing; ibid., 115.
108
right is probably universal. There are countless historical examples of 
feeling not only entitled but even obliged to creating havoc and, indeed, 
sometimes to committing mass murder, out of emotional excitement 
about the righteousness of one’s actions and beliefs. This is what the 
Zhuangzi points out in the—shockingly provocative—analogies it draws 
between those who at its time were regarded as great moral heroes (such 
as the sage rulers Yao or the Confucian ethical exemplars Zeng Zi and 
Shi Yu) and as moral villains (such as the brutal tyrant Jie and the 
infamous criminal Robber Zhi). One passage states: “Formerly when 
Yao governed the world he made everybody exultantly delight in nature, 
which is excitement; and when Jie governed the world he made every-
one suffer miserably in his nature, which is discontent. To be excited 
or discontented is to go counter to the Power (de); and nothing in the 
world which goes counter to the Power can last for long.”15 The Zhuangzi 
continues to explain that after the great sage ruler Yao the world be-
came “agitated by restless ambitions, and only after that … you had the 
conduct of robber Zhi on the one hand and of Zeng and Shi on the 
other.”16
Great emotional investment and feelings of moral righteousness in 
politics pose a threat to peace and social harmony. They can easily prove 
to be divisive and create social contention and conflict. Once one is feel-
ing strongly, and moral feelings are among the strongest humans tend 
to have—then one may also act strongly. Moreover, moral emotions are 
usually double-edged. By feeling moral awe for some people and the ac-
tions they perform, one is likely to feel moral disdain for other people 
and their behaviour. Once there are strong moral emotions in society and 
in politics, they will, at least in part, also include feelings of disapproval, 
condemnation and what has been called “moral anger.”17 Emotionally 
excited “moral anger,” particularly in politics, can have disastrous effects. 
The Zhuangzi thus declares: “I am inclined to think that sagehood and 
knowledge are the wedges of the stocks and the cangue, that Goodwill 
(ren) and Duty (yi) are the pin and hole of fetters and manacles. How 
do I know that Zeng and Shi are not the whistling arrows which signal 
15 A. C. Graham. Chuang-Tzu. The Inner Chapters. Indianapolis, Cambridge: 
Hackett, 2001. 211.
16 Ibid.
17 For a more detailed discussion of this issue see the chapter on “The 
‘Morality of Anger’” in H.-G. Moeller. The Moral Fool. A Case for Amorality. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 53–63.
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the attack of tyrant Jie and robber Zhi?”18 Once moral sentiment is in-
troduced as the major indicator of being personally right and socially 
correct, pathological consequences are virtually unavoidable. Instead of 
following the Confucian project of the cultivation of moral emotionality, 
the Zhuangzi and the Daodejing warn of the dire consequences that are 
bound to result from fostering ethical excitement.
In conclusion, it can be said that the core texts of early Daoism, the 
Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, view the Confucian project of cultivating 
emotional immediacy which is supposed to result in morally correct be-
haviour of individuals and, accordingly, in an orderly and harmonious 
society as inherently flawed. These Daoists text assume that the moral 
emotions that the Confucians believe to be “natural” (such as grief at the 
occasion of the death of a family member) are not so natural at all, but 
rather symptoms of a “bad philosophy”, i. e. of a misunderstanding of 
the Dao or the course of nature. From a Daoist perspective, the Confu-
cian emotional immediacy, as can be seen in social and political practice, 
has not at all led to beneficial results. Its unnatural foundation is shown 
in the pathological effects that moral sentiment has had on individuals 
and society. In order to counter the emotional and moral perversion that 
Confucian ritual practices and political ideals have created in individuals 
and society, the early Daoist texts advocate the cultivation of emotional 
equanimity, which, in their view, is much more in accordance with the 
Dao and thus also much more efficacious and healthy.
18 Graham 2001, op. cit., 213.
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ABSTRACT
Taking as a point of departure Professor Guo Yi’s defence of Daoic phi-
losophy to provide values lacking in Western civilization, it is argued 
that in light of the global ecological crisis, a more creative synthesis of 
Chinese and Western thought is required, a synthesis building on earlier 
efforts to synthesise Chinese and Western thought begun by Leibniz and 
taken much further by Joseph Needham. This project is seen as more 
than complementing Western science with values deriving from Daoic 
philosophy; it involves a transformation of science to incorporate Daoic 
philosophy into science. Through science, people can then appreciate 
that humans are products of and creative participants within a creative 
nature and orient themselves to live by values generated within nature. 
It is argued that this transformation of science has been in process for 
some time. Building on Leibniz’s philosophical opposition to Newtoni-
anism it has developed up to the present in opposition to mechanistic 
materialism as the tradition of process metaphysics. The most advanced 
development of this anti-mechanistic tradition within science, it is sug-
gested, is theoretical ecology, and as such, this provides the foundation 
for the creation of the ecological civilization called for by Chinese envi-
ronmentalists to address the global ecological crisis. 
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INTRODUCT ION
Professor Guo Yi’s paper in this volume, ‘Metaphysics, Nature and 
Mind – The Main Idea of Daoic Philosophy’, is challenging in more ways 
than one. It is a diagnosis of the current crisis facing both Western and 
Chinese civilizations, arguing that despite the unquestionable success of 
Western science in achieving power over the world, it has undermined 
the metaphysical basis for upholding values. The paper offers Daoic 
Philosophy as a basis for upholding values, providing an exposition of it 
and showing at the same time how the achievements of science can be 
given a place as a tool of life, not as an end in itself. This is challenging 
to begin with because of the ambitiousness of what is claimed for Daoic 
philosophy; but this is only the beginning. The proposal involves char-
acterizing not only the main tradition of thought of Chinese civilization, 
but the thought of Western civilization. This proposal is presented in 
English, with all the problems of characterizing and translating Chinese 
thought using terms in English that are themselves highly problematic, 
at a German university. The terms ‘science’ and ‘metaphysics’ are cases 
in point. This makes the defence of this proposal difficult, demanding 
a leap of imagination and a suspension of disbelief for Westerners to 
accept that Daoic philosophy should be taken as the primary tradition 
of metaphysical thought and Western thought subordinated to it at a 
time when the domination of the world by Western thought, including 
the language used to characterize the differences between Western and 
Chinese thought, has never been so complete. 
However, there are reasons for taking this proposal very seriously. 
Largely as a consequence of the domination of the world by Western 
culture we are not only struggling with its nihilism but facing an eco-
logical crisis that threatens all civilization, humanity, and even life on 
Earth. I agree with Professor Guo Yi that by turning its back on meta-
physics, mainstream philosophy in the West has been trivialized, and 
as a consequence, marginalized. This ecological crisis has inspired a 
major movement of thought within mainland China challenging what 
had been regarded as the spectacular success of government policies 
based on Western thought in industrializing and modernizing Chinese 
society. People are calling not only for a revival of Chinese traditions of 
thought, but the creation of an ecological civilization as a successor to in-
dustrial civilization. Professor Guo Yi’s paper comes at a time when such 
a synthesis of European and Chinese traditions of thought is  coming to 
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be seen by many as imperative not only to give a place to values, but to 
develop a civilization which will enable humanity to survive.
So, it is not the ambitiousness of Professor Guo Yi’s paper that I 
want to call into question, but that it is not ambitious enough. That 
is, I will suggest that we do need a synthesis of traditions of thought 
of Chinese and Western (or European) civilization, but, as called for 
by Chinese environmentalists, this synthesis will involve a more thor-
oughgoing rethinking of these traditions than is suggested by Professor 
Guo Yi. To this end I will argue that while Professor Guo Yi is justified 
in recognizing defining characteristics of thought characterizing Chi-
nese and European civilizations, full justice has not been done to these 
traditions, or to previous efforts to integrate them. To begin with I will 
suggest that Professor Guo Yi’s characterization of Western science is 
deficient, most importantly for not recognizing rival research traditions 
within science based on different metaphysical theories, each of which 
upholds different values. This argument requires an examination of the 
notion of metaphysics and its relation to science. Secondly, I will suggest 
that in effecting this synthesis it is necessary to pay more attention to 
ways of thinking developed in China radically different from the ana-
lytic thought privileged in Western civilization. Zhu Xi (1130–1200) is 
particularly important to focus upon if we are to integrate these radically 
different forms of thinking.1 Although constrained by a tradition which 
extolled fidelity to past thinkers, Zhu Xi argued that scholars should not 
accept received wisdom uncritically. They should develop Confucianism 
through critical reflection, empirical research and creative thinking, and 
should be willing to embrace what is best in other traditions.2 His phi-
losophy integrated much of Daoism and Buddhism into Confucianism 
and, most importantly, gave a central place to the study of nature guided 
by general ideas about nature, which he sought to provide. 
1 See W.-T. Chan, ‘The Great Synthesis of Chu Hsi’, in A Source Book in 
Chinese Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 605–633 
and Chu Hsi, Further Reflections on Things at Hand: A Reader, trans. Allen 
Wittemborn, University of America Press, 2002. 
2 On Zhu Xi’s reconciliation of this tension through ‘innovative recon-
struction’, see Liu Xiaogan, ‘The Struggle Between the Two Orientations: 
A Study of Zhu Xi’s Commentary on the Analects’ in Contemporary Chinese 
Thought, 40(2), Winter 2008–9: pp. 46–66. See also S.-H. Liu, Understand-
ing Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming, London: Westport, 1998, 
chaps. 7, 8 & 9.
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In his effort to comprehend and learn from Chinese philosophy, Leibniz, 
who began a whole tradition of thought opposed to the mechanistic 
thought of Descartes and Newton, studied Zhu Xi’s work and, possibly, 
was influenced by him. Central to this tradition, running through Johann 
Herder, Friedrich Schelling, Henri Bergson, Charles Sande Peirce and 
 Alfred North Whitehead, has been the concern to overcome the nihilism 
of mechanistic materialism. While this tradition has been marginalized 
within philosophy, the research programs inspired by it have largely 
succeeded in replacing mechanistic materialism in advanced theoreti-
cal science; and it has been associated with further efforts to reconcile 
Western and Chinese thought, exemplified in the twentieth century by 
Joseph Needham’s massive, multi-volumed study Science and Civilisa-
tion in China. This work was partly inspired by the philosophy of Alfred 
North Whitehead, and Needham’s own work in theoretical biology and 
philosophy also was influenced by Whitehead. This tradition does at-
tempt to give a place to the ways of thinking and values upheld by Chi-
nese philosophy. 
At the same time, however, there is something lacking in these ef-
forts, including those of Leibniz, that is illuminated by Professor Guo 
Yi’s paper. Chinese philosophy is first and foremost concerned with 
fostering virtues, having its main goal the self-cultivation of people 
so that they can find, appreciate and live according to Dao, the path 
or the way. As Angus Graham put it (perhaps not entirely accurately), 
while Western philosophers are pre-eminently concerned with ‘What 
is the Truth?’ Chinese philosophers are pre-eminently concerned with 
‘Where is the Way?’3 Finding the way leads to and inspires harmony in 
people’s relationships. Appreciating this difference, and how virtue was 
understood by Chinese philosophers, should more clearly highlight the 
forms of thinking developed in China and its potential contribution to 
the current world. I will argue that this should lead to a re-conception 
of science so that the development of scientific knowledge should be 
motivated first and foremost not by the quest to control the world, but 
to cultivate people and orient them to live in a way that augments life. 
I will suggest that Zhu Xi was right to argue that such self-cultivation 
3 A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao, La Salle: Open Court, 1989, p. 3. How-
ever, this might be based on a misunderstanding of ancient Western phi-
losophy. Pierre Hadot argued in What is Ancient Philosophy, trans. Michael 
Chase, Cambridge Mass.: Belkanp Press, 2002 that for the ancients, a phi-
losophy was a whole way of life. 
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requires the study of nature, and argue that in the modern world, Daoic 
philosophy requires for its defense and development the tradition of sci-
ence consonant with Daoic philosophy, a tradition which is now being 
advanced most creatively in the science of ecology. It is in this form, 
I will suggest, that the synthesis of Chinese and Western thought can 
serve as the foundation for the new, ecological civilization called for by 
Chinese environmentalists. 
SC IENCE , METAPHYS ICS  AND  TECHNO-SC IENCE
So, what is the relationship between science, technology and metaphysics 
in Western thought. Professor Guo Yi notes that knowledge of natural 
science was only ‘minor skills’ and contrasts this with West which, he 
suggests, has revered natural knowledge and instrumental rationality. 
However, while Western natural knowledge might have supported and 
advanced instrumental rationality, it was not based on instrumental ra-
tionality. And it was not indifferent to values. Western civilization was 
technologically inferior to Chinese civilization for most of its history, 
and then surged ahead because it fused the development of technology 
with philosophical speculation about nature, most importantly, meta-
physical speculation which guided systematic investigation of nature. As 
historians of science have shown, modern science was inaugurated by a 
metaphysical revolution.4 This metaphysical revolution was in part in-
spired by efforts to oppose the values of the Civic Humanists and Nature 
Enthusiasts of the Renaissance. The Civic Humanists, educated in the 
humanities, defended republicanism and were concerned to inspire peo-
ple to serve the common good and develop the virtues required to defend 
their liberty and govern themselves. Education in the humanities was the 
means to this end, and was seen to require the study of history and the 
arts as well as moral philosophy and rhetoric. The Nature Enthusiasts, 
in particular, Giordano Bruno, a significant figure in the development 
of modern science, construed the cosmos and nature generally as self-
organizing, celebrating it as divine, providing not only a metaphysical 
4 See E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, [1924, 
1932], New York: Doubleday, 1954, and A. Koyré, Metaphysics and Mea-
surement: Essays in the Scientific Revolution, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1968.
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and cosmological defence of these civic virtues, but also the aspirations 
of the ‘heroic soul’ to truth, prudence and wisdom.5 
Marin Mersenne, a lifelong friend of Descartes, characterized Bruno 
as ‘one of the wickedest men whom the earth has ever supported … who 
seems to have invented a new manner of philosophizing only in order 
to make underhand attacks on the Christian religion.’6 Mersenne initi-
ated the quest to develop an alternative to Bruno’s system of thought. 
That alternative system — the mechanical philosophy — was provided by 
Descartes.7 Thomas Hobbes, another friend of Mersenne was also a 
fierce critic of the Civic Humanists and Nature Enthusiasts in Britain. 
Strongly influenced by Galileo, he also took up the project of develop-
ing a mechanical philosophy and attempted to subvert the ideals of the 
Civic Humanists by promulgating a view of humans as machines moved 
by appetites and aversions. On this view the only defensible values are 
satisfying one’s appetites while avoiding aversions, particularly death, 
as efficiently as possible, and that consequently the ultimate end which 
all people are pursuing, whether they acknowledge it or not, is having 
the whole world fearing and obeying them. It also justified the view, 
previously suggested by Francis Bacon, that the sole end of scientific 
knowledge is controlling the world. This is the metaphysics that has 
underlain modernity. 
This does not mean that that this philosophy has remained un-
changed throughout modernity. It has evolved from Descartes’ meta-
physics to Newton’s, from Hobbes’ defence of enlightened tyranny to 
Locke’s defence of rule by those with wealth, from an economy based 
on rights to the products of one’s labour to the utilitarianism of neo-
classical economics, and from a static nature to nature seen as evolving 
through the struggle between rival machines for survival, with progress 
being defined as ever improving efficiency of these machines. It is in this 
context that it is necessary to understand the primacy accorded to the 
5 See G. Bruno, The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, trans. Arthur D. Im-
merti, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992, p. 80 f.
6 M. Mersenne, L’Impiété de deists, (Paris, 1624), Vol. I, p. 230 f. Translated 
and quoted by A. C. Crombie, ‘Mersenne’, Dictionary of Scientific Biography, 
Ed. Charles Coulston Gillispie, 16 vols (New York: Scribner 1970–80) Vol. 
IX, 1974, p. 317. 
7 B. Easlea, Witch-Hunting, Magic & the New Philosophy: An Introduction to 
Debates of the Scientific Revolution 1450–1750, (Brighton: Sussex: Harvester 
Press), p. 108.
ARRAN  GARE :  DAO IC  PH I LOSOPHY  AND   PROCESS   METAPHYS ICS 117
economy and the military, and the acceptance of ‘creative destruction’ 
of species, ecosystems, pre-modern societies and losers in the struggle 
between competing economic enterprises. All this is necessary to make 
room for the winners in this struggle for survival, the more efficient ma-
chines. It is in this context that instrumental reason is privileged above 
all else as a criterion of evaluation, with the remainder of human affairs 
being reduced to consumption and entertainment based on subjective 
preferences.
OPPOS I T ION  TO  THE  MECHAN IST IC  WORLD-V I EW
This conception of the world and the values it upholds has not prevailed 
completely, however. Neither Renaissance humanism nor Nature En-
thusiasm nor the quest for republican liberty was completely subjugated 
with the rise of mechanistic metaphysics. In the early Eighteenth Cen-
tury they were forced underground as part of the Radical Enlightenment. 
They survived not only in the quest for liberty and republican democ-
racy, but in the arts, the humanities and anti-mechanist metaphysics 
supporting an alternative tradition of scientific thought. Humanities 
scholars continued to defend the possibility of human freedom, and 
along with this, higher values than surviving, dominating and satisfying 
one’s appetites. They analysed the human condition from perspectives 
inconsistent with and opposed to the view that humans are nothing but 
complex machines. Bruno’s ideas were revived by those who used the 
metaphysics of Leibniz to reformulate Spinoza’s philosophy (which was 
influenced by Bruno) to free it of its mechanistic accretions. J. G. Herder 
in particular was central to this, defending a dynamic view of nature 
while reviving and giving a central place to the humanities. He first used 
the term ‘culture’ in the plural, signifying recognition of and respect for 
diverse cultures, and portrayed humans as developing greater humanity 
through history, and projected a future in which, through education, peo-
ple would be self-governing. These ideas were vigorously promoted by 
the Early Romantics, foremost among them Schelling who, synthesizing 
ideas from Herder and Wolfgang Goethe with the more radical of ideas 
developed by I. Kant and J. G. Fichte, elaborated a coherent metaphysics 
that not only supported the arts and the humanities but had a major 
influence on the subsequent development of the sciences. In his later 
work Schelling went on to argue that “through the virtually unrestricted 
expansion of world relations … the Orient and the Occident are not 
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merely coming into contract with one another, but are being compelled … 
to fuse into one and the same consciousness, into one consciousness that 
should for this reason alone be expanded into a world-consciousness.”8 
To this end, he argued, it will be necessary to develop a ‘philosophical 
religion’, addressing and integrating the freedom of existence, histori-
cal phenomena and nature into an expanded Weltanschauung inclusive 
enough to overcome philosophy’s compulsive tendency to splinter off 
into mutually exclusive schools of thought.9
The coherence and success of this tradition has been obscured by its 
subordinate position. This has had the effect that it has been far more 
prone to fragmentation than the mainstream tradition, with defenders 
of the humanities and arts ignoring advances in metaphysics and sci-
ence that support their views, and its contributions to science plundered, 
reworked and appropriated as achievements of the dominant culture. 
This assimilation has been challenged through metaphysical thinking of 
philosophers and scientists influenced directly or indirectly by Schelling 
who have not only pointed out the true significance of advances in the 
natural sciences, but have contributed to these advances. The most im-
portant of these metaphysicians have been C. S. Peirce, Henri Bergson, 
Aleksandr Bogdanov and Alfred North Whitehead. The view expressed 
by Stephen Hawking and quoted by Professor Guo Yi, that philosophy 
can no longer comprehend science, while common and commonly ac-
cepted and true of much of philosophy, is not true of all philosophy. 
Philosophers of science and philosopher scientists such as C. H. Wad-
dington, Joseph Needham, Ivor Leclerc, Michael Polanyi, David Bohm, 
Ilya Prigogine, Isabelle Stengers, Rom Harré, Stanley Salthe, James Love-
lock and Jesper Hoffmeyer are cases in point. When these philosophers 
and scientists are recognized as part of a tradition, it can be seen that this 
tradition promises to transform science and thereby humanity’s under-
standing of itself and its place in nature, the revolutionary implications 
of which can only be ignored by denying that science is anything more 
than a means to develop technology. 
8 F. W. J. F. Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, Ther Berlin Lec-
ture, trans. Bruce Matthews, New York: State University of New York Press, 
2007, p. 94. (SW II/3: 8)
9 F. W. J. Schelling, Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of My-
thology, trans. Mason Richey and Markus Zisselsberger, New York: S.U.N.Y. 
Press, 2007, p. 173 f. (SW II/4: pp. 364 ff.)
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POST-MECHAN IST IC  SC I ENCE  AND  CH INESE  PH I LOSOPHY
This alternative tradition of metaphysics, and developments in the arts, 
humanities and sciences inspired by it, has throughout its development 
sought to overcome the nihilistic implications of reductionist material-
ism by giving a place to values within nature and supporting the higher 
values aspired to by humanity. The core ideas of this tradition of thought 
not only accord with some of the ideas of Daoic philosophy; Needham 
argued that Chinese thought had a significant influence on its develop-
ment. Taking Whitehead’s organicist philosophy as his point of refer-
ence, he argued that this philosophy was the culmination of a tradition 
going back through Lloyd Morgan, S. Alexander, Jan Smuts, Engels, 
Marx, Hegel, Schelling and Herder to Leibniz. The spectacular original-
ity of Leibniz, the ultimate source of the opposition to the tradition of 
Galilean-Newtonian science, Needham argued, derived from the influ-
ence on him of Zhu Xi. Needham wrote of Zhu Xi: ‘Behind him he had 
the full background of Chinese correlative thinking, and ahead of him 
he had — Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.’10 
Needham then argued that neo-Confucian thought had not been 
able to be understood properly in the past by Western thinkers because 
“they lacked the background … of modern organicist philosophy.”11 Ac-
cordingly, he argued:
“On the organic view of the world, the universe is one which simply 
has the property of producing the highest human values when the 
integrative level appropriate to them has arisen in the evolutionary 
process. … From the point of view of the scientist … the levels of 
organization can be described as a temporal succession of spatial 
envelopes; thus there were certainly atoms before there were any 
living cells, and living cells themselves contain and are built up of 
atoms. … I am prepared to suggest, in view of the fact that the term 
Li always contained the notion of pattern, and that Chu Hsi himself 
consciously applied it so as to include the most living and vital pat-
terns known to man, that something of the idea of “organism” was 
what was really at the back of the minds of the Neo-Confucians, 
and that Chu Hsi was therefore further advanced in insight into the 
10 J. Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. II, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1956, p. 291. 
11 Ibid., p. 474.
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nature of the universe than any of his interpreters and translators, 
whether Chinese or European, have yet given him credit for. … [T]he 
modern view of the universe, as the natural scientist and the organic 
philosopher sees it, are Matter-Energy on the one hand, and Or-
ganisation, the principle of Organisation on the other. If, therefore, 
it were indispensible to translate the Li of Chu Hsi into English, 
‘Organisation’ or ‘Principle of Organisation’ would be the choice I 
would make.”12
Needham thought that qi (or ‘Chhi’), the second concept deployed by 
Zhu Xi, is even more difficult to translate than li. Analogous to the 
Greek pneuma it could be a gas or vapour, or matter as it was understood 
by Aristotle, or ‘ethereal waves’. While he argued that the term is best 
left untranslated, he equated it to the matter-energy of modern physics. 
Needham discussed the conception of Dao in relation to early Confu-
cian philosophy and to Daoism, noting that initially Confucians meant 
by Dao the ideal way or order of human society, while for Daoists it 
meant the way the universe works, or, as Needham put it: ‘the Order of 
Nature.’13 In characterizing the meaning of ‘Dao’ in relation to li, Need-
ham noted that according to Zhu Xi:
“[T]he original meaning of tao [Dao] was ‘way’, while that of li was 
the graining or pattern of markings (Gestalt) in any natural object. 
‘The term tao’, he says, ‘refers to the vast and great, the term li in-
cludes the innumerable vein-like patterns included in the Tao.’ Thus 
Tao was to be used only for the pattern of the whole cosmic organ-
ism, while li could mean also the minute patterns of small individual 
organisms.”14 
Needham ascribed to Zhu Xi the insights that ‘first, the existence of a 
universal pattern or field determining all states and transformations of 
matter-energy, and secondly, the omnipresence of this pattern. The mo-
tive power could not be localized at any particular point in space and 
time. The organization centre was identical with the organism itself.’15 
Zhu Xi also saw this matter-energy consisting of two opposing forces, 
12 Ibid., p. 474 f.
13 Ibid., p. 37.
14 Ibid., p. 484.
15 Ibid., p. 466.
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that nature works in a wave-like manner, and that new things are pro-
duced by reactions which we now call chemical.16 On this basis he was 
able to set forth a comprehensive philosophy of cosmic and human cre-
ativity, formulating a viable account of the formation of the world in 
stages to provide a foundation for the Confucian concepts of human 
nature and self-cultivation.
EVALUAT ING  NEEDHAM’S  INTERPRETAT ION  OF  ZHU  X I
Needham’s interpretation of Zhu Xi is contentious. To begin with, his 
claim that Leibniz’s philosophy had been influenced by Zhu Xi has been 
questioned, and along with this it has been questioned whether the Chi-
nese generally and Zhu Xi in particular had any conception of metaphys-
ics or science as these were developed in Europe. There has also been 
much dispute over how the terms li and qi should be translated and 
interpreted, and even more over the notion of Dao. 
While there has been no consensus reached on how much Leibniz 
was influenced by Zhu Xi, it has been accepted that at very least Leibniz 
found support for his radical ideas in Chinese philosophy.17 The ques-
tion of whether the Chinese had science or metaphysics as understood 
in the West is more complex. In a major study, Yung Sik Kim argued 
that even Zhu Xi’s call for the study of nature lacked most of the features 
we associate with modern science.18 As Professor Guo Yi points out, 
Chinese philosophy has always been concerned primarily with society, 
16 Ibid., p. 467.
17 While David Mungello has questioned this claim in his study of Leib-
niz’s relation to Chinese thought, Mungello still acknowledged that Leibniz 
did find in the work of Zhu Xi ideas entirely consonant with his own philos-
ophy. See D. E. Mungello, Leibniz and Confucianism: The Search for Accord, 
Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1977, p. 15. Needham’s claim 
has been defended by W.-T. Chan, ‘The Study of Chu Hsi in the West’, The 
Journal of Asian Studies, 35(4), Aug. 1976: 555–577, p. 571. Leibniz’s major 
writings on China have been published as G. W. Leibniz, Writings on China, 
trans. Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont Jr. Chicago: Open Court, 1994. 
This does not contain early correspondence in which Leibniz discussed 
Chinese thought.
18 Y. S. Kim, The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi: 1130–1200, Philadelphia: 
American Philosophical Society, 2000. 
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people, value and the meaning of life. David Hall and Roger Ames make 
this point more emphatically. 
“The dramatic contrast between Chinese and Western modes of 
philosophic thinking may be illustrated by the fact that the ten-
dency of European philosophers to seek out the being of things, the 
essential reality lying behind appearances, would meet with little 
sympathy among Chinese thinkers, whose principal interests lie in 
the establishment and cultivation of harmonious relationships with-
in their social ambiance. Contrasted with Anglo-European philo-
sophic traditions, the thinking of the Chinese is far more concrete, 
this-worldly and, above all, practical. One reason for this difference 
is suggested by the fact that cosmogonic and cosmological myths 
played such a minor role in the development of Chinese intellectual 
culture and that, as a consequence, Chinese eyes were focused not 
upon issues of cosmic order but upon more mundane questions of 
how to achieve communal harmony within a relatively small social 
nexus.”19
These different orientations, Ames and Rosemont argued, were influ-
enced by the different languages and forms of writing.20 European lan-
guages with their ‘subject, verb, object’ structure, privilege nouns that 
identify things, essences or substances, which then are seen as doing 
something or having something done to them or attributed to them. This 
leads to efforts to identify the nature of these things underlying appear-
ances, while ancient Chinese language, having no definite or indefinite 
articles, focused on events and relations and fostered concern with ori-
enting people to live in the context of the becoming of the world. It is 
19 D. L. Hall and R. Ames, ‘Dao’ in E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, CD version, Version 
1.0, p. 1419.
20 R. T. Ames and H. Rosemont Jr. ‘Philosophic and Linguistic Back-
ground’ in the ‘Introduction’ to The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical 
Translation, trans. Ames and Rosemont Jr., New York: Ballantine Books, 
1998. See also ‘Appendix II: Further Remarks on Language, Translation, 
and Interpretation’, pp. 279–317. See also C. Hansen, ‘Taoism’, Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2003 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/taoism/ revised, 2007, 
p. 27 f.
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for this reason that Western philosophy was dominated by metaphysics 
and epistemology while Chinese philosophy focused on how to live and 
how to cultivate people, including oneself. 
However, Needham, acknowledged that Zhu Xi only glimpsed 
through a glass darkly what was later fully developed by European sci-
ence, and acknowledged that this research program was not taken up 
in China.21 It appears that because he was a scientist himself, Needham 
was able to see in Zhu Xi’s work something that tends to be missed by 
other historians of thought. His views in this regard were closely related 
to his translations of key Chinese terms. Needham was aware of alter-
native translations of these terms, but defended his own translations. 
Professor Guo Yi interpretes li as ‘the locus of form, reason, law and 
principle’ (p. 22). Needham reviewed the translations of li as Platonic 
or Aristotelian ‘form’ and ‘Vernunft’ or ‘Reason’ and ‘Law’, but argued 
that each of these was unacceptable, severely distorting its meaning.22 Li 
is often translated as ‘principle’, but also as ‘pattern’ or ‘the patterned 
regularity of existence’. The earliest sense of li was a rectangular field 
divided into quadrants to form an ‘orderly pattern’. Later it was used as 
a verb to mean the creating of such a pattern. The term was developed 
as a general concept by the Daoists. As Philip Ivanhoe noted:
“The most important and extensive early uses of li occur in the 
Zhuangzi. There, li appears both in the sense of the grand pattern 
underlying all phenomena and the individual instantiations of this 
pattern in discrete things. The Zhuangzi contains the first occur-
rences of ‘heavenly principles’, ‘principles of the Way’ and ‘great 
principles’, terms which connect the notion of ‘pattern’ to a greater 
cosmic scheme, lending it a wider metaphysical role and greater nor-
mative force. Being explicitly linked to ‘Heaven’ and the ‘Way’, li 
describes not only how things are but also how they should be.”23
21 While written much earlier, Wing-Tsit Chan provides a defence of Need-
ham’s assessment of Zhu Xi, with some modifications, in ‘Neo-Confucian-
ism and Chinese Scientific Thought’, Philosophy East and West, 6(4) Jan. 
1957: pp. 309–332.
22 J. Needham, op. cit., p. 475 f.
23 P. J. Invanhoe, ‘Li’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig, 
London: Routledge, 1998, p. 4750. See also W.-T. Chan, ‘The Mystical Way 
of Chuang Tzu’ in A Sourcebook of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 202 ff. 
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This view was further developed by the Han Dynasty Neo-Daoist Wang 
Bi (226–249).24 The term was appropriated and developed by the Bud-
dhists and then embraced by the Chen brothers who gave it a new 
meaning by claiming that ‘the innumerable principles amount to one 
principle’, with ‘tian’ (‘sky’ or ‘heaven’), ‘decree’ and ‘Dao’ being merely 
different names for this.25 The Song neo-Confucians also compounded 
the word li with the word for the ‘veins in jade’, with ‘veins of the body’ 
and the word ‘way’. To understand the li of things, they suggested, is to 
understand ‘why they are as they are.’26 As Angus Graham characterized 
li, it ‘is a line which it natural to follow, not a law which one is bound 
to obey; it is also spontaneous, “thus of itself ”’.27 Zhu Xi’s contribution 
to the development of this notion was to conceive of li as logically prior 
to, although not actually separable from, existing things. On this basis, 
Needham’s translation of this term as ‘principle of organization’ would 
appear to be justified.28 
Qi as used by Zhu Xi has been translated as ‘pneuma’, ‘the psy-
chosomatic stuff of existence’, ‘hylozoic vapours’, ‘psychophysical stuff ’, 
‘ether’, and ‘vital energizing field’, characterized in terms of the active 
and passive dynamics of yin and yang that had evolved from qi.29 While 
it is a leap to translate this as ‘matter-energy’, Needham acknowledged 
this, and the concept ‘matter-energy’ is itself far from unproblematic in 
modern science.
24 On Wang Bi’s elevation and development of the concept of li, see W.-T. 
Chan, A Sourcebook of Chinese Philosophy, p. 316.
25 See A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers: The Metaphysics of the Broth-
ers Ch’eng, La Salle: Open Court, 1992, p. 11. See W.-T. Chan, ‘Neo-Confu-
cianism: New Ideas in Old Terminology’, Philosophy East and West, 17(1/4) 
Jan.–Oct., 1967: 15–35, p. 20 ff. The influence of Buddhism on the develop-
ment of the notion of li is described by Bryan W. van Norden in ‘What is 
Living and what is Dead in the Confucianism of Zhu Xi’, in Chinese Phi-
losophy in an Era of Globalization, ed. R. R. Wang, New York: S.U.N.Y. Press, 
2004, pp. 99–120, p. 105.
26 A. C. Graham, op. cit., p. 8.
27 Ibid., p. 12 f.
28 Kirill O. Thompson has defended Needham’s interpretation of Zhu Xi 
in ‘Li and Yi as Immanent: Chu Hsi’s Thought in Practical Perspective’, 
Philosophy East and West, 38 (1), Jan. 1988: 30–46. See esp. p. 34. 
29 Yung Sik Kim has pointed out the complexity and some limitations of 
Zhu Xi’s concept of qi in ‘Some aspects of the concept of ch’i in Chu Hsi’, 
Philosophy East and West, 34 (1), Jan. 1984: pp. 25–36.
ARRAN  GARE :  DAO IC  PH I LOSOPHY  AND   PROCESS   METAPHYS ICS 125
The notion of Dao is crucial to all this. Needham’s characterization of 
the Daoist notion of it as ‘Order of Nature’ which brings everything into 
existence and governs everything without the use of force, combines the 
views of the Great Dao characterized by Professor Guo Yi’s explication 
of the first cosmological model expressed in the Guodian text of Laozi 
of Lao Dan and the second cosmological model of the received version 
of Laozi of Taishi Dan. From Needham’s perspective the second text 
can be regarded as simply more elaborate, incorporating mathematical 
notions and the generation of opposing forces, but otherwise it is not 
fundamentally different. However, Professor Guo Yi treats the Dao of 
the second cosmological model as equivalent to Yi, the transcendent 
and absolute world, and ‘One’ as equivalent to taiji, translated by Profes-
sor Guo Yi as the ‘Great Ultimate’. This appears to introduce a notion 
of a transcendent cause much closer to traditional Christian thought, 
whereas Needham, along with many other Westerners who have turned 
to Chinese thought for inspiration, have emphasized the immanence of 
Dao, whether this be the Great Dao, the Natural or tian Dao, or the hu-
man or social Dao of the Confucians and Mohists.30 It is clearly possible 
to interpret these Chinese texts as implying transcendence,31 but they can 
more fruitfully be interpreted as evolving towards and then upholding an 
immanent view of Dao.32 Zhu Xi defended an entirely immanent view of 
Dao.33 He did characterize li as taiji, but as Joseph Adler recently argued, 
it is necessary to translate this as ‘Supreme Polarity’ rather than as ‘Great 
Ultimate’ to make sense of Zhu Xi’s discussions of it.34
While ‘way’ has until recently had no place in Western philosophy, 
it is central to Chinese thought. Dao means ‘path’ or ‘way’ — and since 
30 See for instance D. L. Hall and R. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, 
New York: State University of New York Press, 1987, p. 15.
31 For a defence of an interpretation involving transcendence, see Wang 
S. Jang, ‘The Problem of Transcendence in Chinese Religions’, Whitehead 
and China: Relevance and Relationships, ed. W. Xie, Z. Wang and G. E. Defer, 
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2005, chap. 7. For a critique of such interpreta-
tions, see D. L. Hall and R. T. Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and 
Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture, New York: S.U.N.Y. Press, 
1998, esp. chap.’s 8 & 9.
32 See W.-T. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 1963, p. 4.
33 On this, see B. W. van Norden, op. cit., p. 114.
34 J. A. Adler, ‘On Translating Taiji’, Zhu Xi Now, ed. D. Jones and He Jinli, 
Albany: SUNY Press, (forthcoming).
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it can be singular or plural, it is best treated as the part-whole sum of 
ways. While it is tempting to treat Dao as equivalent to the Western no-
tion of Being for this reason, Dao is essentially a concept of guidance. 
Dao can also be a verb, understood as ‘guide’. Ways do not necessarily 
determine actions, and as a consequence Chinese philosophers allowed 
that it is possible to participate in the creativity of Dao by augmenting 
the way or even to open new ways. As Professor Guo Yi notes, according 
to Confucius (551–479 BCE) ‘It is Man that can enlarge the Dao which 
he follows, and not the Dao that can enlarge men.’35 And as the Zhuangzi 
(370–301 BCE) put it, ‘The path is made in the walking of it.’36 On this 
understanding of Dao, David Hall and Ames argued:
“The natural cosmology of classical China does not require a single-
ordered cosmos, but invokes an understanding of a ‘world’ consti-
tuted by ‘the ten thousand things’. There is no Being behind the 
beings — only beings are. And in toto, these beings are dao. Conti-
nuity makes dao one; difference makes dao myriad; change makes 
dao processional and provisional. Dao is thus both the One and the 
many, or better, the field and foci through which it is entertained. 
The Chinese ‘world as such’ is constituted by ‘worlding’ (ziran), a 
process of spontaneous arising, or literally, uncaused ‘self-so-ing’, 
which references no external principle or agency to account for it. 
The one and the many stand in a holographic relationship: there is 
the indiscriminate field (dao) and its particular focus (de). Dao as 
field is always entertained and focused from some perspective or 
another, from some particular. Just as in a holographic display where 
each detail contains the whole in an adumbrated form, so each item 
of the totality focuses the totality as its particular field.”37
35 Guo Yi, ‘Metaphysics, Nature and Mind – The main idea of Daoic Phi-
losophy’, in this volume, p. 45 f., from Analects, 15:28 as transl. by W.-T. 
Chan. (In the Ames and Rosemount translation, footnote 20 in this article, 
15:29). 
36 Chu Hsi, ‘The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, chap. 2, in Chan, A Source-
book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 180.
37 D. L. Hall and R. Ames, ‘Dao’ in E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, CD version, Version 
1.0, p. 1965 f.
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From this perspective, the ‘sphere of Dao’ or Daoti of the Neo-Confu-
cians referred to by Professor Guo Yi38 would include particular ways. 
This does not entirely support Needham’s interpretation of Zhu Xi’s 
notion of Dao as referring exclusively to the totality, while components 
were referred to as ‘li’, but as Graham pointed out, for the Song Dynasty 
Neo-Confucians, ‘li’ also meant ‘way’. ‘It will be observed’ wrote Gra-
ham in reference to a dialogue between Zhu Xi and his student, ‘that 
the images behind the two words are so closely related that Chu Hsi’s 
questioner could see no difference between them.’39
While the Chinese might not have focused on the question of what 
there is, their concern with how to live involved developing the meta-
physical assumptions that Needham claimed to have found in Chinese 
thought, with the universe construed as self-organizing patterns with 
their component patterns being part of them, guided by the whole but 
not determined by it. Cheng I and Zhu Xi offered this as a framework 
for ‘the investigation of things’ in order to achieve insight, uniting and 
relating what is studied to gain an integral understanding of the world, 
thereby achieving integrity or ‘self-completion’.40 As Cheng I put it, ‘To 
learn from what is outside, and grasp them within, is called “understand-
ing”. To grasp them from what is within, and connect them with outside 
things, is called “integrity”. Integrity and understanding are one.’41 Un-
like the reductionist forms of thinking that have dominated modernity 
in the West, these assumptions do accord with (post-)modern science.
OVERCOMING  N IH I L IS T IC  SC I ENCE
Westerners who have been attracted to Chinese thought generally have 
done so because, grappling with the nihilism of Western civilization, 
they have seen in Chinese philosophy ways of thinking that might en-
able them to go beyond the assumptions that led to this nihilism. These 
assumptions led to what Nietzsche proclaimed as ‘the death of God’; that 
is, the collapse of the God of metaphysics, the ultimate good posited be-
yond all beings and bestowing order and purpose upon them. The death 
38 Guo Yi, ‘Metaphysics, Nature and Mind – The main idea of Daoic Phi-
losophy’, p. 20.
39 A. C. Graham, op. cit., p. 12.
40 See Ibid., ‘KÊ-Wu (The Investigation of Things)’, ch.7.
41 Ibid., p. 75.
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of God deprived the ultimate source of value of its value. The postulation 
of this God as a transcendent cause and source of ultimate value was 
partly a consequence of forms of thinking engendered by European lan-
guages, tending to objectify everything and then treat ‘things’ in abstrac-
tion from their contexts. Analysis has been privileged, dividing up the 
world through abstract concepts into incommensurable domains, such 
as God and nature, minds and bodies, values and facts. Actions which 
bifurcate the agent from the product of its activity, as in the production 
of a commodity, have been taken as paradigmatic, and actions in which 
outcomes are intrinsic to people, as in self-cultivation, have been barely 
acknowledged.42 It was to avoid these tendencies that Martin Heidegger, 
strongly influenced by Daoism, drew upon Chinese thought to develop 
new ways of thinking, appropriating the word ‘way’ in his ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’ and the essays in ‘On the Way to Language’ 
(Unterwegs zur Sprache).43 Thus, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ 
begins: ‘In what follows we shall be questioning concerning technology. 
Questioning builds a way.’44 This unusual use of language enabled Hei-
degger to expose modern technology as a way of enframing that reveals 
the world, including ultimately people, as only standing-reserve ready to 
be exploited while concealing other possibilities, and to show the con-
nection between this and experimental science which sets nature up to 
‘exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance’.45 It also 
enabled him to show that there are other ways of revealing the world, 
notably that of the Ancient Greeks where poiesis (making) was seen as 
agents participating with matter, ends and forms to bring forth products. 
However, Heidegger did not offer a viable alternative to modern tech-
nology. To do this it will be necessary to develop a new kind of science, 
advancing beyond the techno-science of mechanistic materialism, a sci-
ence which enables people to reorient themselves by revealing to them 
that they are participants within the self-organizing patterns of activity 
42 On this, see M. Weber, ‘Concepts of Creation and Pragmatic of Creativ-
ity’ in Whitehead and China, ed. W. Xie, Z. Wang and G. E. Derfer, Frank-
furt: Ontos Verlag, 2005, chap. 9. 
43 Heidegger’s indebtedness to Chinese thought has been revealed by the 
essays in Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. G. Parkes, Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1987.
44 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
trans. William Lovitt, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 3.
45 Ibid., p. 21.
ARRAN  GARE :  DAO IC  PH I LOSOPHY  AND   PROCESS   METAPHYS ICS 129
of nature and society. This is the promise of Needham’s Chinese influ-
enced tradition of science.
Needham began his career as a bio-chemist and theoretical biologist 
attempting to develop a new, post-mechanistic approach to life based on 
process metaphysics while focusing on morphogenesis — the genesis of 
forms in developing embryos. Needham’s colleague in the movement for 
theoretical biology, C. H. Waddington, developed the notions of fields, 
chreods (time-paths) and homeorhesis (stabilization along a time-path) 
to conceptualize such development, granting a place to fields within 
fields and chreods within chreods, which he then generalized to other 
domains, including ecology and human societies.46 This movement for 
theoretical biology has continued up to the present, with one of its fore-
most representatives being Mae-Wan Ho. Ho was born in China and for 
this reason, she claims, was impervious to the reductionist materialism 
she was taught in schools, but uniquely receptive to advances in sci-
ence beyond reductionist materialism.47 Her work, also influenced by 
process metaphysics, integrates these advances.48 That is, as someone 
brought up within a culture permeated by Daoic thinking, she was able 
to embrace and further develop a form of science that had already in-
corporated, or at least resonated with, Zhu Xi’s metaphysics. This work 
aligned her with and led her to collaborate with the theoretical ecologist 
and proponent of ‘ecological metaphysics’, Robert Ulanowicz. Integrating 
non-linear thermodynamics, hierarchy theory and other developments 
in complexity theory with biosemiotics, including eco-semiotics and the 
unique, reflexive semiotics of human culture, theoretical ecology can be 
seen as the most advanced post-reductionist science, transcending Car-
tesian dualism, emphasizing the primary reality of processes over laws 
and mutuality over competition, thereby fusing the best of Western and 
Chinese thought.49 
46 C. H. Waddington, Tools of Thought, Frogmore: Paladin, 1977.
47 See interview by David Riley of Mae-Wan Ho, ‘Quantum Jazz Biology’, 
http://www.i-sis.org.uk/quantumJazzBiology.php (accessed May 10th, 2011). 
48 See M.-W. Ho, The Rainbow and the Worm: The Physics of Organisms, 3rd 
edition, New Jersey: World Scientific, 2008. 
49 R. E. Ulanowicz, Ecology: The Ascendent Perspective, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997, p. 6. Ulanowicz has further developed this argu-
ment in A Third Window: Natural Life beyond Newton and Darwin, West 
Conshohocken: Templeton Foundation, 2009, especially chapter 9 where 
he argues for an ecological metaphysic. Other major figures involved in the 
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The development of theoretical ecology justifies Lovelock’s Gaia hy-
pothesis, the claim that the Earth itself is alive and has produced the 
conditions for life. Gaia is the ultimate community of life on Earth, a 
community of communities of living processes which to survive must 
augment the environmental conditions both of their components and 
of themselves. Organisms are themselves highly integrated ecosystems, 
that is, self-organizing patterns of activity generating and maintaining 
‘homes’ for their constituents, emerging from and participating in a hi-
erarchy of broader ecosystems. Evolution occurs through the elimination 
of species of organisms that undermine rather than augment the condi-
tions of their existence. These theories provide the basis for a better un-
derstanding of humans as a complex of culturally constituted processes, 
structures and communities within the global ecosystem with unique 
powers and liabilities by virtue of their cultures, providing new insights 
into why civilizations survive or collapse, and what is required to avoid 
such collapse.50 In collaboration with Ho, Ulanowicz spelt out the impli-
cations of this work for the economy, for society and for civilization.51 It 
is this program, integrating the achievements of Western and Chinese 
civilization that can provide the foundation for the creation of the eco-
logical civilization now being called for by the Chinese government.52
DAO IC  PH I LOSOPHY  AND  VALUES
What is the significance of all this for Daoic philosophy? As Professor 
Guo Yi presented it, Daoic philosophy is a fusion of Confucian and Dao-
ist philosophy. With the Song and Ming dynasty Neo-Confucians, ‘the 
two fundamental senses of Dao were united. The Dao of Metaphysics 
advance of theoretical ecology are Stanley Salthe, Timothy Allen and C. S. 
Holling.
50 See A. Gare, ‘Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics and Political Philoso-
phy in an Age of Impending Catastrophe’, Cosmos and History, 5 (2), 2009: 
264–286.
51 M.-W. Ho and Robert Ulanowicz, ‘Sustainable systems as organisms?’ 
Biosystems, 82 (2005): pp. 39–51.
52 A. Gare, ‘Towards an Ecological Civilization: The Science, Ethics and 
Politics of Eco-Poiesis’ (Chinese translation), Marxism and Reality, 8 (1), 
2010: pp. 191–202, and A. Gare, ‘Towards Ecological Civilization: The Sci-
ence, Ethics and Politics of Ecopoiesis’, Process Studies, 39(1), 2010: pp. 5–38. 
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and Ontology [of the Daoists] is the source of the Dao of moral norms 
[of Confucius], while the Dao of moral norms is the manifestation of 
the Dao of Metaphysics and Ontology.’53 For Confucius, Dao is Rendao, 
as Ames and Rosemont put it, ‘a way of becoming consummately and 
authoritatively human’54 through conscientious performance of ritual-
ized action. While Professor Guo Yi has argued that Daoism was not as 
opposed to Confucianism as is commonly thought, Daoism did develop 
in opposition to Confucianism and defended the Dao of Nature as the 
guide for living rather than the Dao of social ritual promoted by Confu-
cians. It was the Song Dynasty neo-Confucians, most importantly the 
Ch’eng brothers and following them, Zhu Xi (1130–1200), who effected 
an integration of these notions of the Dao.55 They joined together the 
productive process of the universe with the virtues in Confucian ethics 
by embracing but then reformulating the Dao of Nature of the Daoists, 
ascribing the highest virtue or ren to nature as a vital force, identifying 
substance and function (sheng-sheng) in nature and then viewing nature 
as creative activity.56 Humanity was then understood as a creative par-
ticipant within nature. In the light of the developments in science and 
metaphysics influenced by Zhu Xi, culminating in recent community 
ecology and human ecology, it is now possible to clarify what following 
Dao involves, and to see how this overcomes nihilism. 
As Zhu Xi argued, finding Dao involves the investigation of things 
to explore pattern and to attain knowledge. Through probing situations 
and affairs, constituent patterns and deep structures are more and more 
clearly discerned, generating an integrative comprehension that simulta-
neously cultivates the self to realize its full humanity and orients people 
to act appropriately.57 The tradition of modern science influenced by, or 
53 Guo Yi, ‘Metaphysics, Nature and Mind – The main idea of Daoic Phi-
losophy’, p. 20.
54 R. T. Ames and H. Rosemont, Jr, op. cit., p. 46.
55 Despite Zhu Xi’s criticism of Laozi, he was strongly influenced by his 
conception of nature. On this, see W.-T. Chan, ‘Chu Hsi’s Appraisal of Lao 
Tzu’, Philosophy East and West, 25 (2), Apr.1975: 131–144. 
56 On this integration and its significance, see W.-T. Chan, ‘Chu Hsi’s Ap-
praisal of Lao Tzu’, Philosophy East and West, 25 (2) Apr. 1975: 131–144, 
p. 140. 
57 On Zhu Xi’s arguments for this and the relation between the quest for 
knowledge and self-realization, see S.-H. Liu, Understanding Confucian 
Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming, London: Westport, 1998, p. 190 f. and 
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at least concordant with, Zhu Xi’s philosophy does not see science as 
simply a means to develop technology or a mere tool of life, as Professor 
Guo Yi claimed. Authentic science, intimately related to the philosophy 
of nature and aligned with the humanities and the arts, is an exemplary 
form of life committed to the pursuit of truth and an integral under-
standing of the cosmos, fostering the virtues required for this pursuit. 
It cannot be taught by having students remember texts, but requires the 
socialization of students into communities of enquirers engaged in ob-
servational, experimental and theoretical research and problem solving 
to achieve real understanding of terms used in scientific discourse. Un-
derstanding requires what Michael Polanyi called ‘indwelling’ in which 
what is focused upon is comprehended against a background in terms 
of which it is experienced as significant.58 Such indwelling is exempli-
fied in understanding a sentence where the meaning and significance 
of each word requires indwelling in the whole sentence, which in turn 
must be understood in the broader context of the discourse of which 
it is part. However, indwelling is also involved in using instruments, 
with people coming to experience these as extensions of their bodies, 
in non-discursive practices where people are able to understand what 
others are doing and are able to identify with and participate in the 
projects of groups, and in whole forms of life. Proper understanding 
requires indwelling in all of these contexts, and cannot be fully captured 
by what can be put into words; understanding always involves ‘tacit’ 
knowledge. Advances in understanding include comprehending aspects 
of the physical and biological world, natural and human communities 
and the evolution of cultures and of philosophy and science, as well as 
the lives of individuals and their activities and products. It includes the 
present philosophical, artistic and scientific communities and the efforts 
of their members to advance understanding of the world and themselves. 
As such, science, along with philosophy, history, the arts and other forms 
of inquiry, should be providing people with the means to understand the 
significance of their own lives by dwelling within diverse contexts from 
their own immediate physical and social situations and local human 
communities to the community of all life on Earth, from its beginnings 
to the present, and more broadly still, in relation to the evolution of the 
K. O. Thompson, ‘How to Rejuvenate Ethics: Suggestions from Chu Hsi’, 
Philosophy East and West, vo.41(4), Oct.1991: 493–513, esp. p. 500.
58 On the concept of ‘indwelling’ see M. Polanyi and H. Prosch, Meaning, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 44.
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universe. Scientific enquiry is part of the process whereby Gaia, through 
humans, is coming to understand itself, its significance, its potentialities 
and its ends.
This complicates the quest to live according to Dao. For Confu-
cius, society is a creative achievement. It is maintained by following and 
developing the Dao, acting appropriately (yi) according to traditional 
social rituals (li), thereby inspiring spontaneous cooperation between 
people. For theoretical ecologists, all ecological communities are creative 
achievements. Each is maintained by what could be called the Dao of its 
components and its own Dao within broader communities.59 For vari-
ous reasons, these components can lose their Dao, as occurs with cancer 
cells, leading to the destruction of these communities. What compli-
cates the Confucian picture is that people are simultaneously involved 
in communities of communities, and a particular community can, like a 
malignant tumour, flourish in the short term at the expense of broader 
communities of which they are part. It is necessary to constrain com-
munities to serve broader communities. This tension is the source of 
opposition between not only Confucians and Daoists, but also for diver-
gences between different Confucians such as Mencius, who argued that 
people are basically good, and Xun Zi (ca. 312–230 BC) who argued that 
people are born with an innate desire for gain and a tendency to envy 
and hate others, proclivities which must be overcome through civilizing 
influences.60 There is a further complicating factor. Communities only 
exist through balances of opposing forces within and between them. 
This can be dealt with in Confucian philosophy through the concept of 
harmony, which implies both difference and unity, combined with the 
notions of yin and yang. Living according to Dao must take into account 
diverse Dao, some of which to be healthy are by their very nature par-
tially in opposition to each other.
What are the implications of this for values, and most importantly, 
for identifying the ultimate value? Professor Guo Yi has divided values 
between knowledge system, biological system, general values and ul-
timate value, arguing that the lower values should be subordinated to 
higher values. General values are the ethical, social and political values. 
The ultimate values of the true, the good and the beautiful are different 
59 This, essentially, is how Aldo Leopold characterized the participants 
within ecological communities. See A Sand County Almanac, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1949, p. 203.
60 See Hsün Tzu, ‘The Nature of Man is Evil’ in W.-T. Chan, op. cit., p. 128. 
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approaches to the peak state, but not the peak state itself. The ultimate 
value which is the final meaning of life, An, is a firm belief and norm of 
conduct characterized by quiet, calm, peacefulness and harmony. If this 
final end is not merely a way of living designed to produce a peaceful 
state of mind, which could be efficiently achieved by taking tranquil-
izers, what is it? Interpreting this as living in harmony with Dao, and 
interpreting Dao through post-mechanistic science, we should regard 
this as indwelling to reveal the diverse Dao of the human and non-
human communities on Earth, including the Dao of Gaia, and to live in 
a way that augments the life of Gaia. The difference between lower and 
higher values can be evaluated according to the breadth of context dwelt 
within and responded to. Someone who lives from day to day, concerned 
with immediate sensuous pleasures without concern for the morrow, is 
someone living according to the lowest values, values that they share 
with lower animals. If they indwell within and thereby take into account 
in the way they live the broader context of their whole life, and then the 
life of their family and other immediate communities, they are living 
according to higher values, the values they share with higher animals. If 
they indwell within and so appreciate these immediate communities in 
the context of broader social communities again, whether their village or 
town, their craft or professional associations, their country, their culture, 
civilization and the whole of humanity, in each case taking into account 
broader spatial and temporal spans, then they are living according to 
higher values again, values specific to humans. 
The highest value involves forming oneself through indwelling 
within and experiencing immediate situations in all these contexts and 
the broadest contexts of all, human history, including the history of its 
cultural development, the history of life on Earth and the evolution of 
whole cosmos, and living accordingly. This involves extending the per-
son embodying ren, ‘the general virtue’ or ‘generative force that makes 
virtues real, social and dynamic,’61 from ‘wishing to establish his own 
character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be 
prominent himself, also helps others to be prominent’,62 to include: ‘and 
wishing to prosper, also fosters and augments the resilience and vitality 
of their own and other human and ecological communities.’ Science, in 
61 W.-T. Chan, ‘The Evolution of the Confucian Concept of Jen’ in Philoso-
phy East and West, 4(4), Jan. 1955: pp. 295–319, p. 316.
62 Confucius, ‘Analects’, 6:28, in W.-T. Chan, op. cit., p. 31.
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conjunction with philosophy, history and the arts, should enable people 
to indwell in all these contexts, while at the same time appreciating the 
uniqueness and significance and potentiality of humanity in general and 
of their own situations and lives in particular. The ultimate concern of 
science should be the cultivation of people who can achieve this. Such 
indwelling should constrain the way people live and act to facilitate the 
flourishing of their future selves, their social and natural communi-
ties, other people and their communities, other forms of life and their 
ecosystems, and Gaia. This must involve appreciating conflicts between 
specific Dao, yet maintaining equilibrium and equanimity in the face of 
these conflicts. In doing so, people should not be asserting themselves, 
but in their actions should experience themselves and be seen as ‘ves-
sels’ and expressions of Dao, acting by ‘non-acting’; that is, not acting 
coercively but acting by fostering cooperation and the orchestration of 
the full potential of any community’s population.63 It is in this context 
that a peaceful and harmonious state of mind should be cultivated and 
achieved. It is achieved by living and acting in harmony with and being 
a vehicle for Dao, thereby achieving equanimity even in the face of in-
justices, lack of recognition and threats. This provides an interpretation 
of Cheng Hao’s statement endorsed by Zhu Xi, ‘The constant principle 
of the sage is that his feelings are in accord with all creation, and yet 
he has no feelings of his own.’64 In doing so people should provide 
examples to others and thereby reveal Dao as the best way to live, in-
spiring others to search for and live according to Dao. However, having 
this effect on people should not be a goal. Living according to Dao and 
becoming thereby exemplary persons should not be treated as a means 
to manipulate others to conform to their goals but as acting in a way 
that is conducive to spontaneous cooperation to respond to problems 
and to augment Dao.65 The highest end is not just an end in itself, nor 
simply a means to other ends, but the highest form of participation in 
63 On this, see H. Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, [1972] Long 
Grove: Waveland Press, 1998. See also, H. Fingarette, ‘The Confucian Per-
spective: The Self ’, Mapping Responsibility: Explorations in Mind, Law, Myth, 
and Culture, New York: Open Court, 2004, chap. 10. 
64 Chu Hsi, ‘The Complete Works of Chu Hsi’, 127, in W.-T. Chan, op. cit., 
p. 643.
65 The implications of such an orientation to action have been shown by 
R. C. H. Chia and Robin Holt, Strategy Without Design: The Silent Efficacy of 
Indirect Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
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and contribution to Dao. This is the form of self-cultivation and way of 
living, indwelling in the world in all its complexity as fully as possible 
and living accordingly, augmenting the Dao revealed by this, that is 
required for an ecological civilization. 
SASA  JOS I FOV IC  (COLOGNE)
FIGURATIONS OF FREEDOM
1 . INTRODUCT ION
In the history of Chinese philosophy the concept “Dao” was not used 
exclusively by authors that we classify as “daoists” in the Western lit-
erature. It was rather common to many classical authors including Lao 
Tse and Confucius. And while Confucius uses this concept preferably in 
reference to the way human beings should behave in order to enhance 
the full development of their nature, especially their moral nature, Lao 
Tse speaks of Dao primarily in reference to the idea of an original source 
or the producer of the world. As Guo Yi points out, his own concept of 
Daoic philosophy is based upon Dao as the origin of the universe (root 
of the world, taiji) in the first place. Within a holistic framework, he ad-
vocates a system of metaphysics that distinguishes between the sphere 
of Dao (daoti 道体) the sphere of nature (xingti 性体) and the sphere of 
mind (xingti 心体), and he suggests that the fundamental structure of 
Dao determines the fundamental structures of the spheres of nature and 
mind. He specifies the innate structure of the original or primary Dao 
(the producer) by three fundamental elements, zhi 值, li 理, and qi 气, 
which represent the original sources of value, form, and energy or matter. 
Accordingly, the secondary Dao (nature/the product) must also contain 
“the nature of zhi 值之性 (or the value-nature), the nature of li, 理之性 (or 
the reason-nature), and the nature of qi, 气之性 (or the physical nature)”. 
The human mind also represents a product of Dao and it is therefore 
intrinsically determined by the fundamental structure: zhi, li, and qi. 
Consequently, Guo Yi specifies the innate structure of the mind as the 
mind of zhi 值之心 (or the value-mind) (rooted in the ultimate source of 
values, the zhi of the primary Dao, the taiji), the mind of li 理之心 (or 
the reason-mind rooted in the original source of form), and the mind 
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of qi 气之心 (or the physical mind, rooted in the source of matter)”. And 
moreover he ascribes the productive principle of Dao, the so called taiji, 
to the mind and claims that the mind has a taiji itself, which means 
that the mind is able to determine its own nature. The mind is not only 
a receiver, the patient of the dynamics of Dao but a producer, an agent 
himself. On the basis of the fundamental structure that it shares with the 
original Dao the mind is able to determine its own agency.
This structural framework plays a significant role for one of the ma-
jor concerns of Guo Yi’s text. He proposes a solution for one of the most 
controversial issues in Chinese philosophy during the last 800 years, 
namely the dispute on the primacy of nature or mind. In the Chinese 
history of philosophy the school of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, 程朱学派, ad-
vocated the primacy of nature, while the school of Lu Jiuyuan and Wang 
Yangming, 陆王学派, advocated the primacy of the mind. In regards to 
this controversy Guo Yi argues that “xin, xing and li are the same thing. 
There is no difference between [the claim that] xing is li and xin is li”, or 
in other words: This classical controversy can be dissolved on a higher 
level once we understand that the mind is an agent who has his own Taiji 
and determines his own nature. Therefore the question of primacy can 
be replaced by a more profound understanding of this self-determination 
and its innate (daoic) structure. Zhi, li and qi represent the fundamental 
principle of both, (objective) nature (of mind) and mind itself, because 
they substantially determine the mind’s agency and self-constitution. To 
a certain extent, we can denote Guo Yi’s dissolution as dialectical be-
cause it preserves the truth of both competing theories while it elevates 
the topic from the level of an inevitable confrontation in the finite sphere, 
to the dialectical idea of self-determination on a metaphysical level. 
Because our mind has a taiji and determines its own nature, we are 
able to cultivate our (especially moral) character and gradually overcome 
the innate conflict between our biological and moral nature. Thereby we 
seek to achieve a level of self-determination on which we could easily fol-
low our affections without risking to conflict with the moral law. This re-
sult of such self-cultivation is not at all easy to achieve although it is val-
ued by western philosophers as much as by their Chinese colleagues. The 
German philosopher Friedrich Schiller for example highly appreciates 
such a structure of volition or character and denotes it as “beautiful soul”.1 
1 Schiller, F. 1793: On Grace and Dignity. In: Schiller, Friedrich: Werke. Na-
tionalausgabe. Edited by the Nationale Forschungs- und Gedenkstätten der 
klassischen deutschen Literatur in Weimar (Goethe- und Schiller-Archiv) 
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But he is skeptical about our ability to realize this ideal of education 
within our earthly life. I am, however, convinced that he would have been 
delighted by Confucius’ disclosure that he indeed achieved such a state 
of self-cultivation, although not before the age of 70.2 But as long we are 
cultivating our character and as long as we are still challenged by the 
force of affections of which we are not certain whether they conform to 
morality or not, we must be able to overcome these affections somehow. 
In the tradition of Chinese philosophy, i. e. Chung-ying Cheng believes 
that we are able to overcome our natural feelings by the force of the moral 
feelings, while in the German tradition we speak of the moral law or the 
faculty of reason instead of moral feelings. In this spirit, not unlike Kant, 
Schiller states:
“Every time, then, that nature manifests an exigency and seeks to 
draw the will along with it by the blind violence of affective move-
ment, it is the duty of the will to order nature to halt until reason 
has pronounced.”3
As I mentioned before, Chinese scholars would speak of moral feel-
ings rather than reason but the ability and necessity to reflect upon our 
natural affections and overcome their influence if it confronts moral-
ity is common to both traditions. Guo Yi’s interpretation of the innate 
taiji-character of our mind provides even a solution for the question of 
the primacy of moral feelings or moral rationality, currently discussed 
among Chinese and German philosophers.4 The mind contains both 
elements because it determines its own nature by the three fundamental 
principles that determine it’s agency. And if we exercise the taiji- potential 
of our mind, we will strive to evolve to the maximum of our potentials 
and by the Schiller-Nationalmuseum in Marbach von Lieselotte Blumen-
thal und Benno von Wiese. Vol. 20: Philosophische Schriften. First part. 
1962.
2 Confucius, Analects 2.4.
3 “So oft also die Natur eine Forderung macht, und den Willen durch die 
blinde Gewalt des Affekts überraschen will, kommt es diesem zu, ihr so 
lange Stillstand zu gebieten, bis die Vernunft gesprochen hat.” Schiller, op. 
cit., 20: 292.
4 The debates that we initiated at our Conference in Cologne 2011 were 
continued in Tutzing near Munich 2012. It turned out that the dichotomy 
“moral feeling – moral law” represents an important topic to discuss.
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including our potentials as moral agents. That is an  interesting idea but 
we need to discuss how exactly such self-determination is possible.
It seems to me that a profound understanding of the concept “taiji” 
in daoic philosophy, especially the specific concept of the mind’s taiji 
might help to overcome the controversy about the roles of moral feelings 
and moral laws. I will therefore try to provide some clarification on the 
mind’s agency ere turning to the specific claim that rational agency must 
be based upon laws instead of feelings.
2 . DAO  —  THE  ULT IMATE  SOURCE  OF  A  NASCENT  WORLD
Dao represents the embodiment of the totality of all facticity, all circum-
stances, and all processes that generate the sphere of the “myriad things” 
to which we refer as “nature”. And if we agree that at least our physical 
and biological existence is a product of nature, we could argue that we 
“receive” our nature from the surrounding totality and this is indeed 
what Guo Yi claims. But because we are able to determine ourselves and 
to cultivate our character, we conclude that our character is not only a 
product of nature but a product of our own self-determination and self-
cultivation as well. Just as, in Lao Tse’s words, “a big tree grows from a 
tiny sprout”5 we receive our physical and intellectual potential from na-
ture and this potential serves as a groundwork of our self-determination. 
The achievement potential of our capacities is certainly different from 
individual to individual but we can never evolve to a level of self-deter-
mination that transcends our natural potentials. Translated in Schiller’s 
words, we could say that we have even got the potential to evolve to a 
beautiful soul but we cannot expect this metamorphosis to take place 
without our intense efforts. Thus self-determination is intrinsically tied 
to self-cultivation and the end of both is the maximal development of our 
whole nature, the biological as well as the spiritual or moral.
Daoism, and as far as I see also daoic philosophy, advocates a con-
cept of nature as a continuous process of changes within which all beings 
are currently nascent or, metaphorically speaking, being born.6 In this 
5 Lao Tse, Dao De Jing 64.
6 This idea reminds me very much on Schelling’s process philosophy, es-
pecially his ontology in the “World Ages” from 1811. Thus my essay, “Tao 
als Ursprung der Existenz”, represents an imaginary dialogue between 
Schelling and Lao Tse. It speaks of Daoism but at the same time everything 
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sense nature can be associated to the Latin verb “natare” which means 
“to give birth”. Consequently our own existence is nascent and therefore 
open for possible modifications. Some of these modifications might be 
caused by the surrounding circumstances of our existence, while some 
others represent products of our own self-determination. But the theory 
of our self-determination based on the potentials that we receive from 
our nature determines the process of our self-cultivation because accord-
ing to this theory we are justified to privilege one specific form of self-
cultivation which aims at the development of the faculties and capacities 
that we receive from nature, rather than any sort of self-determination 
that violates our nature or the principles and laws of the environment. By 
accepting the theory that we receive our potentials from Dao, we accept 
the fact that our existence is a product of specific (natural) circumstances 
and that it can be maintained only if we maintain these circumstances. 
This is one of the reasons why according to the Daoic philosophy the 
process of the human self-determination and the realization of human 
nature is necessarily connected to environmental ethics. The continuity 
of the process of changes manifests life according to a specific principle 
or productive force, “Ziran”, and thus Ziran represents a value indepen-
dently from our volition. It is a necessary condition of our existence as 
human beings. Similarly our “mind” including world-orientation and 
value-orientation together with the ability to determine our volition 
represents an essential element of our existence because it is “given” to 
us by nature and the whole process of our volition is based upon this 
faculty. In my paper I will actually focus on the social sphere of our self-
determination but here, not unlike Arran Gare, I suggest that the concept 
of Daoic philosophy might provide some interesting perspectives for the 
debates on environmental ethics, because it enables us to advocate the 
value of natural processes such as the emergence of life independently 
from individual or collective human interests.
that is mentioned claims to be true of Schelling’s “World Ages” as well as of 
Daoism. In reference to the wu-Negation I tried to create a wu-presence of 
Schelling in this text. Cf. Josifovic, S. 2008: Tao als Ursprung der Existenz. 
In: Bickmann, C. et al.: Religion und Philosophie im Widerstreit. Studien 
zur interkulturellen Philosophie 18, Band 1.
142
3. FREEDOM REPRESENTS A   NECESSARY  CONDIT ION OF GUO Y I ’S  CLA IM
In sum, I appreciate Guo Yi’s embedment of the human existence in the 
totality of nature as well as the idea of nature as a continuous process 
of the emergence of life and humanity, and therefore I agree with his 
postulation that practical philosophy needs to develop a framework that 
enhances the full development of the human nature. 
But here I need to confront Guo Yi’s theory with the Western theory 
of freedom and action, because according to the classical German phi-
losophy, freedom represents a necessary condition of all sorts of self-
determination, self-cultivation, and of course especially of moral agency. 
Even if we agree on the fact that there are certain natural values, we 
must insist on the idea that the development of our natural potentials 
represents a primary object of our volition and self-determination. Our 
self-determination is possible only under the condition of our freedom 
because of the following argument: Freedom represents the necessary 
condition of morality. In Kant’s words: Freedom is the ratio essendi of 
the moral law. So, if we intend to establish “a spiritual home for human 
beings” (Guo Yi) which provides the groundwork for the full develop-
ment of the human nature, we need to discuss the underlying theory of 
freedom and self-determination. In the tradition of the classical German 
philosophy I will present a conceptual framework of which I suggest that 
it complements and supports Guo Yi’s ideas. Basically, I believe that the 
classical German theory of freedom, especially Kant’s concept of “prac-
tical freedom” concerns a specific sort of rational agency by which the 
mind (of which Guo Yi speaks) determines his own nature. Let us agree 
that the mind has a taiji. Let us also agree that the mind is an agent able 
to determine his own nature. We are now moving on to this determina-
tion precisely and trying to understand more about it.
4 . THE  THEORY  OF  PRACT ICAL  FREEDOM
In classical German philosophy, we define freedom as a faculty to de-
termine our own volition and act on the basis of classifiable ends and 
principles.7 These ends represent the objects of our self-determination 
7 Of course, Kant does not speak of zhi, li, and qi but nevertheless we can 
accept the definition of freedom as volitional self-determination based on 
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and they are usually given to us on the basis of sensuous affections re-
spectively natural feelings. But in contrast to animals, we are not neces-
sarily driven to follow these affections. Instead, we are able to anticipate 
possible consequences of our actions, to consider the attractiveness of 
these consequences, and to overcome given affections in case that the an-
ticipated consequences seem unattractive. The ability to overcome given 
inclinations, in Kant’s words “arbitrium liberum” (CPR: B 562, B 830), 
represents a substantial element of his theory of practical freedom in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. 
We have got a choice whether to follow a given inclination or not, 
and we are able to make this choice consciously. Whenever we experi-
ence a sensuous affection, based on the natural appetite, we are able to 
reflect upon this affection and to recognize it as a legitimate expression 
of our volition or to deny it this recognition and thus disqualify it as a 
mere natural drive that needs to be overcome. This act of recognition 
represents a specifically human faculty and it can be either based on the 
attractiveness of the anticipated consequences or on principles. We ex-
ercise practical freedom in both cases, but the ability to act on the basis 
of principles represents a higher level of freedom, because it involves the 
autonomy of reason which is able to determine the structure of our own 
volition independently from given affections. This is exactly the human 
faculty of which Kant claims, that it “infinitely elevates my worth as an 
intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a 
life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world”. (CPrR: 
AA 162)8 The moral principles represent the highest level of the autono-
my of reason and we are bound to follow these principles in every single 
manifestation of our rational agency, respectively our practical freedom. 
This is exactly how the human mind determines his own nature, this is 
the prototype of rational agency.
Practical freedom represents the ability to act on the basis of clas-
sifiable ends as far as we recognize these ends as an expression of our 
own volition. But we recognize these ends as achievements of our own 
freedom only if we have realized them by our own actions. The exercise 
certain principles. These principles might even be zhi, li, and qi. We need 
to clarify this matter gradually.
8 Kant, I.: The Critique of Practical Reason/Kritik der praktischen Ver-
nunft. In: Kants Werke. Akademie Textausgabe. Vol. 5: Kritk der prak-
tischen Vernunft. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1968, 
pp. 1–163 (henceforth cited as CPrR).
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of practical freedom is therefore based on the ability to identify the ap-
propriate means and to determine one’s own volition to undertake the 
necessary action. 
Furthermore, if we take especially the transition from Kant’s to 
Hegel’s theory of freedom into account, we understand that there is an 
insufficiency in the structure presented above, and this insufficiency re-
lates to the fact that the ends on the basis of which we exercise our prac-
tical freedom are given to us by a contingent source — sensuous receptivity. 
We are free to recognize them as an expression of our own volition, but 
we do not specify these ends freely. We could speak of a higher quality of 
freedom, if we could also determine the contents of our volition freely.9 
And if, as Guo Yi advocates, the mind determines his own nature, it must 
also control this aspect of self-determination.
We share the intuition that we are able to do this. But in fact, we can 
only speak of a free determination of the ends of our volitional self-de-
termination if these ends are specified by a faculty that represents an au-
thentic expression of our spontaneity. Spontaneity refers to agency and it 
seems to me that only the combination of spontaneity and agency is able 
to clarify the taiji-character of the human mind within the framework of 
Western philosophical vocabulary. According to Kant Reason represents 
a spontaneous faculty which determines itself by autonomy — and it does 
it on the basis of rational principles. Thus Christine Korsgaard states:
“Kant is usually thought of as a rationalist, but the Kantian concep-
tion of practical rationality represents a third and distinct alterna-
tive. According to the Kantian conception, to be rational just is to 
be autonomous. That is: to be governed by reason, and to govern 
yourself, are one and the same thing. The principles of practical 
reason are constitutive of autonomous action: they do not represent 
external restrictions on our actions, whose power to motivate us is 
therefore inexplicable, but instead describe the procedures involved 
in autonomous willing. But they also function as normative or guid-
ing principles, because in following these procedures we are guiding 
ourselves.”10
9 Compare: G. W. F. Hegel 1817–1830: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences. §§ 476–482.
10 Korsgaard C. 1997: The Normativity of Instrumental Reason. In: Ethics 
and Practical Reason. new edition: Korsgaard, C. 2008: The Constitution 
of Agency, Oxford University Press, 31.
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The specification of the contents of our volitional self-determination 
must not be based on arbitrariness and contingency, because arbitrari-
ness and contingency oppose the idea of control within our own voli-
tional self-determination and thus they oppose the idea of freedom. In-
stead of contingency and arbitrariness, our volitional self-determination 
must be based on consistent principles, because practical freedom is the 
ability to act on the basis of specified ends and principles, and not only 
on the basis of specified ends; and we achieve the full development of 
our practical freedom only under the condition that the totality of all 
involved faculties evolves to the maximum of their performance. Acting 
without the consideration of the moral autonomy does indeed represent 
some sort of practical freedom, but it does not represent its highest form 
and it does not at all represent the full achievement potential of the 
human autonomy and volitional self-determination. According to Kant 
we can hardly speak of a free will if we exercise our volition arbitrarily. 
He recognizes the human volition as a free will only if it is determined 
exclusively by the autonomy of reason and the moral law. (CPrR, AA 72) 
Similarly Schiller concludes: 
“The will really then makes use of its liberty even whilst it acts 
contrary to reason: but it makes use of it unworthily, because, not-
withstanding its liberty, it is no less under the jurisdiction of nature, 
and adds no real action to the operation of pure instinct; for to will 
by virtue of desire is only to desire in a different way.”11
Thereby Kant and Schiller support Guo Yi’s advocacy of a human self-
determination that aims primarily at the development of the moral char-
acter and they would easily agree that the mere satisfaction of desires 
represents an unworthy form of existence and that we need to determine 
the ends of our volition on the basis of the moral autonomy. In fact, 
Guo Yi wouldn’t speak of the moral autonomy nor of the moral law but 
rather of morality, value, and the “noble part” of our nature, which is 
the reason why we must sooner or later discuss the underlying concept 
of morality: but here we find an agreement in regard to the theory of the 
11 “Er gebraucht also seine Freiheit wirklich, wenn er gleich der Vernunft 
widersprechend handelt, aber er gebraucht sie unwürdig, weil er ungeachtet 
seiner Freiheit doch nur innerhalb der Natur stehen bleibt und zu der Op-
eration des bloßen Triebes gar keine Realität hinzutut; denn aus Begierde 
wollen heißt nur umständlicher begehren.” Schiller, op. cit., 20: 291.
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human self-cultivation and the underlying structure of volition or practi-
cal freedom. I propose to accept this agreement as a common ground and 
starting point of the intercultural encounter. And if we translate Guo Yi’s 
postulation of the full development of our nature into Kantian words, we 
must perform our practical freedom in regard to ends that are “desirable 
in relation to our whole state”, which means that they are good as well 
as useful (CPR, B 830) in order to evolve to a form of practical freedom 
by which it is possible to achieve the maximal development of morality 
along with the maximal development of happiness, which is, of course, 
the ideal of the highest good. (CPR, B 832 ff.: CPrR, AA 110 f.) If, on the 
other hand, we translate Kant’s idea into Guo Yi’s vocabulary, we could 
state that the Kantian ideal of the highest good aims at the full develop-
ment of the human nature.
In sum, Kant’s theory of practical reason and practical freedom is 
based on the distinction of our phenomenal and our noumenal (intel-
ligible) life, in this context especially the intelligible character, and his 
theory of freedom is on one hand based on our ability to overcome given 
sensuous affections and on the other hand on the ability to determine 
ourselves a priori. He is aware of the fact that our biological life involves 
ourselves into circumstances that are able to corrupt our moral develop-
ment. Schiller even develops an explicit theory of the “natural instinct” 
(Naturtrieb) and concludes that dignity consists of the ability to over-
come it: 
“The rule over the instincts by moral force is the emancipation of 
mind, and the expression by which this independence presents itself 
to the eyes in the world of phenomena is what is called dignity.”12
And not unlike Guo Yi, they both privilege the development of our free-
dom on the basis of morality, or, to put it in Guo Yi’s words: the higher 
end of our existence is our moral life and we must first and foremost 
develop the higher end of our existence. But in Kant’s philosophy there 
is a particular reason for this hierarchy: This reason is control. If we want 
to determine the contents of our volition independently from given af-
fections, and if we want to maintain control over our self-determination, 
we must exercise it on the basis of a consistent groundwork of prac-
12 “Beherrschung der Triebe durch die moralische Kraft ist Geistesfreiheit, 
und Würde heißt ihr Ausdruck in der Erscheinung.” Schiller, op. cit., 20: 
294.
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tical principles. Otherwise our self-determination would be based on 
contingency and arbitrariness. Control is the reason why the European 
tradition of moral philosophy gave up the metaphor of a “good heart” 
and turned the concept of the “moral law”. And if, as Guo Yi claims, the 
human mind determines his own nature through his own taiji, it must 
preserve the necessary control over this process of self-determination. It 
must assure that the nature that it produces is determined by the three 
fundamental principles. What I am trying to say is that this control can-
not be maintained without classifiable principles.
5 . D ISCUSS ION
I am convinced that we share a common ground in regard to the fact that 
our practical freedom must be based on morality and we also agree on 
the fact that we don’t support a theory of freedom based on the arbitrari-
ness and contingency of natural desires. 
According to Guo Yi’s terminology, we would agree on the idea that 
our life must be based on the “value-mind”, the “zhi-mind”. But the 
crucial point is our understanding of the principle zhi. We can interpret 
it as a more or less explicit groundwork of moral values. We could also 
interpret it as a “good heart”. And in some sort of a popular understand-
ing those things coincide. But in fact, the metaphor of a good heart needs 
to be translated into a clear set of moral principles, or else it does not 
represent a philosophical concept acceptable for the German classics. 
We could raise the same claim even in reference to Confucius, because 
he is absolutely clear about the fact, that the moral substance needs to 
be bound to a specific framework of values and even a specific framework 
of rituals and that these rituals represent the necessary and authentic 
expression of the moral substance within a given society. The relation 
between the moral substance and the li is not at all arbitrary. And if a 
human being is supposed to develop his full natural potential within a 
society, he must cultivate his character on the basis of the li. It does not 
suffice to trust in the good heart as long as the individual in question 
is not a siege, a “beautiful soul”. Of course, I do not intend to advocate 
the li of Zhou as a groundwork of a new “spiritual home” for human be-
ings in the 21st century, neither would I support the idea to enforce the 
structure of the Platonic state, but I suggest that the philosophical qual-
ity of the idea that the li represent a necessary expression of the moral 
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 substance consists in understanding how and why the rituals communi-
cate and manifest the values which determine a society. 
The underlying set of values represents the groundwork of the emer-
gence of society at all. It does not only contain the defining function in 
the logical sense but in fact an ontological dimension to which we can 
refer as emergence or figuration of the social reality. The social reality 
represents the totality of the social interactions of human beings and 
I am convinced that these interactions do not only recognize but actually 
manifest the values that constitute society. Thus the underlying values 
and the social practice are necessarily interconnected and the unity of 
both represents the emergence or the figuration of society. Accordingly 
I agree with the concept li only in reference to the codes of the social 
interaction within a given society as long as these codes represent an 
appropriate manifestation of practical freedom including the moral au-
tonomy and self-determination and certainly not in reference to the spe-
cific codification of the Zhou-society. According to Krummel13 “the sense 
of Li evolves from the basic verbal meaning of ‘to order’ to encompass 
its nominal sense of ‘order’ or ‘pattern’ — to distinguish it from this order 
or disharmony — both in its explanatory and normative sentences, both 
cosmologically and ethically” and I intend to emphasize the constitutive 
dimension of this function for the emergence of society. The li do not 
restrict the options of the individual self-determination in a given soci-
ety: they rather constitute the groundwork of the society and thus they 
actually provide all options. 
Within the sphere of the social interactions the li serve to provide a 
sophisticated code that enables every individual agent to manifest and 
express his own values by his actions. On the basis of the postulated 
unity of form and substance of morality in the tradition of Confucian-
ism (see: Analects 12.8) as well as in the theory of the moral substance 
( Sitt lichkeit) in German Idealism, we can draw some conclusions in re-
gards to the free actions of individuals and their ability to articulate the 
underlying values and realize their ends adequately. It is essential for the 
theory of freedom to provide a framework within which it is possible 
for every individual agent to express his own values precisely and thus 
to articulate and manifest his values and ends by his own actions. This 
social sphere of the human practice, according to Confucius as well as 
13 Krummel, J. W. M. 2010: Transcendent or Immanent? Significance and 
History of Li in Confucianism. In: Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Volume 
37, Nr. 3. (417–437). 
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according to the German Idealism (especially Hegel), must be rooted 
in a precise set of codes instead of a metaphorical reference to a “good 
heart”. A society, that lacks of such codes, in Confucius’ understand-
ing specifically a precise structure of the li and a precise language, is 
constantly challenged by the problem that the individuals cannot ad-
equately express their values, cannot adequately realize their ends and 
thus misunderstandings are unavoidable. And even worse: the relation 
between the underlying value and its attempted manifestation by the 
action is arbitrary, which is the reason why the agent cannot provide the 
necessary control over his actions and guarantee that his intention is 
realized in his action. But what kind of freedom do we have, if we cannot 
guarantee that our actions manifest our ends? If we intend to develop 
and advocate a theory of freedom based on straightness, zhi, we must 
postulate a precise set of codes, li, that provides the necessary groundwork 
for the precise articulation of our own volitional contents in every single 
action, or otherwise we have got to deal with the problem that Confucius 
specifies in the Analects VIII, 2:
“Respectfulness, without the rules of propriety (Li), becomes labori-
ous bustle: carefulness, without the rules of propriety (Li), becomes 
timidity; boldness, without the rules of propriety (Li), becomes in-
subordination: straightforwardness, without the rules of propriety 
(Li), becomes rudeness.”
But we don’t want our carefulness to be misunderstood as timidity, our 
boldness to be misunderstood as insubordination, nor our straightfor-
wardness to be misunderstood as rudeness. And if within our actions we 
want to provide the necessary control over the expression of our values, 
we need to rely on a precise system of codes as a part of our communica-
tion and social interaction. If we are to be held liable for our actions, we 
must be able to rely on a precise set of codes of our interaction. 
6 . THE  F IGURAT ION  OF  FREEDOM IN  THE  SOC IAL  PRACT ICE
As Guo Yi points out, the concept of education in the ancient Chinese 
culture is strongly connected to the education of the, specifically moral, 
character and the concept of theoretical, instrumental knowledge serves 
only as a transitory moment of education. He also points out that the 
concept of knowledge is mostly the knowledge of virtue, which is the 
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reason why we should probably associate it to the Western concept of 
wisdom rather than knowledge. But the actual education of the moral 
character is based on the participation in the social reality. This partici-
pation serves as a ground for the individual experience of the values that 
form the specific framework of codes that constitutes a given society. 
Thus, if an individual is to be educated and to develop a strong moral 
character, it must be introduced to the system of values within a society, 
and this introduction is not based on the communication of knowledge 
alone, nor on argumentation, but on practice and participation and in its 
consequence on the ability to share values. From the point of view of 
the society and the theory of education, we introduce an individual to a 
given system of values if we invite him to share our values. Those who 
share values participate on one and the same society, and they establish 
a community that provides and offers options for the development of 
their personal freedom.
The opportunities that a random society is able to provide for the in-
dividual self-determination are nothing given by nature. They are always 
a nascent product, a figuration of the human interaction and especially a 
representation of the values that the individuals share. Thus the invita-
tion to share certain values, of which we assume that they are appropriate 
to support the development of the human nature in regards to the indi-
vidual as well as in regard to the social sphere of our freedom, is essential 
for the establishment of social order and for the establishment of any 
sort of opportunities that the society might provide for the personal self-
determination of individuals. In the tradition of the theory of recognition 
developed in the classical German philosophy, especially by Fichte and 
Hegel, this conclusion not at all controversial. But what I’m trying to 
emphasize here is the agreement of the European and Chinese tradition 
in regard to this point because I’m convinced that although Confucius 
doesn’t use the concept of freedom, self-determination, or recognition, 
social philosophy contains a sophisticated fundamental structure able to 
respond to the requirements and achievements of the theory of recogni-
tion. 
We need to understand that the full development of the human na-
ture entails a creative, dimension, which culminates in the option to 
cooperate, share intentions, share ends, realize these ends together and 
thus establish a system of values as a nascent product of our own practice. 
I actually believe that this is a descriptive approach, because I am con-
vinced that this is the way we establish normative structures within the 
totality of the global world, whether we like it or not, whether we’re con-
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scious of it, or not. Our interactions are always based on certain values, 
some of which we share, and some of which we intend to impose upon 
one another, and the reality of the social practice, the reality of our ac-
tions and the performance of our practical freedom represent the actual 
recognition or figuration of these values. We do not recognize values by 
verbal commitments, we manifest them by our actions. And Confucius 
was probably one of the first philosophers who advocated such a primacy 
of the social practice. (See: Analects II, 13 and IV, 24). Thus the “rees-
tablishment of a spiritual home for all human beings”, which Guo Yi 
postulates, represents primarily a practical challenge which at the same 
time represents a new establishment of practical freedom and together 
with our practice the figuration of value structures, ideally such value 
structures that we all recognize as an expression of our own volition and 
our own freedom. 
7 . THE  MORAL  AT T I TUDE
Confucius was often accused of advocating some sort of a more or less 
insubstantial moral formalism based on an unnecessarily complicated 
system of rituals and it was considered as a system that restricts freedom 
instead of supporting it. This accusation was made especially in contrast 
to Daoism, and it is indeed not easy to absolve every cultural phenom-
enon in the Chinese history that justified its validity and existence in 
reference to Confucius, from this suspicion. I would even doubt that the 
li of Zhou need to be considered in our current debates. But the philo-
sophical fidelity requests us to distinguish between the original theory 
that was advocated by Confucius himself and the tradition of Confucian-
ism, and to consult Confucius’ own attitude to this topic. In reference 
to the Analects III, 26 we can easily argue that Confucius himself con-
demns the idea of an insubstantial moral formalism:
“The Master said, ‘High station filled without indulgent generosity; 
ceremonies performed without reverence; mourning conducted with-
out sorrow;— wherewith should I contemplate such ways?’”
According to this, he definitely dislikes the practice of rituals without the 
adequate attitude, especially, as we might add, without the most substan-
tial of all ethical principles, ren. The execution of rituals must therefore 
be based on an appropriate attitude and without it the whole ritual would 
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degenerate to a mere spectacle and even to a charade. Thus we conclude 
that he advocates a theory of the appropriate figuration of values in our 
practice. In reference to the Analects III, 3: 
“The Master said, ‘If a man be without the virtues proper to human-
ity, what has he to do with the rites of propriety? If a man be without 
the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with music?’”
we can incorporate the principle ren into our argumentation and con-
clude that the whole attitude that forms the groundwork of the appropri-
ate practice of the li culminates in ren and that therefore ren represents 
the principle and source of every single moral action. Without ren, the 
moral practice is impossible and of course the practice of the Rituals (li) 
is insubstantial. In this case the li serve to the figuration anything. It is 
therefore a key concern of Confucius to teach and advocate the insepa-
rability of ren and li. 
The main difference to the daoist understanding of the ideal human 
attitude, wu-wei, dos not at all consist in the putative rejection of this 
concept by Confucius, but rather in the fact that, probably in concor-
dance with Lao Dan, but in contrast to Taishi Dan, he argues that only 
within a society, where virtue and duty, ren and li, and thus the substance 
and form of morality have evolved to their ultimate perfection, a placid 
action such as wu-wei is able to provide and maintain morality, the so-
cial order, and freedom. But as soon as these forms turn into disorder, 
or as soon as they are executed without the appropriate attitude and 
without the rootage in ren, wu-wei becomes inapt to maintain order and 
avert chaos. Confucius’ main objection to the daoist theory of wu-wei 
is after all based on a certain understanding of education and the idea 
that the moral substance cannot evolve to its full potential without the 
appropriate form. Thus, if ren represents the embodiment of the moral 
substance, and the li represent the embodiment of the moral form, the 
moral practice must be based upon the unity of ren and li. Confucius is 
deeply convinced that morality is reliant on its appropriate form and that 
the moral principle, ren, cannot find its expression in the moral practice 
randomly. The articulation of the underlying moral principle within the 
reality of the moral practice is bound to the idea that there is a privileged, 
necessary, natural expression of morality, which is the system of the 
rituals of Zhou, li. As a matter of fact, I think that we need to face the 
authentically philosophical challenge to understand that for certain rea-
sons that are rooted in the human nature, “ren” must be the ground of “li”. 
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From Guo Yi I learned that there is a continuity in the development of 
the underlying principle of ancient Chinese ethics. It was originally be-
lieved that the principle was justice (yi) but in the Zhou Dynasty justice 
was replaced by the rituals (li) which evolved to the unity of ren and li in 
Confucius’ philosophy and the Four Beginnings in the teachings of Meng 
Tse (ren, yi, li, zhi). The evolution of Chinese ethics in the transition 
from the philosophy of Zhou to the philosophy of Confucius consists in 
the establishment of a new principle of ethics based on the unity of ren 
and li and we must try to understand why, according to Confucius, it is 
necessary for the li to be rooted in ren. 
8 . REN  (仁)
In my opinion, the concept “ren” does not necessarily need to be associ-
ated to the Western concept of humanity. It suffices to emphasize the 
fact that ren stands for at least two people being together, which is the 
underlying figure in the theory of recognition (Hegel and Fichte), en-
counter (Martin Buber), and substantial communication (Karl Jaspers).
Fichte and Hegel were the first Western philosophers who devel-
oped a sophisticated theory of recognition based on the encounter of 
two free, self-conscious agents. Martin Buber refers to a similar figure 
by the concept of the “encounter” in “I and Thou”14 and Karl Jaspers 
specifies it within the theory of the “substantial communication” (ge-
haltvolle Kommunikation).15 Thus the idea of at least two people coming 
together to build a unity is not only the origin of the idea of a family, 
but furthermore the offspring of the specifically human practice, hu-
man freedom, and human virtue, which is, in the first place, based on 
the social interaction. But ren is insufficiently analyzed, if we emphasize 
only its moral dimension. Its moral dimension is actually based on the 
underlying experience and practice of the encounter: two people who 
turn to each other and come together establish a unity, com-unity, and 
begin to share values, which is the offspring of society and all the options 
it can provide for the individual self-determination. From the theory of 
recognition we know that two people together are very different from two 
14 Buber, M. 1923: Das dialogische Prinzip. Ich und Du. (I and Thou). In: 
Werke I. Schriften zur Philosophie, 5. Aufl. Heidelberg 1984.
15 See: Jaspers, K. 1932: Philosophie. Zweiter Band: Existenzerhellung.  Vierte 
Auflage. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1973 (Chapter on Communication)
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people alone and that the concept “we” contains much more then “me 
and the others” because “me and the others” can culminate into the idea 
of “us” only as a result of our free commitment. Thus the encounter is 
a necessary condition and original source of shared values. And these 
shared values find their privileged form within the system of the social 
codes. So, if I had to approach ren from the point of view of the European 
tradition, I would in the first place refer to Martin Buber’s “encounter” 
or Karl Jaspers’ “substantial communication”. If I had to address it by 
a general, non-philosophic concept, I would first of all choose “commu-
nity” and if I had to describe its structure philosophically, I would choose 
the approach of “recognition” as advocated by Hegel.
The secondary meaning of “ren”, that contains its ethical and educa-
tional elements, and to which we usually refer as “humanity” is actually 
based on the encounter, and since, according to Confucius, ren and li 
represent an inseparable unity, the moral implications should rather be 
approached by an analysis of the underlying values within the system 
of the rituals, respectively the social codes. This is actually an essential 
element of his theory of education. Education is certainly based upon the 
transitory moment of getting in touch with the rituals, gaining the know-
ledge of virtue, but it evolves to the practice of these rituals based on the 
appropriate attitude and thus also to the understanding of the underlying 
values. And furthermore it leads to the internalization of these values, 
which integrates the individual into the community that shares these 
values. Without the knowledge of the rituals an individual is unable to 
exercise them properly. Without the appropriate attitude the rituals are 
meaningless. Without study the individual will never understand the 
underlying values. And without the internalization of these values, the 
individual will never accept them as an expression of his own volitional 
self-determination. This is why the process of education is crucial to the 
establishment of society and we might conclude that the internalization 
of values and the ability to share values represent an offspring, a figura-
tion of freedom.
9 . CONCLUS ION
In sum, I emphatically support Guo Yi’s idea that we need to establish 
a new spiritual home for all human beings in the world and provide the 
groundwork that enables us to develop the whole potential of our nature. 
But in the tradition of the classical German philosophy I need to em-
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phasize the importance sophisticated theory of freedom or action. In this 
sense freedom means the ability to determine one’s own volition on the 
basis of classifiable principles and ends and to realize these ends in the 
lifeworld. The manifestation of our values is a product of our interaction 
because we recognize and manifest values by actions. This transition 
from a mere verbal commitment to an object or phenomenon of the 
social interaction is what I denote as figuration, emergence of values. 
And if the exercise of our volitional self-determination represents the 
manifestation of values within the sphere of the social interaction, and if 
the volitional self-determination represents freedom, I conclude that our 
social practice represents a figuration of freedom. This figuration is based 
on the specifically human ability to build communities, share values, 
and thereby establish a society that provides options for the individual 
self-determination by participation. I use the concept “figuration” to em-
phasize the nascent character of the society and the concept “encounter”, 
which I associate to ren (仁), in reference to our ability to come together, 
build communities, and share values.

PAUL  COBBEN  ( T I LBURG) 
RECOGNITION AS UNITY BETWEEN 
 THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL REASON
INTRODUCT ION
The project of philosophy is in itself a universal undertaking. Reason is 
not limited to a specific culture; metaphysical foundations have an ab-
solute status. Therefore, philosophical discussion is principally a world-
wide discussion that includes all traditions. In our globalized world the 
need for this world-wide discussion also corresponds to the experiences 
of real life, in which, for example, philosophical conferences are increas-
ingly attended by representatives from all continents. However, I must 
admit that my philosophical knowledge restricts itself to Western phi-
losophy. Moreover, even this pretension is highly exaggerated. I must 
be satisfied if it turns out that I have an accurate knowledge of some 
specific fields within Western philosophy. Therefore, it is very important 
to me that Professor Guo Yi has undertaken to initiate the dialogue 
between Chinese and Western philosophy. I realize that this first meet-
ing is insufficient for a real, substantial discussion. The conversation 
must be continued in order to establish a better mutual understanding. 
However, Professor Guo Yi at least begins the reciprocal acquaintance by 
presenting his interesting paper “Metaphysics, Nature and Mind – The 
Main Idea of Daoic Philosophy”. In my attempt at a first reaction, I will 
comment on three fundamental topics that are raised by Professor Guo 
Yi: 1. The separation between knowledge and value in Western think-
ing; 2. The relation between philosophy and science; and, 3. The relation 
between the finite and the infinite world.
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I . THE  SEPARAT ION  BETWEEN  KNOWLEDGE  AND  VALUE  
IN  MODERN WESTERN  TH INK ING
Professor Guo Yi formulates the following thesis: “Since modern times, 
Western philosophers have been chiefly concerned with the world of 
knowledge and have taken knowledge as their highest goal”.
This thesis is of importance because it links modern philosophy 
with the crisis in which the modern world finds itself. This crisis has to 
do with a one-sided interest in knowledge. While technology has been 
developed to the highest degree, the normative framework fails to guide 
this development in the right direction.
Obviously, I can agree with this diagnosis of the crisis in the modern 
world. The globalization of the modern world seems, in the first instance, 
to relate to economic markets. Globalization is less evident at the level of 
human rights. With regard to philosophy, this diagnosis indeed implies 
that we have to search for the internal coherence between knowledge and 
values; between science and the normative dimension. In this respect, I 
can only welcome the dialogue between Western and Chinese philosophy 
that is proposed by Professor Guo Yi. However, I would like to provide 
a short commentary on his characterization of Western philosophy as 
a philosophy that has, since the time of Kant, been chiefly oriented to-
wards knowledge. This may indeed be the case for a considerable part of 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition, but this is in no way representative of what 
I consider to be the core of modern Western thinking. To underpin this 
opinion, I will provide three considerations:
1. Although the rise of modern Western thought is closely tied to 
the rise of modern science, the driving force of this philosophy is by no 
means limited only to the acquisition of knowledge. René Descartes and 
David Hume, for example, turn against superstition and orientate them-
selves on the basis of reason. This reason is not only utilized in service 
of the development of knowledge, but also has an important practical 
meaning. Reason also had to provide an alternative to what religion 
could no longer offer: a normative framework that was convincing for 
all. The practical goal was clear: to overcome the threat of religious wars.
For Kant, the great merit of the Critique of Pure Reason not only 
consists in its reflection upon modern science, but also in the implica-
tion of this reflection — namely, the insight that modern science does 
not contradict religion. Ultimately, Kant is mainly interested in practi-
cal reason, or rather, in the coherence between practical and theoretical 
reason.
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2. I would not only like to argue that the establishment of the relation 
between rationality and normativity, or between nature and freedom, is 
one of the motives of modern philosophy, but even that it is the cen-
tral motive. I have already made mention of Kant, who was principally 
interested in reflecting upon the unity of reason; specifically, the unity 
between theoretical and practical reason. In this context, Hegel, who had 
the intention of radicalizing Kant’s project, is particularly important. 
Like Kant, he wanted to reconcile modern freedom with modern science. 
Moreover, Hegel would not have been surprised if his philosophy was to 
be characterized in a way analogous to professor Guo Yi’s characteriza-
tion of Chinese metaphysics; in other words, as concerning itself with 
“three levels, namely ontology, human nature and the human mind”. 
Incidentally, there may be an immediate historical connection between 
the central opposition of dialectics (form and content) and the oppo-
sition between yin and yang: “The great Ultimate through movement 
generates yang. When its activity reaches its limits, it becomes tranquil. 
Through tranquility the Great Ultimate generates yin. When tranquil-
ity reaches its limit, activity begins again. So movement and tranquility 
alternate and become the root of each other, giving rise to the distinction 
between yin and yang, and the two modes are thus established”. (p. 22) 
Hegel writes: “As a curiosity, I will give a more specific characterization 
of this principle. Both basic figures are on the one hand, a horizontal 
line ( —, yang) and, on the other hand, the same line that falls apart in 
two parts (– –, yin): the first one representing the perfect, the father, the 
male, the unity, as in case of the Pythagoreers, the affirmation, the sec-
ond one representing the imperfect, the mother, the female, the duality, 
the negation1”.2 
It is true that the development of the real world of modern Western 
society is characterized by the one-sidedness that Professor Guo Yi at-
tributes to Western philosophy; namely the primacy of knowledge, and 
especially technological knowledge. However, it was also precisely this 
1 So, yin and yang correspond to the basic poles of dialectic thinking.
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, 
Frankfurt/M., 1986, p. 143–4: “Der Kuriosität wegen will ich diese Grund-
lage näher angeben. Die zwei Grundfiguren sind eine horizontale Linie 
(—, Yang) und der entzweigebrochene Strich, so gross wie die erste Linie 
(– –, Yin): das erste das Vollkommene, den Vater, das Männliche, die Ein-
heit, wie bei den Pythogoreern, die Affirmation darstellend, das zweite das 
Unvolkommene, die Mutter, das Weibliche, die Zweiheit, die Negation”.
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philosophical tradition that criticized this development. To begin with, it 
was, of course, Hegel’s pupil, Marx, who criticized Western capitalism as 
a society that is dominated by an economic system that has become inde-
pendent. [Incidentally, I am curious as to whether a form of Marxism also 
exists in China that is not incorporated by the ideology of the communist 
party, i. e., a philosophical Marxism that is prepared to engage in debate 
with traditional Chinese philosophy]. After Marx came Heidegger, who 
criticized one-sided technological development in terms of the “will to 
power”. Horkheimer and Adorno, with their concept of instrumental rea-
son, criticized a version of reason that is one-sidedly oriented to know-
ledge and power. Following the first generation of the Frankfurt School, 
Jürgen Habermas developed his notion of the paradigm of philosophy of 
consciousness to articulate a similar criticism. All these attempts to criti-
cize the one-sidedness of actual development in the Western world were 
accompanied by the formulation of alternatives in which this one-sided-
ness could be overcome. In Marx, this alternative was called “The Realm 
of Freedom”; in Heidegger, “fundamental ontology”; in Horkheimer and 
Adorno, “critical theory” and in Habermas, the “theory of communicative 
action”. In the Anglo-Saxon world, too, there is, following Habermas, an 
actual discussion about the paradigm of recognition.
3. I consider the paradigm of recognition to be the most promising 
prospect for the accomplishment of the project that Professor Guo Yi 
envisions. However, this is only the case if this paradigm is not under-
stood in the manner in which it is elaborated by Jürgen Habermas; in 
other words, as the theory of communicative action. It makes just as 
little sense to follow the modification worked out by Axel Honneth, or 
to focus on the elaboration of the recognition theory in the Anglo-Sax-
on world. In all these cases, recognition is understood as a one-sidedly 
practical, intersubjective relation. As a consequence, while it is true that 
these approaches are well able to thematize the value dimension, it re-
mains unclear as to how this value dimension is internally related to the 
knowledge dimension. The knowledge dimension is left to the positive, 
empirical sciences. While it is true that the value dimension and the 
knowledge dimension are related to one another (for example, by so 
called rational reconstructions — the normative framework — that have to 
be indirectly affirmed through the positive sciences), it remains unclear 
as to why reality would lend itself to standardization at all. In this sense, 
I think that these approaches are inadequate in comparison to that of 
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Hegel, and probably also to that of Kant. After all, both of these latter 
approaches intended to provide a way to think of the unity of theoretical 
and practical reason.
I I . INTERMEZZO:  A  SHORT  SKETCH OF  HEGEL’S  PARADIGM OF  RECOG-
NIT ION AS  THE  UNITY  OF  THEORET ICAL  AND PRACT ICAL  REASON
The lord/ bondsman relation is the core of Hegel’s paradigm of recog-
nition. The lord symbolizes the pure self; the self that Kant calls the 
“autonomous individual”. The bondsman symbolizes the real self; the 
self that observes human law that underlies the social organism. There-
fore, the lord/ bondsman relation can be considered as a model in which 
Kant’s noumenal and phenomenal self are united. The relation between 
both selves is mediated by the fear of death. 
To understand the fear of death, the elementary relation between 
the organism and the earth has to be examined. This relation can be 
described as an interplay of forces. Insofar as the organism is affected 
by the earth, it is interested in the earth. This effect appears as a specific 
need. In its reaction, the organism satisfies its need — it overcomes its 
interest and returns back to itself. The life process is the endless repeti-
tion of this movement. In the fear of death, however, this movement is 
interrupted. At this moment, the earth appears as the absolute power of 
death — as the “absolute lord”.3 
What exactly does the organism’s experience of the “absolute lord” 
mean? Firstly, the organism’s relation to nature is no longer determined 
through specific interests. The absolute power of nature appears as in-
divisible otherness. Therefore, the organism is, in this relation, the force 
that is pushed back into itself.4 However, this “force that is pushed back 
into itself ” is not the result of needs that are satisfied. Under the influ-
ence of the absolute power of death, “alles Fixe” in the organism “hat 
gebebt”.5 The fear of death tears the organism away from all specific 
3 “… the fear of death, the absolute Lord”. G. W. F. Hegel: Hegel’s Phenom-
enology of Spirit, transl. A. V. Miller, Oxford 1979, p. 117.
4 Concerning the fear of death of the self-conscious organism (the bonds-
man), Hegel speaks about “a consciousness forced back into itself ” (Ibid., 
p. 117)
5 “… everything solid and stable has shaken to its foundations”. (Ibid., 
p. 117)
162
natural needs. All specific interests are sublated in the unifying experi-
ence of the fear of death. In this sense the fear of death is the experience 
of “nothingness”, because all specific determinedness has perished in the 
experience of the pure unity of life.6 All specific interests vanish in the 
undifferentiated unity in which life as life is experienced. The temporal 
process of life is transcended in the experience of the supra-temporal 
unity of life. Therefore, the fear of death is also the experience of the 
finitude of life — the experience of one’s own mortality.
In the fear of death, the interplay of forces that characterizes nature 
is suspended, because the “absolute lord” is internalized. After all, the 
“absolute lord” appears as the force that is absolutely pushed back into 
itself, and is experienced in the fear of death that makes the organism 
the force that is absolutely pushed back into itself. As the force that is 
absolutely pushed back into itself, the organism experiences life as life; 
in other words, as the supra-temporal unity of life. In fact, the supra-
temporal unity of life reflects the supra-temporal unity of nature — the 
“absolute lord” who, mediated by the fear of death, is experienced by the 
organism.
The fear of death that Hegel has in mind is not just the fear of death of 
an organism, but the fear that is experienced by an organism that is also 
a pure self. Initially, the body is threatening to the pure self. It threatens 
the pureness of the self because it implies that the self is externally de-
termined in its awareness of its needs. Therefore, the pure self tries, at 
the level of Desire (PhS, p. 109), to negate the awareness of its body by 
satisfying its needs. From an external perspective, the interplay of forces 
between the organism and the earth can be interpreted as an action of 
the pure self that also has a body to rescue its pureness. At the moment 
of the fear of death, however, the pure self “experiences” that it is impos-
sible to negate the awareness of its body. After all, in the fear of death, the 
body appears as the force that is absolutely pushed back into itself — as 
an independent self. This experience appears to be the definitive end of 
the pure self ’s attempt to realize itself, yet the opposite is true. In the 
fear of death, the organism of the body has transcended itself — it has 
itself negated the naturalness of the organism. Therefore, the pure self 
can “recognize” itself in its body. It experiences that it is the “lord” of its 
body. The unity of life, the life as life, that the organism experiences in 
6 In this sense, Heidegger’s analysis of the fear of death in “Sein und 
Zeit” repeats Hegel’s analysis.
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the fear of death, is a self-relation, a being-at-itself whose pure form is 
the pure self. The pure self-relatedness of the pure self is not negated by 
the organism, but rather affirmed; specifically, by the organism in the 
fear of death. 
In the relation of the fear of death in which the pure self “recognizes” 
itself, the pure self is related to the organism in its own independence. It 
is in the otherness as otherness returned to itself. This means that the 
pure self is not identical to the essence of the organism. The organism 
appears in its own independence — the relation between the pure self and 
the organism expresses an ontological difference. The organism is the 
appearance of the pure self, but it is only a finite appearance of the pure 
self, that in its finitude is essentially distinguished from the infinitude 
of the pure self.
The foregoing development has shown that the pure self is always 
already related to an organism in the fear of death. In this sense the pure 
self (or: das reine Ich) is an abstraction of this relation. The relation to the 
organism (in the state of the fear of death) is presupposed. Principally, 
this relation is a relation of transcendental openness — principally, the 
pure self has a free relation to the organism and can “conceive” of it in its 
own nature. Initially, however, the pure self has no insight into this rela-
tion. As a pure self, it is not able to perform any reflection, any thinking 
or knowing: after all, it is purely itself. Therefore, I placed “recognize” 
and “conceive” in quotation marks. The question is how the pure self is 
aware of its relation to the organism.
Hegel draws attention to the fact that this awareness can only be 
generated under the special condition that the fear of death is caused by 
another self. In this case, the absolute master (death) has the form of the 
other self; in other words, the other self is the master of the organism. 
Since the first self has experienced itself as the essence of the organism, 
it can “recognize” itself in the other self — the other self is the representa-
tion of the pure self. However, once again it is not clear as to how a pure 
self is able to “recognize”. According to Hegel, this recognition is not a 
spiritual act, but is expressed purely in practice. The first self recognizes 
the other self in its practical service — by being a bondsman who serves 
his lord.
From an external perspective, the serving bondsman is in theory the 
pure, free self. By internalizing the power of nature (the absolute lord), 
he has overcome death and can represent his pureness in the lord. In 
practice, however, with respect to his corporeality, the bondsman is part 
of a social organism. The organism of the bondsman does not (imme-
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diately) serve itself — it does not satisfy its needs — but rather serves the 
lord. In this service, the fear of death; in other words, the transcendence 
of nature; is institutionalized. The relation to nature has, in the first 
place, the form of freedom. Through this openness to nature, the actions 
of the bondsman are no longer natural — they do not express the laws 
of instinct (the laws of the natural species), but the laws of the human 
species — the laws of the state (the social organism), whose essence is the 
lord, or the representation of the pure self. 
The lord/ bondsman relation cannot only be considered the relation 
between the noumenal and the phenomenal self (Hegel’s version of the 
Critique of Practical Reason), but is also the presupposition of Under-
standing, i. e., Hegel’s alternative to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. It 
resumes the “reine Ich” (Hegel’s transformation of the transcendental 
subject) in the form of the representation of the pure self (the lord) and 
shows that this pure self already presupposes the social organism of the 
bondsman. In the service of the bondsman — in his relation to nature in 
the form of labor — nature always already appears in practice (a priori) 
in the form of a law. In this sense, nature is reasonable. The “freedom” 
of the bondsman (his relation to nature which is mediated by the lord) 
results in an openness to nature which enables him to discover specific 
(contingent) laws of nature. These laws are not discovered through scien-
tific experiments, but are rather practically experienced in the framework 
of the labor division which characterizes the social organism. But these 
practical laws are presupposed by the scientist. The scientists who exam-
ine the laws of nature are involved in a social organism in which nature 
already appears all the time in the form of the human law.
I I I . THE  RELAT ION  BETWEEN  PH I LOSOPHY  AND  SC IENCE
Professor Guo Yi quotes Stephen Hawking in order to stress how one-
sided Western philosophy has become. It not only neglects the great 
metaphysical questions, but is also no longer able to reflect on modern 
science. Science has become so “technical” that philosophy limits itself 
to language-analysis. The great tradition from Aristotle to Kant is in-
terrupted. In opposition to this development, Professor Guo Yi pleads 
for the restoration of the bond between knowledge and metaphysics; 
between science and philosophy. In his article, he presents several exam-
ples of possible connections between metaphysics and modern sciences: 
“There is a room to imagine that we compare ‘the Great begins to depart’ 
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with the process of the Big Bang, ‘then it becomes further and further 
away’ with the expansion of the universe, ‘then returns to the original 
point’ with the collapse and condensation of the universe”. (Guo, in this 
volume, p. 19) Another example: “Modern biology proved that parents’ 
genes could be inherited by their children, while most members of an 
ethnic group carry the same gene. Based on this, we can conclude that 
as the mother of the universe, the single point should contain all basic 
information, and all things should carry the original information of the 
single point”. (p. 21)
However, I highly doubt whether the bond between metaphysics and 
science can be repaired in this manner. If we wish to understand the 
relation between science and philosophy, this, at the very least, can-
not mean that we sacrifice the particular nature of scientific knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge is based on hypotheses of laws that are affirmed 
through experiments. In contrast to metaphysical knowledge, scientific 
knowledge is basically hypothetical. Professor Guo Yi relates the sepa-
ration of science and metaphysics to the separation of “substance” and 
“phenomenon”. In a specific sense, we can again make note of this sepa-
ration in Kant. However, as I have argued, it is, in fact, Kant who has 
prioritized the unity between theoretical and practical reason. Moreover, 
it is precisely the separation between phenomenon and substance that is 
the central point in Hegel’s criticism of Kant. This criticism results in a 
philosophical position in which substance (in Hegel: the absolute spirit) 
manifests itself in the phenomenal world. However, this does not mean 
that, according to Hegel, philosophy or metaphysics could take instruc-
tion from the concrete models of science. Like Kant, Hegel, too, regards 
philosophical insight as limited to the law form that science imposes 
on the phenomenal world. Precisely which models science constructs to 
concretize this law form is its own business and has to be developed in 
relation to experimental practice. 
However, Professor Guo Yi correctly states that the relation between 
science and philosophy in modern Western philosophy is a problem, 
not only in the tradition of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, but also in the 
continental tradition, and even in thinkers who appeal to the paradigm 
of recognition. Habermas, for example, rejects philosophy’s indepen-
dence and turns against all forms of metaphysics. In his opinion, sci-
ence; in other words, knowledge that is in the last resort empirically 
testable, has primacy. Philosophy only provides the encompassing de-
velopment models of what Habermas calls, “rational reconstructions”. 
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However, the truth of these reconstructions is dependent upon scientific 
research.
If the relation between science and philosophy is conceptualized in 
this manner, it becomes impossible to ground scientific knowledge. Ul-
timately, each attempt to establish this foundation should be affirmed 
by scientific research. In this respect, this position implies a weakness 
in comparison with Kant. The question of how scientific knowledge is 
possible at all cannot be answered without an appeal to science itself. 
I have already argued that this problem does not arise in Hegel’s version 
of the paradigm of recognition. Hegel has developed the internal coher-
ence between the law form of theoretical and practical reason. 
I V . THE  RELAT ION  BETWEEN  THE  F IN I TE  AND  THE  INF IN I TE  WORLD
Apart from the relation between knowledge and value and between phi-
losophy and science, I would like to discuss a third fundamental re-
lation; namely the relation between the finite and the infinite world. 
I quote Professor Guo Yi: “Dao is a core concept in Chinese philosophy, 
and was held in high esteem by all Confucianism, Daoism and Bud-
dhism. But every school interpreted it differently. Generally speaking, 
as a philosophical concept, Dao is used in two fundamental senses. One 
is law, principle and norm, which extended from its original meaning 
(namely, road and way); another is the source of the universe and the 
nature of the world. The concept Dao we discussed above belongs to the 
latter”. (p. 44)
I would like to ask Professor Guo Yi some questions about these two 
fundamental senses of Dao: Dao as law, principle and norm, and Dao as 
source of the universe and the nature of the world. I would like to trans-
late this distinction into, on the one hand, the philosophical concept of 
the absolute world, and, on the other hand, the philosophical concept 
of the finite world. I hope that Professor Guo Yi can enlighten me as to 
whether this translation makes sense.
Until now, I have argued that there is a fundamental affinity be-
tween the project that Professor Guo Yi proposes and the Hegelian one. 
However, with regard to the two senses of Dao, we may have reached the 
limitations of this affinity. My own teacher, the late professor Jan Hol-
lak, educated me in a critical reception of Hegel. I think that his critique 
of Hegel can be connected to the two senses of Dao that professor Guo 
Yi distinguishes. The core of Hollak’s critique of Hegel comes down to 
PAUL  COBBEN :  RECOGNI T ION  AS  UN I TY 167
the following thesis: Although Hegel pretends that his philosophical 
system develops the philosophical concept of the absolute, he instead 
only developed the philosophical concept of the finite (in other words, 
the human) world. His philosophical concept of “substance”, the abso-
lute spirit, cannot be identified, as he pretends, with the philosophical 
concept of god, but rather concerns the absolute, philosophical concept 
of the human world. This critique of Hegel refers to the concept of god 
that is developed in the tradition of Thomas Aquinus. In his view, god 
cannot be dependent on a world that is created. The almightiness of 
god implies that it is meaningless to speak of the self-realization of god. 
God has always already realized himself. In god, being is fully actual. As 
a consequence, divine freedom is fundamentally distinct from human 
freedom. In contrast to humans, who have to realize their freedom, god 
and divine freedom cannot be situated in time.
To a certain extent, the distinction between the divine and the hu-
man world seems to correspond to Professor Guo Yi’s distinction be-
tween general values (concerning the true, the good and the beautiful) 
and the final value, called an, that has the meaning of “quiet, peaceful, 
calm, stable, safe, easeful, happy, harmonious etc.” (p. 43). Ultimately, 
the values that are linked to an seem to express a state rather than an 
activity. They seem to correspond to the divine being that does not have 
to realize itself. Moreover, Professor Guo Yi himself, as I understand 
him, also relates an to the divine dimension: “Up to now, the various 
transcendental concepts such as Tian or Heaven in Confucianism, Dao 
in Daoism, the Unconditioned in Buddhism, God in Christianity and 
Allah in Islam, are all the realization of the sphere of Dao from different 
standpoints and angles by different civilizations, and at last all of them 
developed into the Way that people should behave so as to direct the be-
havior of human beings. Therefore, approaches to final value by human 
beings can be called ren dao (or the Human Way)”.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear to me precisely how Professor Guo 
Yi understands the relation between the divine and the human world. 
On the one hand, an seems to be a value that transcends human reality, 
but on the other hand, an seems to be the final value that “decides the 
fundamental purpose of human beings” (p. 43). Does this imply the same 
ambiguity in the relation between the human and the divine world as is 
found in Hegel? Or is the separation between these worlds maintained 
because An is always interpreted by human beings? (Professor Guo Yi 
refers to “approaches to the final value by human beings”). I hope that 
Professor Guo Yi can elaborate upon his view as to the relation between 
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philosophy and religion. How precisely are religious and humanist be-
liefs related? Has religion its own domain that cannot be translated into 
philosophical conceptions? Or is the religious dimension, too, ultimately 
accessible to reason?
My last question concerns Professor Guo Yi’s thesis that: “The basic 
values of contemporary society are science and democracy” (p. 46) He 
adds that “science is a tool of life, not life itself ”. And: democracy is a 
“general value and not a final value”. Although I can agree with this 
analysis, I am surprised that professor Guo Yi does not mention human 
rights as belonging to the basic values of contemporary society. Profes-
sor Guo Yi stresses that the contemporary notions of freedom “including 
freedom of faith, political freedom, freedom of speech, economic freedom 
and so on”, “belong to outside freedom and cannot in the same breath 
be compared to life freedom which belongs to internal freedom”. (p. 46) 
But what about Kantian freedom — the freedom of will — that can be con-
sidered to ground the concept of human rights? According to Kant, free 
will makes human beings an “end-in-themselves”. Does this conception 
of freedom not belong rather to internal freedom, and, therefore, to final 
value? So, I would like to invite Professor Guo Yi to present his concep-
tion of contemporary human rights. Is this a conception that is only 
connected to the Western, Christian tradition, as some argue? Or are 
human rights related to final value?
One of the formulations of the Kantian categorical imperative is: 
never make the human person only a means. Basically, this moral cri-
terion was Marx’s standard to criticize capitalism. After all, capitalism 
made the individual, as the commodified labor force, only a means to 
capital. If Marxism can be related in this manner to the Kantian cat-
egorical imperative, and, if the categorical imperative can be related to 
final value, does this imply that not only traditional Chinese philosophy, 
but also the Marxist tradition in China, offer an entrance for thematizing 
the concept of final value? Or is the Marxist tradition in China restricted 
to the political dogmas of the communist party? 
GÜNTER  ZÖLLER  (MUNICH) 
THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF VALUE
A Modernist Reply to Professor Guo Yi
“There is no classical author in philosophy.”1
1 . VALUE  OR  KNOWLEDGE
Professor Guo’s sweeping panorama of traditional Chinese philosophy, 
undertaken under the guiding perspective of a Daoist-inspired thinking 
that he terms “Daoic,” develops an original philosophical position situ-
ated in a twofold larger context: the distinction between Western and 
Chinese philosophical thought and the distinction between traditional 
and modern philosophical thinking. Professor Guo maintains the dif-
ferent basic orientation of the Western and the Chinese philosophical 
traditions. In particular, he sees Chinese philosophy centered around 
the concept of value, and Western philosophy focused on the concept of 
knowledge. Moreover, he regards both philosophical traditions as subject 
to modification under the conditions of modernity as defined by the con-
juncture of the unprecedented expansion of knowledge (“science”) and 
similarly aggressive economic growth (“capitalism”). On Professor Guo’s 
assessment, Western as well as Chinese philosophy is to respond to the 
1 Immanuel Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, ed. Prussian Academy of Sciences 
(vols. 1–22), German Academy of Sciences (vol. 23) and Göttingen Acad-
emy of Sciences (vols. 24–29) (Berlin, later Berlin/New York: Reimer, later 
de Gruyter, 1900–), 8:219 note (Über eine Entdeckung …) (emphasis in the 
 original).
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twofold, cognitive and economic challenge of modernity with a project 
of emendation that complements the limited orientation of each of the 
two grand traditions in philosophy with the basic orientation of the other 
one: Western philosophical thinking, marked by the focus on knowledge, 
is to be supplemented by the systematic concern with value, while Chi-
nese philosophical thinking, characterized by the concern with value, is 
to be supplemented by systematic attention to the issue of knowledge. 
In the case of Western philosophy the systematic incorporation of 
the dimension of value advocated by Professor Guo is properly a redis-
covery and a return, since Professor Guo acknowledges that pre-modern, 
traditional Western philosophy already had been concerned chiefly with 
issues of value, only to have its earlier basic axiological orientation su-
perseded by the modern focus on knowledge in theory as well as practice. 
In the case of Chinese philosophical thought the systematic inclusion 
of the dimension of knowledge recommended by Professor Guo is not 
to take the form of a departure from the traditional orientation on value 
but is to serve as an enhancement of traditional Chinese thought in the 
interest of responding adequately to the modern growth of knowledge. 
In articulating the ideal dual focus on value and knowledge in Chi-
nese philosophical thought Professor Guo stresses throughout that the 
foundation of both knowledge and value is metaphysical in nature. In 
particular, he documents the cosmological dimension of traditional Chi-
nese thought and notes certain affinities between Daoist cosmogony and 
modern astronomical speculations (“big bang”). Moreover, he traces the 
ontological basis of value to what he terms “value nature” — as opposed 
to “physical nature” and “rational nature.” In particular, Professor Guo 
notes the distinction between “final value” and “general value,” arguing 
that freedom and democracy, while representing general values tran-
scending cultural divisions, do not therefore represent final values, which 
reside, according to Professor Guo, not in the socio-political sphere but 
in an inner, spiritual dimension. Accordingly, Professor Guo concludes 
with a reconsideration of the traditional Chinese conception of the sage, 
who acquires virtue through extensive education and erudition, thereby 
reaffirming the special status of philosophy independent of a modern 
world marked by the twin temptations of cognitive and economic ex-
pansionism.
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2 . ANC IENTS  AND  MODERNS
From my own perspective, which is informed by scholarly acquaintance 
with European philosophy in its two outstanding manifestations, viz., as 
classical Greek philosophy and as classical German philosophy, as well 
as extensive teaching experience in North America and Europe along 
with visiting appointments and conference attendances in East Asia, 
Australia and South America, Professor Guo’s perspicuous analyses and 
assessments seem less specific to the situation of Chinese philosophical 
thought than to the condition of philosophy worldwide today. Whether 
practiced in Europe, North or South America, Australia or the Far East, 
philosophy — especially academic philosophy — finds itself in the situa-
tion of a traditionally established discipline confronted with the scientific 
and cultural revolutions of the modern world and called upon to respond 
to them by means of sustained reflection and critical analysis. Accord-
ingly, almost everywhere in the world of academic philosophy there are 
to be found two main types of response to the modern challenge, viz., 
a return to some earlier, lasting, lost or threatened kind or form of phi-
losophy and a more or less emphatic embrace of the novel outlook on 
life offered through the scientific and cultural conditions of modernity.
With regard to the European philosophical tradition, chiefly pre-
served in Europe itself and in the Americas, the modern-anti-modern 
duality manifests itself, e. g., in the competitive coexistence of “analytic” 
and “Continental” modes of philosophical thought, or in the rivalry of 
neo-Aristotelian and neo-Kantian approaches in ethics and in social and 
political philosophy. Unlike Professor Guo’s portrayal of the situation 
might suggest, Western philosophy is by no means homogeneous and 
affirmative in its responses to the conditions of modernity but reacts to 
them with a broad spectrum of positions that reach from outright denial 
and outraged denouncement to genuine approval and active endorse-
ment. Similarly, the distinction offered by Professor Guo between the 
primary orientation of one type of philosophy toward knowledge and 
that of another type of philosophy toward value is, on my view, not 
specific to the distinction between Western and Chinese philosophy but 
also marks an internal opposition between traditionalist and modernist 
philosophy in the West today.
The true divide, then, in contemporary philosophy does not run be-
tween a narrowly epistemological type of philosophy to be encountered 
in the West and a primarily value-oriented type of philosophy favored 
by Chinese philosophy. Rather the deep division that Professor Guo sees 
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between Western and Chinese philosophy is equally an inherent division 
within the former and may well have its counterpart within the latter. 
Just as there is to be found in the West, in addition to specifically modern 
modes of philosophical thought, a substantial and extensive commitment 
to traditional forms of philosophy, along with a focus on traditional 
values, including traditional religious values, there are to be found in 
Chinese philosophical thought, in addition to a traditionalist orientation, 
specifically modern forms of philosophical thinking.
But Professor Guo’s analyses are not limited to a typological charac-
terization of Western and Chinese philosophy past and present. In addi-
tion to the descriptive level there is an evaluative dimension to Professor 
Guo’s assessment of the historical and contemporary conditions of the 
two philosophical traditions. Moreover, the normative aspect of Pro-
fessor Guo’s reconstruction of Chinese philosophy chiefly concerns the 
potential of traditional Chinese philosophy in the face of the challenges 
posed by modernity. Professor Guo considers Chinese philosophy in its 
traditional form — and in its syncretistic composition reflecting Confu-
cian, Daoist and Buddhist traditions — capable and called upon to oppose 
the negative effects and implications of a modernity chiefly defined by 
uncontrolled cultural and economic development.
3 . THE  VALUE  OF  KNOWLEDGE 
In response to Professor Guo’s portrayal of the current possibilities and 
tasks of philosophy in general and of traditionally oriented Chinese phi-
losophy in particular, I would like to examine more closely the relation 
between the two key features of Western and Chinese philosophy de-
tected by Professor Guo, viz., knowledge and value. In particular, I would 
like to draw on Western philosophy, both past and present, to assess the 
nature of the relation between knowledge and value. More specifically, 
I will investigate the mutual involvement of considerations of know-
ledge and considerations of value in Western philosophical thought. In 
the process, I will argue for the (limited) modernity already of classical 
Greek philosophy and for the emphatic modernity of classical German 
philosophy. In so doing, I will draw on a conception of modernity that is 
itself specifically philosophical and that exceeds the narrow confines of 
a merely scientistic or economistic conception of modernity, as presup-
posed by Professor Guo.
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From its origins in archaic gnomics (Seven Sages) and Ionic philosophy 
of nature (Thales, Anaximander) through its heyday in Plato and Aristo-
tle to its later developments in Pyrrhonic skepticism and old and middle 
stoicism Greek philosophy has been concerned equally with what came 
later to be identified as “theoretical philosophy,” involving physics and 
metaphysics, and with what came to be labeled “practical philosophy,” 
involving ethics and politics. Moreover, both sets of inquiry pursued 
throughout by Greek philosophers typically involved epistemological is-
sues addressing the modality and extension of knowledge to be achieved 
in the various areas of theoretical and practical philosophy. Major ex-
amples of the prominence of epistemological concerns in both main 
parts of Greek philosophy are Plato’s theory of forms, which serves both to 
distinguish opinions concerning appearances from knowledge regarding 
true reality and to mark off unreliable from safe and sound standards of 
conduct, and Aristotle’s distinction between the scientific knowledge to 
be obtained in physics and metaphysics (episteme) and the role of practi-
cal judgment (phronesis) in ethical and political matters.
But the interconnection between epistemological and axiological is-
sues in classical Greek philosophy concerns not only the presence of 
considerations of knowledge in practical philosophy. It also manifests 
itself in the reverse presence of axiological considerations in theoreti-
cal philosophy. A central concern of the Greek philosophers throughout 
is the significance or, in Professor Guo’s preferred parlance, the value 
possessed by philosophical knowledge, in contrast to other modes of 
theoretical inquiry and practical existence. Chief examples of the Greek 
philosophical evaluation of knowledge in general and of philosophical 
knowledge in particular are the comparison and contrast of the lives of 
the ordinary citizens and the guardian-philosophers in Plato and the 
distinction between the forms of life devoted to artisanal production 
(poiesis), ethical and political acting (praxis) and philosophical contem-
plation (theoria) in Aristotle. It is significant for the overall orientation 
of Greek thinking that, while the Greek philosophers on the whole value 
most highly the contemplative life of study and speculation, they also 
acknowledge the worth and indeed the worthiness of a life informed by 
philosophical insight but devoted to the furtherance and maintenance of 
the common good in political activity.
A further feature that marks classical Greek philosophy in general 
and its chief manifestations in Plato and Aristotle in particular is the 
critical spirit of philosophy that is geared both toward extra-philosophi-
cal beliefs and traditions and toward alternative philosophical positions 
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and doctrines. Throughout Greek philosophy is marked by controversies, 
polemics and antagonisms, resulting in an adversarial style of argumen-
tation. To be sure, the pervasive element of polemics and antagonism in 
Greek thought is not a purpose of its own but reflects the deep-seated 
conviction that philosophical insight results from intellectual struggles 
and that lasting results and wider agreements require the prior carrying 
through of vehement disputes and radical dissension. A chief illustration 
of the Greek way of doing philosophy controversially are Plato’s mature 
dialogues, especially the Phaedo and the Republic, that have surpassed 
the aporetic impasses of his earlier works but do not yet exhibit the dia-
lectical openendedness of his late works. Considered as a whole, Greek 
philosophical thought is critical to the point of being self-critical. As a 
result of its critical, even self-critical spirit, classical Greek philosophy is 
marked by disagreement among its main representatives, even in cases 
where nominally they may belong to one and the same “school” of think-
ing. In the classical Greek tradition there is not to found an established, 
recognized and lasting consensus on philosophical matters. The very 
nature of knowledge, its definition, its intension and extension, remains 
as much a matter of controversy between Academics, Peripatetics, Pyr-
rhonists, Stoics and Epicureans as the nature of the good (or the valu-
able), its constitution and the conditions of its obtainability.
4 . THE  KNOWLEDGE  OF  VALUE
The critical character of classical Greek philosophy finds its modified 
continuation in the dramatic development of modern philosophy from 
Descartes and Hobbes through Hume and Kant to Frege and Husserl 
and beyond that to Adorno and Heidegger. Modern European philoso-
phy, along with its satellite developments in North America and else-
where, has been marked by internecine strife, resulting in clashes be-
tween opposed schools and affiliations, and by philosophical attacks on 
established traditions and authorities, both religious and secular. The 
focus on reason, in particular on instrumental rationality, that is often 
cited as a main feature of modern philosophy in the West involves not 
so much the idolatry of reason as the reliance on reason for the critical 
assessment of the extra-rational aspects of human life in culture, poli-
tics and religion. Most importantly, the modern philosophical focus on 
reason often includes the self-critique of reason assessing as much the 
limits or boundaries of reason as its capacities and reach. For religiously 
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motivated modern philosophers, such as Pascal and Leibniz, the philo-
sophical consideration of reason is to be supplemented by that of reli-
gious faith and divine grace. For secularly oriented modern philosophers, 
such as Hume and Rousseau, feeling, rather than reason, is the main 
source of orientation and motivation in human life.
The self-critical dimension of the concern with reason in modern 
philosophy is particularly obvious in the works of Immanuel Kant and 
his idealist successors, chiefly among them Johann Gottlieb Fichte and 
Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel. Kant sets out to critically assess the 
claims of reason to knowledge in matters of metaphysics, arguing that 
traditional metaphysics is unable to justify its alleged cognition of su-
persensible objects, in particular the soul, the world in its entirety and 
God. Moreover, Kant limits possible knowledge to objects in space and 
time, including their universal and, for that matter, metaphysical prin-
ciples. Accordingly, Kant’s purification of theoretical philosophy from 
false metaphysical pretensions results in a “metaphysics of experience” 
(Herbert James Paton) based on a novel account of non-empirical, meta-
physical knowledge of the empirical, physical realm. 
Kant complements the drastic curtailment of theoretical, knowledge-
geared reason to possible experience with a reverse extension of practi-
cal, volition-geared reason beyond the limits of experience and beyond 
the confines of a merely instrumental understanding of practical reason. 
In fact, Kant views the limitation of theoretical reason as a necessary pre-
requisite for the establishment of genuine, purely practical reason, viz., 
moral reason. Only the ideality of the objects of knowledge can safeguard 
the reality of the moral law (categorical imperative) and the freedom it 
entails. Yet Kant also insists on the unity of theoretical and practical 
reason, arguing that it is one and the same reason that is subject to a 
twofold employment under alternative sets of principles, one involving 
the determination of objects by means of the categories, the other in-
volving the determination of the will by means of ideas of reason, chiefly 
that of freedom from natural causation and rational self-determination 
(autonomy).
Kant’s conception of a non-instrumental practical use of reason and 
the associated constitutive role of reason in the normative determina-
tion of human conduct distinguishes his account of human action from 
a metaphysically-based theory of value. On a Kantian account, neither 
cognition nor volition can be accounted for by an appeal to matters of 
fact. Both are products rather than findings, made rather than given, 
constituted rather than detected. To be sure, the activity of reason that 
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Kant locates at the basis of knowing as well as willing is not arbitrary 
and contingent but based on strict principles that structure and guide 
the exercise of theoretical spontaneity as well as practical freedom, each 
in its own specific way. Kant’s strictly reason-based account of cognitive 
and conative normativity preserves and even strengthens the axiologi-
cal dimension of human conduct in theory as well as in practice, even 
if value is not primary but reason itself, especially pure practical reason 
as the supreme condition of everything to be valued in human cognitive 
and volitional endeavors.
In sum, then, Kant offers an account of reason — in its differentiation 
as well as unity, in its theoretical as well as practical employment, in its 
pure as well as empirical use — that redresses the alleged shortcomings of 
modernist, merely instrumental reason as being defective, one-sided and 
impoverished. But it also places modern philosophy under the outright 
moral obligation to emphatically advocate the liberating potential of rea-
son in the face of a modern world that has turned reason into rationality, 
progress into profit and communication into consumption. On a Kantian 
analysis, it is not modernity that has failed. Rather we moderns, half-
moderns, to be precise, have failed modernity, its potential for a truly 
enlightened, genuinely cultured and actually civilized form of life that 
continues the humanizing aspirations of traditional life forms under the 
conditions of an increasingly world-wide interaction of previously sepa-
rate traditions that need to seek modes of coexistence and compatibility. 
CHR IST I AN  KR I JNEN  ( AMSTERDAM/T I LBURG) 
ON RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF  KNOWLEDGE 
AND VALUES IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 1
1 . 
If I take Guo Yi’s considerations as a starting point for a dialogue be-
tween China and Europe about the metaphysical foundations of know-
ledge and ethics, it is important to go into some presuppositions of his 
view on modern Western as well as ancient Western philosophy. These 
presuppositions are already relevant for the exposition of the problem, to 
which Guo Yi wants to introduce Chinese philosophy as the solution. It 
seems to me, that the dialogue should also be about what Western phi-
losophy is and how it relates to values. Without having a clear picture of 
that, and of course of Chinese philosophy, a philosophical dialogue can-
not be fruitful. For sure, philosophy is not only about something which 
has to do with what Guo Yi calls “the source of the world, the nature of 
the myriad of things and the order of society”,2 about ‘was die Welt im 
Innersten zusammenhält’ (Goethe), and with that about totality. It is also 
about our understanding of that totality. At least in Western philosophy 
it has turned out that it is unavoidable for an adequate conceptualization 
of totality, to take also into account our understanding of it: our under-
1 I thank all participants of the conference Metaphysical Foundations of 
Knowledge and Ethics for their presentations and discussions. They inspired 
me to address some additional issues in the published version of my pre-
sentation.
2 All quotes and references concern the chapter ‘Introduction’ of Guo Yi’s 
article Metaphysics, Nature and Mind – The main idea of Daoic Philosophy (in 
this volume).
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standing of the world we live in and of the place we have in it as humans. 
Hence, digging into some presuppositions of Guo Yi’s understanding of 
Western philosophy is an essential element of the philosophical dialogue 
between China and Europe itself. 
In what follows, I will make some comments about the contrast 
sketched by Guo Yi between knowledge and rationality on the one hand 
and values on the other.3 My suggestion is that Guo Yi’s contrast does 
insufficient justice to Western philosophy, especially to modern conti-
nental Western philosophy. Philosophy, values and meaning of life are 
intertwined here, as they already are in science itself. 
2 . 
Guo Yi’s argument for the relevance of Chinese philosophy hangs to-
gether with a view on Western philosophy, especially modern Western 
philosophy, that is for sure influential, but is still incorrect. In this view 
modern Western philosophy in particular is supposed to be only con-
cerned with knowledge, chiefly the scientific knowledge of nature, in that 
it reduces rationality to instrumental rationality, and neglects or even 
excludes values because of that idea of rationality. 
As far as the philosophy of the 20th century is concerned, this pic-
ture of philosophy could of course refer to logical positivism and its 
reductionist empiricist methodological monism in regard to natural sci-
ences. According to logical positivism, scientific knowledge is value-free 
and as far as its content is concerned scientific knowledge is founded 
3 Cf. for more extensive elaborations my work on philosophy and values: 
Nachmetaphysischer Sinn. Eine problemgeschichtliche und systematische Studie 
zu den Prinzipien der Wertphilosophie Heinrich Rickerts, Würzburg 2001; Phi-
losophie als System. Prinzipientheoretische Untersuchungen zum Systemgedanken 
bei Hegel, im Neukantianismus und in der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Würzburg 
2008; Philosophy – Philosophy of Science – Science, in: Economics and 
Management & Organization Studies: A Critical Philosophical Introduction, 
Ch. Krijnen/B. Kee (Ed.), Deventer 2009, 13–50, chap. 2.3; Wert, in: Hand-
buch Ethik, M. Düwell/Ch. Hübenthal/M. H. Werner (Ed.), Stuttgart 32011, 
527–533; Values and the Limits of Economic Rationality. Critical Remarks 
on ‘Economic Imperialism’, in: Elements of a Philosophy of Management and 
Organisation, P. Koslowski (Ed.), Heidelberg et al. 2010, 111–136; Bedeu-
tung, in: Handbuch Kulturphilosophie, R. Konersmann (Ed.), Stuttgart 2012, 
279–287 (forthcoming).
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in observations (observational statements). Empirical verification is the 
key for scientific research. Values seem only to be subjective, the results 
of atheoretical beliefs and mere decisions, irrational. They just disturb 
the process of acquiring scientific knowledge. Not only is science itself 
value-free, a truly scientific philosophy of values seems also impossible 
here; philosophy, in essence, is the logic of science, its task is not to 
determine and justify irrational objects like values. 
This view has been extremely important for what has been called 
‘analytic philosophy’ of science. The distinction between facts and val-
ues led much of the analytical philosophy of language, of metaphys-
ics, and of epistemology to become hostile to the idea that our talk of 
value and human flourishing can be rational, right or wrong. Nowadays, 
however, even within analytic philosophy many studies about values ap-
pear. There is not only an intensive discussion going on about epistemic 
values,4 but more general issues about values are addressed too.5 And 
of course, in Western philosophy disciplines like ethics have always been 
intrinsically concerned with values. 
3 . 
But let’s put this point aside now and assume for the sake of argument 
that a scientific philosophy of values seems far out of reach of Western, 
especially modern Western philosophy. According to Guo Yi, we need 
(traditional) Chinese philosophy for that. According to him, a theory of 
values should be dominant and central in philosophy, whereas a theory 
of knowledge should only hold a subordinate position. To a certain ex-
tent I agree with the systematic statement that a theory of values should 
be dominant and central in philosophy — especially from a Kantian point 
of view, leading however to substantial problems in confrontation with 
4 Cf. e. g. A. Haddock/A. Millar/D. Prichard (Ed.): Epistemic Values, Oxford 
2009; G. Schönrich (Ed.): Wissen und Werte, Paderborn 2009.
5 Cf. e. g.: H. Putnam: The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other 
Essays, Cambridge, Mass. 2002; P. Grice: The conception of value, Oxford 
1991; D. Wiggins: Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, 
Oxford 1987/1998; Harry Frankfurt: The importance of what we care about. 
Philosophical essays, Cambridge 1988; A. MacIntyre: After Virtue. A Study in 
Moral Theory, London 1981; J. L. Mackie: Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, 
London 1977; B. Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London 1985.
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Hegel’s idealism.6 And I would like to add, that, at least from a sys-
tematical standpoint, one can identify the view that values should be 
dominant and central with much of Western philosophy. 
Hence, values are not the “major defect of Western philosophy”, but 
a main object of its interest. I would hold, however, that only knowledge 
taken as natural knowledge can have a non-primary function. As philo-
sophical knowledge it must have a primary function for a philosophy of 
values. The metaphysical turn towards traditional Chinese philosophy, 
as proposed by Guo Yi, and the cosmological component it apparently 
starts with, comes into conflict with the autonomy of human reason, at 
least according to the main figures of modern continental philosophy 
like Kant, Hegel, the Neo-Kantians, Husserl, etc. But for Guo Yi, these 
authors do not function as substantial references. Instead he refers to 
the physicist Stephen Hawking — whose lack of philosophical knowledge, 
especially of the continental tradition, has recently become the subject 
of many discussions on the internet and mailing lists. It seems to me 
that a dialogue between Chinese and European philosophy is in need of 
another approach, taking the heritage of continental Western philosophy, 
especially German idealism and its later developments, more seriously.
6 Cf. my studies: Selbsterkenntnis und Systemgliederung. Hegel und der 
südwestdeutsche Neukantianismus, in: Systemphilosophie als Selbsterkennt-
nis. Hegel und der Neukantianismus, H. F. Fulda/Ch. Krijnen (Ed.), Würzburg 
2006, 113–132; Ch. Krijnen 2008, op. cit., 4.2.3 f.; Kulturalisierung des Geis-
tes? in: Geist? Hegel-Jahrbuch 2010, A. Arndt/P. Cruysberghs/A.  Przylebski 
(Ed.), Berlin 2010, 253–258. — In confrontation with Hegel, limits of the 
concept of value can be discussed fruitfully, especially taking into account 
Hegel’s concept of idea. This leads to an important difference between 
philosophical systems following a Kantian setting and a Hegelian setting: 
the difference between self-formation and self-knowledge. Both settings 
are bound to the problem of self-knowledge of thought. But it is only in 
Hegel that self-knowledge turns out to be the basic principle structuring 
the order of the system itself. The Kantian model leads to a philosophical 
system ‘culturalizing’ reality, the Hegelian model to a philosophical system 
‘idealizing’ it.
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4 . 
As logical positivism, and with it the roots of analytic philosophy, plays 
such an important role for Guo Yi’s interpretation of modern Western 
philosophy and its concern with values, it seems fair to point out that 
in the founding years of logical positivism there was huge philosophical 
attention to values.7 Many treatises on the concept of value were pub-
lished.8 For a great number of philosophers in the last decades of the 
19th and the first decades of the 20th century, the concept of value does 
not just function as a kind of expression of the latest verbal fashion, 
accompanied by the popularizing voice of Nietzsche’s call for an “Um-
wertung aller Werte” und “Erfinder neuer Werte”.9 Rather, the concept 
of value turns out to be the most fundamental concept of philosophy itself. 
Although the philosophical use of the word ‘value’ appears especially 
since the 19th century, the matter at stake is thought to be as old as phi-
losophy itself. According to many philosophers in those days, seen from 
a historical perspective, philosophy is essentially philosophy of values. 
This can easily be illustrated by taking a look into works about philo-
sophical schools in those years:10 It will be difficult to find philosophers 
in Germany not being classified as ‘philosophers of values’. Philosophy 
7 Ch. Krijnen 2001, op. cit., 2.3.
8 Johannes Erich Heyde: Gesamtbibliographie des Wertbegriffes, in: J. E. 
Heyde, Literarische Berichte aus dem Gebiet der Philosophie 1928/29, (15/16) 
111–119, (17/18) 66–75, (19/20) 11–18.
9 Cf. for Nietzsches role in making the talk of values popular: F. Bamber-
ger: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung des Wertproblems in der Philosophie des 
19. Jahrhunderts, Halle/S. 1924, p. 3; M. Heidegger: Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist 
tot’ (1943), in: M. Heidegger, Holzwege, Frankfurt/M. 71994, 209–267, p. 227; 
J. Hessen: Wertphilosophie, Paderborn 1937, p. 15; J. E. Heyde: Wert. Eine 
philosophische Grundlegung, Erfurt 1927, p. 7; A. Messer: Wertphilosophie der 
Gegenwart, Berlin 1930, 2; W.Windelband: Die philosophischen Richtun-
gen der Gegenwart, in: E. v. Aster (Ed.), Grosse Denker, Bd. 2, Leipzig 1911, 
363–377, 363 f.
10 Cf. e. g.: J. B. Lotz: Sein und Wert. Das Grundproblem der Wertphilo-
sophie, in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 57 (1933), 557–613, 574 ff.; F.-J. 
v. Rintelen: Die Bedeutung des philosophischen Wertproblems, in: F.-J. 
Rintelen (Ed.), Philosophia Perennis. Abhandlungen zu ihrer Vergangenheit und 
Gegenwart, Regensburg 1930, 929–971; F.-J. v. Rintelen: Wertphilosophie, 
in: F. H. Heinemann (Ed.), Die Philosophie im XX. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 
1959, 441–449; J. Hessen 1937, op. cit., 16–19; H. Schnädelbach: Philosophie 
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of values here includes thinkers like Windelband and Rickert, Dilthey 
and Spranger, Brentano and Meinong, Scheler and Hartmann, Lotz and 
Przywara, Münsterberg and Stern, among others with even Husserl being 
taken as a philosopher of values. 
This focus on values hangs together, as in Guo Yi’s exposition, with 
a crisis — but with a different crisis. The crisis German philosophy of 
values wanted to react to was a crisis between facts and values too, be-
tween (empirical) knowledge and the sources giving meaning to our life. 
But for them this crisis resulted from the decline of the philosophy of 
German idealism and its speculative understanding of reality on the one 
hand, and the rise of the role of empirical knowledge for the world-view 
of man (Weltanschauung) on the other. The crisis concerns the problem 
of substantial orientation in what we can call a post-metaphysical era. 
In this era the reference to beings belonging to a super-sensible realm 
functioning as grounds for the validity of human thinking and acting 
lost much of its persuasiveness. Perspectives of the empirical sciences 
and those of the philosophical reductions accompanying them (physical-
ism, materialism, biologism, historicism, psychologism, etc.)11 became 
dominant: German idealism, and the unity of facticity and meaning, of 
reason and reality conceptualised in it, lost its leading spiritual position 
in Germany. 
In the course of this development, theoretical thinking seemed un-
able to develop an encompassing systematic interpretation of the world 
we live in. At the same time it became unclear how something like hu-
man orientation could still make sense. Against all kinds of natural-
isms and scientific reductionisms, evoking loss of meaning, richness and 
depth of life, against the spook of nihilism, of metaphysical emptiness, 
the philosophy of values tries to bring in the objective validity of values. 
Hence, the philosophy of values takes the pessimistic, relativistic and 
nihilistic signs of its time as a starting point for a thorough reflection on 
the values that guide human life. The central position that the philoso-
in Deutschland 1831–1933, Frankfurt/M. 1983, 206 with 219 and 225. Cf. also 
further literature mentioned in footnote 8.
11 Cf. on the issue of world-view, philosophy, and the natural sciences in 
the 19th century the recent work of K. Bayertz/M. Gerhard/ W. Jaeschke 
(Ed.): Weltanschauung, Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert, 
3 Bd., Hamburg 2007. Cf. on the Psychologismusstreit in philosophy: M. 
Rath: Der Psychologismusstreit in der deutschen Philosophie, Freiburg/Mün-
chen 1994.
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phy of values gained was not in the last place due to the fundamental 
uncertainty of modern man regarding the guiding factors of his thinking 
and acting. The foundations of human self-understanding and of human 
understanding of the world he lives in are at stake here.
Of course, the philosophy of values as a distinctive type of phi-
losophy is not much older than a century or so — but its concern appar-
ently includes themes that used to be central to metaphysics. Concepts 
like ‘truth’, ‘reality’, ‘morality’ and the like express a kind of framework, 
which gives orientation to human theoretical and atheoretical (practical, 
esthetical, religious, etc.) life. As guiding factors for human endeavors, 
values take over the place once occupied by metaphysical entities as 
sources for the meaning of life. 
Taken in this comprehensive way, the concept of value does not have 
just an ‘ethical’ nature. The ethical sphere, or to put it more broadly, 
the practical sphere, is only one sphere of values among many, e. g. the 
sphere of knowledge, of art, or of religion. All these spheres, i. e. cul-
ture, are related to values determining them. Not only does reducing 
philosophy of values to ethics miss the point, at least systematically, the 
same counts for attempts to subjectivize or anthropologize the value-
determinedness of human life. It is especially in a philosophy of values 
following the methodological setting of Kant, that the concept of values 
turns out to mean a set of rules, securing the objective validity of human 
endeavors.
5 . 
The Neo-Kantians of the South-West school in particular (Windelband, 
Rickert, Bauch, Cohn) succeeded in clarifying the concept of value in 
many respects. They tried to overcome value relativism and nihilism in a 
post-metaphysical and scientifically (in the broad sense: not restricted to 
natural sciences) justified way. Because of their decisive conviction that 
culture as an expression of human life is determined by values, they also 
hold that the sphere of knowledge and theory is determined by values, 
founded in a set of values. This set of values can be understood as whole 
of validity principles, as Kant’s realm of transcendental aprioris. These 
values, the traditional term for labelling them as a set is ‘truth’, orientate 
our actual thinking to become knowledge of objects. The Neo-Kantians 
mentioned above transpose this constellation of theoretical (epistemic) 
values and validity to the cultural spheres of atheoretical objectivations: 
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both the sphere of the theoretical and the atheoretical are conceptualized 
as ‘taking position towards values’ (Stellungnehmen zu Werten), as being 
subjected to ‘oughts’. Building further on Fichte’s interpretation of Kant, 
they develop Kant’s ‘primacy of practical reason’ to a general philosophy 
of values as a philosophy of culture.
6 . 
Hence, for them philosophy is the philosophy of values. In all its disci-
plines philosophy is about the fundamental determinants of orientation 
for humans as rational beings. It cannot be overlooked that Kant plays 
an important role in this conceptualization of philosophy as the phi-
losophy of values. This is especially true with regard to the rationality 
and justification of values.12 After all, the concept of value is about the 
end (goal, purpose) for human endeavors, philosophy of values about 
the foundations (principles) of human orientation. But if the purpose 
as determinant of orientation for human endeavors is the issue, then 
the validity of human endeavors is at stake, the validity determinedness 
of our thinking and (non) acting. All human endeavours are included. 
For traditional metaphysics, grounds for the objective validity of our 
endeavors are secured by super-sensible, ‘transcendent’ beings. Empiri-
cists conceive of such grounds as being guaranteed by an ‘immanent’ 
(sensible) being, making it, however, incomprehensible as to how truly 
human, self-determined and at the same time intersubjectively valid ori-
entation is possible.
Against both metaphysics and empiricism, Kant paradigmatically 
holds and shows what it means to to approach the subject of founda-
tions (principles, validity qualifications) philosophically. According to 
what is historically known as his historical Copernican turn, and what is 
called from a philosophical point of view his transcendental turn of the 
foundational project of philosophy, certainty with regard to the validity 
of human endeavors can only be reached by the transcendental route. 
On this route, to use the usual (though non-Kantian) term, ‘subjectiv-
ity’ turns out to be the principle of ‘objectivity’, of possible relations to 
12 Hence, the focus is not so much on the specific content of Kantian 
philosophy, but on Kant’s methodology of philosophy: on his ‘approach’. 
This enables a kind of relevance going beyond the specific conditions of his 
time, treating the subject matters of our time.
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objects, hence the ground for validity. Subjectivity here stands for the 
entirety of faculties of the subject; an entirety of faculties that can nei-
ther be naturalized nor culturalized in the sense of a mere multicultural 
plurality.13 Transcendental knowledge of human endeavors leads to a set 
of grounds for validity, of values (as transcendental philosophy of values 
would put it), which cannot be understood by referring to something 
outside the structure of these endeavors themselves, i. e. by reference to 
some kind of a being as in metaphysics or empiricism. It can only be 
understood by reference to the validity claim and validity structure of 
human endeavors themselves.14 
Behavior related to validity has meaning. Hence, values function as 
source for meaning: they constitute phenomena of meaning or meaning-
ful entities. Phenomena of meaning are phenomena of validity: they can 
only be sufficiently determined by the concept of value. The objective 
validity of the human production of meaning, of human objectivations, 
has its foundations in a set of validity principles, as Kant would put it: in 
a set of ‘conditions of the possibility’ of such productions. The objective 
validity of these validity principles is made plausible by showing that 
they are validity conditions of such theoretical or atheoretical objectiva-
tions, i. e. productions of phenomena of meaning. Methodologically, this 
means to reflect on the validity claim of human endeavors in order to 
13 This philosophy of subjectivity is therefore also not to be confused with 
a kind of egology: subjectivity as a set of principles of validity is conceived 
of as a ‘general’ subjectivity, binding all ‘human subjects’ as it defines what 
it means to be human. 
14 With this reference to the claim of human endeavors themselves, tran-
scendental knowledge is about humanity, about what makes us human, 
about the humanum : the normative dimension of human thinking and act-
ing. The fundamental factors guiding subjects therefore are no longer meta-
physical entities, but values which are defining aspects of humanity itself. 
They are valid categorically, ‘transcendent’ in the sense that their validity 
does not depend on their factual recognition; on the contrary: they should 
be recognized because they contain what it means to be human, hence to 
think and act at all. They immediately determine the validity of such think-
ing and acting, and with that the thinking and acting subject. As their cat-
egorical validity is part of the validity claims of that subject itself, they are 
at the same time ‘immanent’: the subject forms itself by being determined 
by values which belong to its own status as a subject. The harsh critique 
that the philosophy of values falls short because of its dogmatic ‘realism of 
values’ falls short itself.
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determine its validity structure. Apparently it is this structure that func-
tions as a determinant of orientation for human endeavors. With that it 
functions as ‘value’. Values are (conscious or non-conscious) determi-
nants of orientation for human endeavors.
7 . 
In the course of this Kantian philosophical paradigm, basing objectivity 
in subjectivity, it turns out that ‘ontology’, including ‘cosmology’, has 
its foundations in the cognitive claims of the knowing subject. Hence, 
an “analytic of pure understanding”, to use Kant’s famous phrase, must 
take over the foundational place of “ontology”.15 A logic, as Hegel puts 
it no less famously, takes over the position of the former metaphysics,16 
and as “metaphysics proper” (eigentliche Metaphysik)17 it changes both 
theme and method of pre-Kantian (but also Kantian) metaphysics.18 Of 
course here, as in the transcendental philosophy of values, logic is con-
ceptualized as an objective logic: a logic that makes thought explicit as 
thought about objects. Both for Kant and Hegel and the transcendental 
philosophy of values, regardless of the differences in their philosophical 
systems, nature is included as theme of philosophy. Nature, however, 
is not included as philosophia prima, but as a theme of later worries: 
as a theme which has itself only philosophical meaning when founded 
in logic. Differing from traditional Chinese philosophy here too, the 
philosophy of nature with respect to cosmology is not the discipline to 
start the philosophical system with, at least not if a philosophical system 
claims to be scientific knowledge.
15 I. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in: Werke in sechs Bänden, W.  Weischedel 
(Ed.), vol. 2, Darmstadt 1983, 303.
16 G. W. F. Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Teil, ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig 
1951, p. 46, and G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaf-
ten im Grundrisse (1830), F. Nicolin/O. Pöggeler (Ed.), Hamburg 81991, § 24.
17 G. W. F. Hegel, Logik, op. cit., 5.
18 Cf. Ch. Krijnen 2008, op. cit., 4.2.1.2, and Ch. Krijnen: Metaphysik in 
der Realphilosophie Hegels? Hegels Lehre vom freien Geist und das axio-
tische Grundverhältnis kantianisierender Transzendentalphilosophie, in: 
M. Gerhard/A. Sell/L. de Vos (Ed.), Metaphysik und Metaphysikkritik in der 
Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie,  Hamburg 2012, 171–210.
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Neither Kant nor Hegel nor transcendental philosophy restrict know-
ledge (and science) to knowledge of the natural sciences. Of course they 
do not restrict philosophy to the clarification of the formal language of 
the natural sciences either. On the contrary, they see clearly that natural 
sciences for methodological reasons miss normative competence. In the 
third antinomy of his Critique of Pure Reason Kant even maximized the 
explanatory power of natural sciences to the whole realm of nature — and 
still showed that a realm of human freedom is possible. And going be-
yond Kant’s concept of freedom, Hegel even makes freedom part of his 
concept of speculative knowledge that determines his whole system of 
philosophy. 
This is another way of saying that in these philosophies rationality is 
in no way reduced to instrumental rationality. The concept of instrumen-
tal rationality, for sure very influential, is much too narrow to enable an 
adequate conceptualization of human behavior.19 Historically speaking, 
rationality has always also been associated with arithmetic and calcula-
tion. But historically speaking the term rationality also refers to a more 
fundamental meaning: rationality as foundation and justification. As a 
disposition of man (animal rationale, to use the more precise Kantian 
term: animal rationabile) rationality signifies the competence to have 
reasons for beliefs (regardless of which) and the ability to justify beliefs 
(regardless of whether that justification is sufficient or not).20 Compe-
tences of this kind are not limited to the validity of the means to achieve 
given ends, but also include the validity of goals (purposes, ends) them-
selves. Human behavior is not merely heteronomous (determined by 
natural and cultural constellations), but autonomous (self-determining) 
too. Limiting rationality to instrumental rationality is indeed unrealistic: 
this limitation does not sufficiently pertain to man’s behaviour. Rather, 
the exclusively instrumental view makes absolute a particular aspect of 
rationality. Human rationality, however, has a reflexive dimension, tak-
ing means as well as ends into account.
19 Cf. Ch. Krijnen 2010, op. cit.
20 For an example of analytical philosophy cf. R. Brandom: Making it Ex-
plicit. Reasoning, Representing, and discursive Commitment. Cambridge, Mass. 
1994. For an example of continental philosophy cf. W. Flach: Grundzüge der 
Erkenntnislehre. Erkenntniskritik, Logik, Methodologie. Würzburg 1994.
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8 .
Philosophies of values trying to appropriate Kant’s philosophy, were es-
pecially eager to get a grip on Kant’s philosophical method, called by 
them transcendental, method. They appreciate Kant’s insight into the 
problem of validity and its methodological treatment, and with that into 
the problem of values and their methodological treatment. At the same 
time, they find it important to develop Kant’s concept of philosophy 
further, rather than falling back on to metaphysical speculations or re-
ducing the method of philosophy to a positivistic approach of validity. 
Not only do they reactivate Kant’s contribution to philosophy, they also 
reactualize his contribution, as their time is characterized by a different 
constellation of philosophical problems.
Kant’s transcendental turn then contains a key to the solution for 
the problem the philosophy of values was motivated by in the first in-
stance: the problem of orientation, the problem of the meaning of life, of 
human endeavors in a post-metaphysical era. Ultimately, Kant’s sphere 
of the transcendental functions as a whole of grounds for the objective 
validity of human thinking and acting, and with that as the true source 
for culture as the human world of meaning. Hence, by focussing on 
the ‘conditions of the possibility’ (i. e. validity principles) transcenden-
tal philosophy turns out to be a critical philosophy of culture: it is not 
beings which function as grounds for validity, but subjectivity. With 
this reference to subjectivity, transcendental philosophy offers a post-
metaphysical philosophy of meaning.21
To be sure, this means of all meaning, of the meaning of life. As 
post-metaphysical philosophy of meaning, philosophy does not restrict 
meaning to the sphere of knowledge and theory. The atheoretical domain 
is included too. Philosophy gives a conceptual account of the totality of 
meaning. Obviously, in Western philosophy serious efforts have been 
undertaken to develop a system of philosophy in which the concept of 
value is central and crucial. 
Of course, the idea of a system of values is much disputed. The pos-
sibility of a scientific doctrine of values has already been denied or re-
stricted Whereas Neo-Kantians like Rickert or contemporary transcen-
dental philosophers like Wagner and Flach argue with good reason for 
a comprehensive scientific doctrine of values, philosophers like Simmel, 
21 Cf. Ch. Krijnen 2001, op. cit.
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Weber, Jaspers etc. take an agnostic stance towards values. According to 
them, it is only possible to acquire scientific knowledge about theoreti-
cal (epistemic) values, as those who do not recognize theoretical values 
will be caught up in contradictions. In this realm of ‘truth’ the validity 
of values can be proven scientifically. The validity of atheoretical values, 
however, is supposed not to be capable of such a scientific determina-
tion. A variant of this idea one can find in the work of philosophers who 
identify science primarily with the natural sciences and then exclude 
questions about value and meaning from scientific research and hand 
them over to the realm of ‘world-views’ and (religious and non-religious) 
‘beliefs’ of concrete subjects.
As far as the idea of a philosophical system is concerned, for many de-
cades the antipathy against thinking in philosophical systems has been 
immense (analytic philosophy, Frankfurt school, hermeneutics, post-
modernism). Still, if we really want to know what makes up the value 
character of the different fundamental values (like truth, morality, jus-
tice, holiness, etc.), we cannot avoid determining the relations between 
the several different realms of values (Wertsphären). The validity claim 
of our concrete endeavors already confronts us with the quest for validity 
(the quaestio iuris). Obtaining certainty about the value determinedness 
of our own endeavors is intrinsically related to all our validity claims. 
This eventually leads to knowledge of both the system of values which 
belongs to a specific fundamental value (like truth, morality, etc. — e. g. 
the system of epistemic values, the system of moral values, etc.) and the 
system of these fundamental values itself.22 
22 To be sure, neither Kant nor Hegel conceive of the system of philosophy 
as an ‘axiomatic’ system. On the contrary, Kant showed that philosophical 
concept formation cannot follow the mos geometricus, i. e. the axiomatic-de-
ductive paradigm of mathematics that has been so important in the history 
of philosophy too. Hence, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are no argu-
ments against the idea of a system of philosophy as it has been developed 
within German idealism. Unity here is conceived of as self-differentiation. 
Hegel’s concept of idea e. g., is defined as unity of subject and object: ‘out-
side’ this unity, there is no ‘meaning’, no ‘being’, no ‘nature’, no ‘subject’, 
or whatsoever. As already pointed out, thought per se, as principle of objec-
tivity, is not to be identified with our thought and its claim to knowledge 
(cf. Ch. Krijnen, Realism and the validity problem of knowledge, in: Ch. 
Krijnen/B. Kee, op. cit., 237–265). — More in general, two arguments have 
always played a major role in thinking about philosophical systems (cf. Ch. 
Krijnen 2008, op. cit., chap. 0 and chap. 6): The first argument addresses 
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Certainty on the basis of immediate intuitions (‘self-evidence’) about 
the value determinedness of our concrete endeavors and its values (cf. 
e. g. Scheler) is at the most a starting point for our knowledge about the 
validity of both the endeavors and the values guiding them. At the end 
of this process of acquiring certainty (Selbstvergewisserung) we’ll have 
to come up with knowledge about the validity of values. Such knowledge 
is presupposed in each and every claimed instance of value determined-
ness. It leads us to a system of values. The philosophical determina-
tion of the system of values has then to face difficult problems like the 
completeness of the system of values, the ranking of the different values, 
the historicity of the system of values, etc.23 And as far as philosophical 
ethics is concerned, ethics is knowledge about what is Good. It claims 
to be justified knowledge, at least it is obliged to justify its knowledge 
claims about what is Good, i. e. the system of moral values. The task of 
securing their (moral) validity claim belongs intrinsically to the moral 
endeavors themselves. This attempt to clarify the value determinedness 
of our concrete moral endeavors culminates in (philosophical) ethics. 
As knowledge, of course, ethics itself needs to be substantiated by logic.
the ‘finitude’ of researchers as they are determined by nature and culture in 
many ways. The second argument concerns the ‘infinitude’ of the natural 
and cultural reality we live in. The latter argument especially seems to be 
very relevant for traditional Chinese philosophy. The argument in essence 
has an empiricist and positivist color. However, is the reference to the 
manifoldness of the world a sufficient reason to reject ‘closed’ systems and 
prefer what are called ‘open’ systems? After all, the philosophical system is 
not after the world, but after an entirety of thoughts about the world. Hence, 
does the argument mix up the object of a theory with the theory of an 
object? From a German idealist perspective, the distinction between ‘open’ 
and ‘closed’ systems, which arose from developments within the special sci-
ences, for philosophy only makes sense on a phenomenological level. An ad-
equate philosophical system is both open and closed, for ‘forms’ as well as 
for ‘contents’ — it is neither open nor closed, but the philosophical systems 
that conceptually determines, in its time, totality via a justified entirety of 
thoughts.
23 Cf. Ch. Krijnen 2008, op. cit.
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9 . 
Let me conclude. Guo Yi’s article gives reason to pose many questions 
and to address many issues. For sure, it concerns intricate questions and 
issues: questions and issues that hit right at the heart of philosophy, 
its basic problems, its method, and its system. However, German ideal-
ism from Kant to Hegel, the Neo-Kantians, Husserl, and contemporary 
transcendental philosophy has developed very profound and elaborate 
answers and concepts. Taking them into account seriously seems to be 
an inescapable condition for the possibility of a fruitful debate between 
Chinese and Western philosophy. 

T I LMAN  BORSCHE  (H I LDESHE IM)
PHILOSOPHICAL AUTHORITY
A critical discussion of Guo Yi,  
“The Main Idea of Daoic Philosophy”
The first question that came to my mind after reading the paper “Meta-
physics, Nature and Mind – The main Idea of Daoic Philosophy” pre-
sented by Guo Yi was the following: Is it legitimate and does it make 
sense to construe and compare “Chinese” and “Western” philosophy, as 
Guo Yi does it throughout the paper? My answer is: no, it is not; or, to 
put it more cautiously: it is legitimate only under very restrictive condi-
tions and only as a first very general and introductory approach to com-
parative studies in the field of philosophy. I can find no position among 
those referred to in the paper as “Chinese” which could not be found in 
“Western” philosophy; and I assume that it will be the same when one is 
looking in the other direction. The labels “Chinese” and “Western” are 
simply too wide and too unspecific: They cannot serve as suitable objects 
of comparative inquiries.
Taking this observation as my point of departure, I will try to restrict 
the scope of the following comparative survey and reduce it to a manage-
able size asking what are the entities (texts, ideas, systems) that could be 
compared. This purpose in mind it is easy to see that there are, beyond 
(or beneath) those misleading general labels, a number of interesting 
philosophical statements presented and discussed in the paper which 
seem to be suitable for specific comparative inquiries. For example, the 
concept of “Daoic philosophy”, specifically concerning the question of 
the division of “philosophy”, seems to be sufficiently close to concepts 
concerning the same question within Stoic philosophy. “Philosophy”, 
taken as comprising all human mental activities, if I read correctly, is 
divided into the fields of nature, theory and practice. Within this frame-
work comparing seems to be a promising task. Therefore, comparing 
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the proposed division of philosophy in Daoic and, respectively, in Stoic 
doctrines will constitute the first part of the following discussion. On 
the basis of this discussion I will then proceed to the central problem of 
method in philosophy — Daoic and Stoic — in the second part. I will pose 
the fundamental question: Who is authorized and by which legitimation 
he is authorized to specify, to classify, and to evaluate the doctrines of 
“philosophy” (in the broad sense of human mental activities)? In a brief 
concluding third section I will reflect on what will have been discussed 
so far trying to ascertain what the purpose of Daoic philosophy might be. 
To put it more precisely: to ascertain what kind of truth it is that Daoic 
philosophy is searching for or, perhaps more correctly, is trying to teach 
us. The essay will end — not with alternative teachings, but with several 
open questions in the hope of finding answers through the subsequent 
discussions of this meeting. 
I . DAO IC  AND  STO IC  “D IV IS ION  OF  PH I LOSOPHY”
(a) “An important characteristic of Chinese metaphysics is the combina-
tion of cosmology and ontology.” (“Cosmology” taken as the doctrine 
of “the origin and evolution of the universe”; “Ontology” taken as the 
doctrine of “the source, nature and structure of the world”).
Stoic philosophy being materialistic in the sense that everything ex-
isting in the world (or the universe?) has a material nature, never accept-
ed a fundamental difference between these two spheres (cosmology and 
ontology): both belong to physics. The idea that “exploring the origins 
of the universe” is helpful for understanding “the order of society” is in 
accordance with the Stoic emphasis on the sympathy of all parts, facets, 
aspects of the world including the natural order of society. The anal-
ogy of the Big Bang theory both with Daoic and with Stoic cosmology 
is undeniable, but it is not surprising and does not go very deeply. You 
may add the Orphic “theory” of the primordial egg and similar myths 
of other cultures: such similarities concern the metaphorical outside of 
the various mythical narratives. The fundamental difference though, the 
revolutionary force of the Big Bang theory does not lie in its mythical 
outside, but in its mathematical structure, its formal representation. It 
is possible to predict discoveries of unknown objects and events in the 
universe, both past and future, on the basis of this theory. None of the 
older myths has had any such potential or power. That is what makes up 
for the difference. (It doesn’t prove any truth, though.) 
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(b) But now the division of philosophy:
This division is tripartite in both doctrines: 
1) zhi – (value)   ~ Ethics
2) qi – (energy and matter)  ~ Physics 
3) li – (form, reason, law)  ~ Logic (principle, or structure
     of zhi and qi)
It is even more interesting to compare the subdivisions of Daoic physics 
(i. e. of philosophy of nature):
1) Elements    (water, fire, earth …)
2) life     (plants)
3) Awareness    (animals with senses)
4) Consciousness of justice   (yi)
At first sight, this division reflects a well-known Aristotelian doctrine, 
representing the four levels of the scale of nature. Anyone familiar with 
this still widely accepted tradition can easily see several substantial 
similarities as well as subtle differences between both doctrines. Work-
ing out a serious comparative study, however, would require thorough 
knowledge of both traditions and both original languages. Translations, 
even if there were competent and reliable ones, would not do, because 
the characteristics of both doctrines were established over extensive ter-
minological evolutions and complex traditions, which form an essential 
part of their understanding. 
(c) But this comparison is not my purpose for today. I want to high-
light one other major point in Guo’s presentation of Daoic philosophy, a 
point that is clearly present in Stoic philosophy too, but does not figure 
quite as prominently there. This difference may indicate a major shift of 
emphasis between the two doctrines and help us to better understand an 
important distinctive feature of Daoic philosophy.
As mentioned before, the various categories of mental objects resp. 
mental activities and fields of study (parts of philosophy) are somewhat 
similar in both doctrines. For the sake of argument I will now treat them 
as being equal. I will then take a look at their relations among each other 
on both sides. It seems to be a major point in Daoic philosophy and a 
major message of the paper we are reading that this relation has to be 
hierarchic. The author does not leave any doubt: Value (zhi) is supposed 
to take its place at the top, it is the sole end and justification of the other 
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two: theory/logic (li) and nature/physics (qi). Good life, i. e. justice in our 
behavior and in our social relations, justice in the order of society and in 
the government of people as well as justice in the order and government of 
nature — these are the purposes and the duties of everything. Energy and 
matter, lower life forms including that which is misleadingly called “bio-
logical life” should be developed and protected and cultivated, but they 
have to be and to remain subservient to “value nature”. Otherwise the 
harmony and balance of the universe is in danger. It is the foremost duty 
of everybody (and everything) to support this harmony and to maintain 
this balance as far as he or she can contribute to it. By this duty the four 
cardinal human virtues mentioned in the paper are justified: humanity, 
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (cf. Guo, in this volume, p. 28-29). 
Stoic philosophers talk about the relations between the three parts 
of philosophy, too. When they suggest a relation of their respective roles 
and values, they arrive at similar conclusions. Famous and quite reveal-
ing are the similes used in this rating procedure: (1) Philosophy is com-
pared to a garden: Logic stands for the wall that has to protect the garden 
against attacks from outside, physics corresponds to the trees with their 
branches which eventually will bear the fruits, but only ethics represents 
the fruits, i. e. explains the purpose of having the garden. There are more 
similes with the same function and message. (2) Philosophy is compared 
to an egg: Logic is the shell, Physics the egg-white that has to nourish 
the seed, and ethics is the yolk: it stands for the purpose of the whole. 
(3) Or philosophy is compared to an animal: Logic counts for bones and 
nerves, physics for blood and flesh, ethics for the soul (Sextus Empiricus, 
Math. VII 16–19; Diogenes Laertius, VII 40). But whereas from the Daoic 
point of view “physics” and “logic” seem to have auxiliary functions only, 
from the Stoic point of view these fields of study have their own value 
and are dealt with in their own right. All three fields are independent dis-
ciplines of knowledge. Furthermore, the Platonic and Aristotelian view 
that “theoria” — theoretical knowledge of eternal truths — is the highest 
of all human acts, seems to enjoy a strong background presence and will 
never be completely forgotten. 
I I . DOGMAT IC  METHOD
The similarities between the Daoic and the Stoic concepts of philosophy 
are striking, differences were noted with regard to the hierarchic relations 
among the parts or fields of philosophy. In this section I want to explore 
T I LMAN  BORSCHE :  PH I LOSOPH ICAL  AUTHOR I TY 197
another area of comparison by way of analyzing a functional analogy 
between both sides.
Stoics were named after a hall in Athens where Zenon, the founder 
of the school, used to meet with his disciples and teach. In polemic writ-
ings of contemporary ancient literature, however, the Stoics were also 
called by another name relating more directly to their teachings: Stoic 
philosophy was known as “dogmatic” philosophy. The Stoic philosopher 
is a wise man. He is not so much a seeker, but rather a knower. He knows 
things, and he teaches what he knows. 
The philosophical fields of teaching, according to the Stoics, as I 
said before, are Logic, Physics, and Ethics (under these names). But in 
all three fields philosophy is primarily a way of learning and of teaching; 
its first and major result, therefore, is true knowledge. To be sure, good 
practice belongs to (Stoic) philosophy too: Zenon, the school founder, 
was officially praised by a decree of the city of Athens with these words: 
“Whereas Zeno of Citium, son of Mnaseas, has for many years been de-
voted to philosophy in the city and has continued to be a man of worth in 
all other respects, exhorting to virtue and temperance those of the youth 
who came to him to be taught, directing them to what is best, affording 
to all in his own conduct a pattern for imitation in perfect consistency 
with his teaching,…” (Diogenes Laertius, VII 10). Obviously then, the 
way of life of a philosopher is considered to be quite important for his 
public esteem as well as for his philosophical reputation. But that is true 
for teachers from all philosophical schools. The distinctive feature of a 
philosopher or his school of philosophy, however, is not his conduct in 
life, but the sum of his teachings (gnoomai): It is his specific knowledge 
about the nature of things, the nature of the world, his knowledge about 
the right conduct in life, knowledge about virtues in personal as well as 
in public relations; and the knowledge of dialectics, the art of arguments. 
Stoic teaching comprises all three parts of philosophy: Logic, physics, 
ethics.
But how does the philosopher teach? He presents his doctrines in 
the form of oral or written assertive statements (speeches, books etc.). 
Assertive statements are true or false. The Stoic philosopher’s state-
ments claim to be true assertive statements. Exactly for this reason the 
Stoics are called ‘dogmatic’ philosophers. They take positions and try 
to defend them. This general form of presentation is a Sophistic and 
then Aristotelian heritage in the field of philosophy (to be taken over 
by and still be valid for science, to a large degree). During the short so 
called classical age of philosophy in the city of Athens philosophy turned 
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public. Philosophical claims became objects of public debates, they had 
to be defended by argument. Neither the Stoics nor any other school 
of philosophy in Europe could ever since ignore this fact or rather this 
tradition, even though it was not always accepted. History knows of a 
good number of successful attempts to overcome (or transcend) this 
restriction of philosophy to the formal rules of reasoned argument by 
other forms of thought, e. g. by way of paradoxical speech. 
A crucial part of Stoic teaching, therefore, ought to be and actually 
was a theory of knowledge. How do we find and recognize true state-
ments, and how can we ascertain their truth? A criterion of truth had to 
be established to distinguish effectively true statements from false ones. 
The logicians of the Stoics were leading in this domain. Their highly 
sophisticated as well as stubborn opponents were the sceptics, Academic 
sceptics especially. (Epicureans didn’t care much about logic and were 
not interested in public debates.) But again, it’s not my purpose to go 
into details here. Only that much: The theory of knowledge was a stan-
dard chapter of Stoic teaching of philosophy. It was taught in a dogmatic 
way. There is nothing wrong with “Dogma”. Dogma means belief of 
something, it denotes a position someone is holding. “Dogmatic” phi-
losophy, therefore, just means that the philosopher teaching is teaching 
his position. A Stoic philosopher would even be willing to explain and 
defend his position against reasonable doubts. But he would not give it 
up only because he was unable to convince his skeptic opponent. That 
is why sceptics would call him “dogmatic”. 
But how far does Stoic argumentation (reasoning, justification of 
beliefs) go? At the bottom of an argument the Stoic philosopher expects 
to find natural evidence (if not, he will have to go on looking for such 
evidence), i. e. undeniable mental facts (enargeia). From a great historical 
distance we may recognize or diagnose such “facts”, which to the Stoics 
appeared to be undeniable, as beliefs deeply rooted in tradition.
With the Stoics there is plenty of very interesting and noteworthy 
doctrine together with its sophisticated defense, but there is no internal 
critique; impressive teachings, but no reflection, no justification of the 
basic beliefs. Critique came only from outside: Sceptics denied the pos-
sibility of knowledge of this type in general. But there was no serious 
discussion between both sides. 
How does Stoic dogmatism relate to Daoic philosophy? Here again, 
similarities are striking: My second thesis on Daoic philosophy (as I 
gather the teachings from their presentation in the English version of 
the paper of Guo Yi): Daoic philosophy is similar to Stoic philosophy not 
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only in its concept, its division and many of its teachings, but even more 
than that in its form. Daoic philosophy is a purely dogmatic presentation 
of what is considered to be true by its proponent. 
This presentation of “truth”, how will it be defended and justified 
in the face of possible doubts? The method of justification is twofold:
(a) Appeal to traditional Chinese authorities such as Confucius, 
 Mencius, Laozi, Zhu Xi and others, 
(b) appeal to what seems to be natural evidence for everybody.
There is no attempt of justification of the doctrines presented and the 
beliefs discussed by any argument beyond these two sources. I could 
express this situation with the words of Plato’s Sophistees reporting that 
the guest form Elea was complaining about Parmenides by saying that 
he, Parmenides, ‘treated them like little children’. — And I would add, 
two thousand years later, that we don’t deserve such treatment. 
These sources, ancient Chinese authorities and natural evidence, are 
by no means illegitimate sources. But why should we believe them? Felt 
evidence is not evident to everybody, and authorities have to be justi-
fied. The dogmatic philosopher might respond by reminding us that the 
sceptics mentioned before don’t have anything better to offer. They just 
don’t give answers. Moreover: it is not unlikely that we will always be 
bound to start with some sort of belief when we are looking for answers 
to questions and searching for solutions to problems. But he also offers 
a positive answer: reminding us that our most general and deep rooted 
beliefs usually have religious sources. And furthermore, that there is a 
widely spread religious belief — certainly not with all religious doctrines, 
but with some of them –, that, basically, all religions are the same, teach 
the same, promise the same. I was not surprised, therefore, to read that 
“the peak state of life” or “the final goal” is considered to be the same for 
all men whereas the approaches are different as are the names. Yi, Tian 
and Dao appear in one line with Allah and God (cf. Guo, op. cit., p. 39). 
These are different names for the one agenda setting focal point of all 
philosophical problems, doctrines, and promises.
This situation leads me to the last part of my presentation: 
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I I I . SEARCH  FOR  TRUTH
This part is twofold. The first part may be read as a historical question, 
comprising the whole history of Western philosophy: Why did Western 
philosophy not come to a rest with Stoic philosophy? Or reassure Stoic 
philosophy by deepening and broadening, by strengthening and defend-
ing its doctrines? Obviously, I cannot even enter the process of answer-
ing this question in a brief presentation like this. What I can do is to re-
mind you of the fact, that philosophy has developed ever since, and that 
it has developed by critical, sometimes even revolutionary steps. Again, 
I will not even try to outline possible reasons of this process, but I can 
and will recall its result: Philosophy in the Western world showed more 
and more reluctance to state philosophical (general and fundamental, so 
called “metaphysical”) truths. This means that in the long run, dogmatic 
thinking has had and will have no future in the field of philosophy. To 
be sure, new dogmatic concepts came up, again and again, but critique 
would follow immediately and sweep them away, or reduce them to what 
they could be: interesting suggestions to deal with specific (philosophi-
cal) problems we are confronted with here and now. People looking from 
outside have called this philosophical attitude “nihilism”. In my view 
it is the factual result of a long philosophical tradition, a tradition of 
self-conscious metaphysical experience. This experience led Nietzsche 
to observe: Dogmatism “wird bei einem Philosophen heute ein Lächeln 
und zwei Fragezeichen bereit finden” (… today will evoke a smile and two 
question marks). (Fr. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 16., KSA 5, 30)
So my last question which may also sum up the previous brief re-
marks on the presentation of Daoic philosophy, is simply asking: By 
which authority the author of dogmatic statements is putting forward 
his doctrines, whichever they may be? I will briefly consider three pos-
sible candidates: 
1. By the authority of god. (Guo certainly does not.)
2. By the authority of the natural light of reason. (Guo would prob-
ably deny this, too, because it might be too close to “Western” 
rationalism.)
3. By the authority of Chinese traditions. (Sometimes this seems 
to be the case. The author would then face the same problems 
Thomas faced and discussed when he was compiling his Summa 
contra gentiles.) 
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If I understand the message of the paper adequately, we are told to accept 
the following answer to the above question: The author’s starting point 
is a critical assessment of the present situation of mankind: No doubt 
(for him), we are confronted with a “crisis of humanity and Philosophy”. 
This statement is not a thesis to be tested, but to be taken and accepted 
as a fact. Daoic philosophy is presented as a remedy for such a situation. 
Taken in this function, it reminds us, first of all, that “in any reason-
able [sic!] philosophical system [why system?], a theory of value should 
occupy the dominant and central position, and a theory of knowledge a 
subordinate position.” (Guo, op. cit., p. 16) Then a traditional Chinese 
doctrine of values is presented. The theoretical framework as well as the 
ethical doctrines are comprehensible, honorable and interesting, they 
surely deserve further investigation. But their epistemic status is not 
clear. They are certainly far from what I’m used to call “metaphysical 
foundation” of anything. 
Let me conclude with a remark and two further questions to the 
proposals of the Daoic therapy presented in the paper:
(1) Why call on the Big Bang Theory for the purpose of philoso-
phy? Neither Confucius nor Mencius etc. had any idea of it (there is no 
mathematics in their cosmology). Even if there were significant analogies 
between both sides, it would not help much. Astronomers are not the 
philosophers of our days. As scientists they have no more authority in 
philosophical questions than any other well educated citizen. Their opin-
ions may be interesting and should be discussed as such, but they cannot 
claim any privilege in philosophicis. So it seems better to forget about it.
(2) Values and virtues seem to be the main topics. Who is authorized 
to define the virtues and set the values? For whom? And what will hap-
pen to those who do not accept the proposed values?
So my major question can be summed up like this:
(3) By which authority we are told the Daoic narrative? Are we to 
believe it? And if so, why are we to believe it? — I see no answer.
These questions were addressed not to “Chinese thinking” in general, 
but to “Daoic philosophy” as presented in the paper we are discussing. 
Fortunately there are many other voices from the vast ocean of ancient 
(and modern!) Chinese thinking. I am still waiting for a skillful inter-
preter.

RALPH  WEBER  ( ZUR ICH) 
MAKING THE IMPLICIT EXPLICIT
An Analysis of Some  Comparative 
Claims in Guo Yi’s Discussion of 
 Chinese and Western Philosophy
It is metaphysics in a traditional sense of the term that Guo Yi in his 
essay on ‘Daoic philosophy’ seeks to engage in. Against all talk of an end 
of metaphysics, Guo self-consciously embraces the traditional sense of 
the term as prôtê philosophia, interpreting the path of metaphysics since 
the beginning of the 20th century in Western philosophy and, under its 
influence, also in Chinese philosophy as a dead end not only for meta-
physics, but for philosophy more generally. He thus takes a firm stand in 
that debate and at the same time joins the many voices currently debat-
ing the role of Chinese philosophy in the contemporary world. 
With a view to Guo’s scholarly biography, the essay by no means can 
be said to reflect a more recent interest of his but is variously linked to 
his in-depth studies on questions of authorship and textual chronology 
of pre-Qin texts culminating in his 850 page monograph on the Guo-
dian 郭店 bamboo texts.1 Perhaps, it is fair to say that he has recently 
taken up more explicitly than in his earlier work questions regarding the 
present and future of Confucianism in China and the rise of Chinese 
1 Cf. Guo Yi 郭沂, Guodian zhujian yu xian Qin xueshu sixiang 
郭店竹简与先秦学术思想, Shanghai: Shanghai Shiji Chubanshe, 2001. For 
reviews in English, see the one by Masayuki Sato in China Review Interna-
tional 9 (2), 2002: 427–433 and the one by Martin Lu in Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 31 (2), 2004: 297–301.
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philosophy.2 Still, the ambition to offer a reconstructed Chinese philoso-
phy has been manifest throughout all of his writings. 
In his essay on ‘Daoic philosophy’, he continues his reconstructive 
efforts by setting forth a metaphysical system based on traditional Chi-
nese philosophy to work towards a future “world philosophy” (p. 16), 
which he claims is much needed in our modern times. His project is 
indeed ambitious and far-reaching, and it should be clear that both its 
ambition and scope exceed by far the limited possibilities of an essay. 
Much of what Guo writes requires further detail, or illustration, or argu-
ment — or all three. I hence take it that Guo’s essay on ‘Daoic philosophy’ 
is to be understood as exploratory and speculative. 
My response to Guo’s essay is structured in three parts. First, I of-
fer a summary of the text in terms of what I take to be its central and 
systematic part, i. e. his reconstruction of Chinese philosophy. This will, 
for one thing, expose my understanding, but — more importantly — it will 
also help to identify where I might misunderstand. Second, I highlight 
the comparative setting in which Guo’s reconstructive effort is embed-
ded and subsequently engage in a familiar scholarly exercise by analys-
ing that setting for implicit presuppositions as well as for unconvincing 
claims. Finally, this leads me to outline the problem to the solution of 
which he seeks to contribute and to raise a specific challenge to Guo’s 
project as it currently stands. I advocate a more explicit manner of pur-
suing comparative philosophy, i. e. in the few cases in which such an 
approach recommends itself at all, because in the great majority of cases 
no comparative approach in terms of Chinese versus Western philosophy 
is required or indeed recommendable. Guo’s project, I shall hold, is a 
case in point.
I . ‘DAO IC  PH I LOSOPHY ’ :  METAPHYS ICAL  AND  MORAL
Guo presents his reconstruction of Chinese philosophy as ‘Daoic phi-
losophy’ (道哲学). ‘Daoic’ is a neologism that he deploys to highlight the 
importance of dao 道 as a metaphysical concept on the basis of which 
philosophy and metaphysics are to be constructed. He distinguishes 
2 Cf. Guo Yi, “Zhongguo zhexue de dangdai jiangou 中国哲学的当代建构” 
in Hebei Xuebao 4/5, 2009; Guo Yi, “Ruxue gaixin jiazhi guan lishi yanbian 
he xiandai jiazhi 儒学核心价值观历史演变和现代价值” in Zhejiang Xuebao 
6, 2010.
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the term ‘Daoic’ from the term ‘Daoist’ (道家) and hence from Daoism, 
which is usually in philosophical contexts more restrictively associated 
with the Laozi 老子, Zhuangzi 庄子, Liezi 列子 etc., but also from Confu-
cianism, because ‘Daoic’, as he explains, captures a sense “beyond the 
ideas of Dao in both Daoism and Confucianism” (p. 22). Guo largely 
abstains from giving a translation of dao 道, but turns it into a loan 
word capitalised as Dao.3 By referring to Dao, Guo does not in the first 
instance refer to the prominence that the term dao boasts in many of the 
texts of Chinese philosophy, but he rather refers to a kind of insight or 
wisdom that is reflected in that prominence. And it is on the basis of this 
insight that he sets out to construct his philosophy.
He begins with a section on the sphere of Dao (“Where We Come 
from”) and identifies three models in ancient Chinese philosophical cos-
mology, respectively based on the Guodian version of the Laozi, the 
received version of the Laozi (which, Guo thinks, was later than the 
Guodian version), and the Xici 系辞 (which Guo ascribes to the late Con-
fucius). This serves to emphasise the vitality of philosophical cosmology 
in ancient China and its ontological dimension, which together points 
to its metaphysical basis in Dao. Guo has much to say on Dao and its 
composition: relying on the words of ancient texts, he explicates that it 
stands for “the origin of the universe and the root of the world” (p. 22), 
it points to a sphere that constitutes “a transcendent and absolute world” 
(p. 20), and it is “an absolute ‘great whole’ 大全, boundless, ceaseless, all-
embracing, without beginning or end” (p. 22).4 And adding to the ancient 
texts, Guo suggests that there are three “fundamental elements” forming 
the sphere of Dao, namely zhi 值 (the locus of value and meaning), li 理, 
and qi 气, and that they are distinguished in terms of their “properties” 
and also in their hierarchical position, zhi being the highest and qi the 
lowest element. He also points out “ten characteristics” (shide 十德) of 
Dao, giving priority to the characteristic of it being eternal (heng 恒).5 
With the help of this conceptual framework, Guo develops an explication 
3 Towards the end of his essay, Guo makes occasional use of “the Way” 
as translation of dao.
4 The reference of ‘great whole’ (daquan 大全) is to the Zhuangzi (Tian 
Zifang), where a dialogue between Laozi and Confucius is recorded ending 
in Confucius telling Yan Hui how Laozi helped him see the greatness of the 
world (孔子出, 以告顏回曰:“丘之於道也, 其猶醯雞與! 微夫子之發吾覆也, 
吾不知天地之大全也. ”). 
5 I cannot find the textual basis for the concrete list of ten characteristics 
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how the universe has come about (from wuji 无极 to taiji 太极), bring-
ing in further conceptual baggage (yin 阴, yang 阳, wuxing 五行, etc.) and 
dividing the Great Ulimate (taiji) into “original” and “secondary” (the 
latter amounting to xing 性, the nature of the myriad things, wanwu 万物). 
The bottom line of Guo’s explication is that the Great Ultimate and, by 
analogy, Dao both are by virtue of being the source of everything “tran-
scendent and a priori” and at the same time by virtue of running through 
all things “internal and experiential”.6 
Turning to the sphere of xing (“Who We are”) and drawing e. g. on 
the Xunzi 荀子, Mengzi 孟子, more Confucius as well as Zhu Xi 朱熹 and 
Wang Yangming 王陽明, Guo continues to draw up a differentiated meta-
physics. He distinguishes between “the reason-nature of value” (zhili 
xing 值理性) and “the reason-nature of matter” (qili xing 气理性), whereby 
he claims that only humans have “the reason-nature of value” given their 
exclusive “awareness of justice” (p. 30) and ability of “self-realization” 
(p. 30). From among the initially distinguished elements, qi turns out to 
be decisive in the nature of all things, while only some things in addi-
tion to qi possess li and zhi. When considering the question whether all 
things called humans do share the same nature, Guo claims that again 
qi is what accounts for differences in endowed reason-nature and value-
nature. Yet still, everyone has “the possibility of doing good or bad” 
(p. 33). What road eventually is taken basically depends on “cultivation 
and education” (p. 33) rather than initial endowment. In an interesting 
twist, Guo sets aside one of the most established distinctions with regard 
to Song-Ming Confucianism, namely the opposition between the Cheng-
Zhu (程柱学派) and the Lu-Wang (陆王学派) lines, claiming that xin 心, 
xing 性 and li 理 “are the same thing” (p. 34). 
that Guo offers, but it seems that the expression shide appears in a variety 
of contexts including different characteristics.
6 It remains to be explained how exactly one can have knowledge about 
Dao e. g. in terms of its constituting elements (why tree parts, why not 
four parts?) if, as is claimed, it constitutes a “transcendent and absolute 
world”. Guo seems to argue that knowledge is possible because Dao also 
is “internal” and “experiential”, but that possibility is at least to some ex-
tent undermined by the very distinction that Guo draws himself between 
Daoti 道体 and xingti 性体, which is a metaphysically relevant distinction. 
Any knowledge about Daoti could only be claimed from the standpoint of 
xingti, which is, as Guo points out repetitively, a limited standpoint.
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Having thus arrived at the notion of xin 心 (“What We can Do”), Guo 
again engages in further differentiation, this time distinguishing “three 
basic functions” (p. 35) of xin, namely knowing (zhi 知, comprising the 
“three forms” of renzhi 认知, cognition, ganzhi 感知, sense perception, 
and juezhi 觉知, illumination), emotion (qing 情, comprising the “three 
levels” of natural compassion and mercy, desire, and feeling), and inten-
tion (yi 意, comprising the “four connotations” of consciousness of the 
mind, commander of the mind, direction of the mind, and condition 
of the mind).7 Of particular importance is juezhi, which “is the way to 
know the world of zhi (the world of value), and the way to get the value 
of the universe and the meaning of life” (p. 35) and as “performer of 
the experience of life” denotes the “life state” of “value-life” (p. 39). But 
to have appropriate “direction and extent”, it like all other functions of 
the mind requires right intention, which is hence singled out by Guo as 
“commander” (p. 38) of the other two functions of knowing and emotion. 
Determining the goal and meaning of each thing to be the full develop-
ment of its nature, Guo analogises by claiming that the aim of illumina-
tion is to help realize “one’s value-nature” (p. 40), and it is here where 
the essay reaches a culminating point in terms of its metaphysical and 
philosophical construction: 
“The highest aim of illumination is to achieve the original state of 
the world of value, that is, being with the eternal value in the state 
of Non-ultimate of Dao, and being compatible with it, and thereby 
fully realizing ‘the ten characteristics’ of Dao, attaining the greatest 
freedom, ease, happiness, satisfaction and peace in life. This is the 
peak state or peak experience of life. It can be said to embody life’s 
final meaning, to reach man’s true spiritual homeland. Thus, the 
endless pursuit of illumination is an unending process of spiritual 
liberation.” (p. 40)
From among five approaches to reach that peak state, Guo considers the 
approach of “realization of the mind” as leading to an “immediate and 
thorough understanding and insight of Dao” and as the one favoured by 
7 Guo uses a variety of terms in his differentiations and it is unclear how 
they relate, both vertically and horizontally. How do “functions” (gong-
neng 功能) relate to “forms” (xingshi 形式), “levels” (cengmian 层面) and 
“connotations” (yi 义)? And are the latter to be understood as synonyms, as 
“the diagram of substance and function” (p. 46) seems to suggest?
208
both “Chinese” and “Indian civilization”, whereas “Western” and “Islam-
ic civilization” prefers another approach relying on the aid of “the gods”. 
In the course of his essay, Guo takes up ever more explicitly the 
normative implications of his metaphysics (“How We should Do”). His 
reconstruction hence ends with a further analogizing differentiation with 
regard to “culture” and “cultural phenomena” and the identification of 
an 安 as the “final value”, for which he gives a whole cluster of mean-
ing from “quiet” to “happy” and “harmonious” (p. 43). An, or “spiritual 
quietness”, is in Guo’s view “a firm belief ” and “the norm of conduct in 
civilizations”. It is higher than “the three basic value categories” of “the 
true, the good and the beautiful” and than other general values (ethi-
cal, social, political, etc.) that “do not involve the final meaning of life” 
(p. 44). Thus, an emerges as the “final value” in Guo’s reconstruction of 
Chinese philosophy.
I I . AN  ANALYS IS  OF  PRESUPPOS I T IONS  AND  COMPARAT I VE  CLA IMS
As with the five approaches leading to the peak state of realised an, Guo 
embeds his metaphysics in a comparative setting, in his introduction 
and in the concluding paragraphs, but also every so often in his central 
reconstructive parts on Chinese philosophy. In what follows, this com-
parative setting will be explored and some crucial parts analysed. The 
manner of analysis forthwith employed relies on a simple procedure, 
which demands that all commonalities that an author asserts, say, by 
virtue of speaking in the plural or by postulating oppositions are taken 
seriously. Are the claims that come with such asserted commonalities 
stated implicitly or explicitly and are they substantiated by argument or 
qualified by a cautionary remark about their presuppositional nature or 
put forward unconsciously and thus not really asserted? 
In any comparative setting, there are different comparata denoting 
what it is that is under comparison. In Guo’s essay, there are two differ-
ent sets of comparata. One is the opposition between tradition and mo-
dernity — “traditional philosophies and modernity” (p. 15), “traditional 
society” and “contemporary society” (pp. 47–48) — and the other is a set 
with particular emphasis on two comparata among several. In the intro-
duction, the guiding opposition is between what is “Western” and what 
“Chinese”, whereas towards the end, as mentioned above, Guo refers to 
“Chinese”, “Indian”, “Western” and “Islamic”. But these comparata are 
different in virtue of one or several commonalities, which are asserted in 
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notions such as “Chinese and Western philosophies” (p. 15), “in Western 
culture” (p. 13), “traditional Western metaphysics” (p. 17) and “traditional 
Chinese metaphysics” (p. 18), and “different civilizations” (p. 46). Each 
of these assertions amounts to a claim, which can be of very different 
status. For example, talk of civilization here and there could mean to 
posit an ontological claim (that there is such a thing as “civilization”) or 
perhaps a heuristic claim (that for reasons other than claiming existence 
it might be useful to speak of “civilization”), together with the additional 
claim that the differentiating adjectives “Western” and “Chinese” are the 
ontologically or heuristically appropriate ones. 
Obviously, this mapping of the comparative setting could be contin-
ued for a long time and include claims asserted in manifold ascriptions 
to the above notions, such as when Chinese philosophy and Western 
philosophy are both related to a “theory of knowledge” and to “a theory 
of value” (p. 16), and so forth. This might well include the single use of 
some specific words, which — in the case of Guo’s essay being a trans-
lated and shortened version of a Chinese essay — would turn attention to 
comparative claims raised by decisions of translation. Guo, for instance, 
in one passage uses “thing-in-itself ” to qualify the three components of 
Dao. In the Chinese version, it is of course not the case that there is e. g. 
wuziti 物自体, a common translation for the Kantian notion, but what we 
find are two expressions, zizai 自在 and sanzai 散在, which evoke quite 
different associations. The former, zizai (“free, unrestrained”) has roots 
in texts such as the Hanshu 汉书 or in the Tang-dynasty Confucian Han 
Yu’s Changliji 昌黎集, but also in Buddhist texts such as the Lotus Sutra 
(Fahuajing 法华经) or in Bai Juyi’s poetry. The point is that Guo’s use 
of “thing-in-itself ” opens up an entire world of comparative issues and 
claims. Further exhausting such an analysis, one would probably un-
cover a huge map of claims. Up to which point such an analysis proves 
useful, is itself questionable, but it should be clear enough that the main 
comparative claims of a text have to be open for such scrutiny. And it is 
to these claims that I wish to return now. 
As pointed out above, Guo does not specify how exactly notions such 
as “philosophies” (zhexue 哲学), “cultures” (wenhua 文化) and “civiliza-
tions” (wenming 文明) hang together. Does every civilization have one 
culture and one corresponding philosophy? Guo seems to defend in his 
essay some form of a positive answer to this question. Choosing the 
comparative setting that he does and thus opposing “Western philoso-
phy” and “Chinese philosophy”, he certainly needs a robust sense of 
each of these expressions, which he establishes by presenting a unified 
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conception. Whatever frictions and oppositions could possibly threaten 
that unified conception of “Chinese philosophy”, in Guo’s essay all of 
them are quickly dispersed. There are no real frictions; often what has 
appeared to others as contrary in Guo’s assessment turns out really to be 
merely “definitions of the same thing from different sides” (p. 28), where-
by sameness is emphasized to an extent that makes all difference vanish.
These unifying efforts are evident when Guo runs together, say, the 
Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang lines of Song-Ming Confucianism by assert-
ing that “xin, xing and li are the same thing” (p. 34). Mind the claim 
here is not that they are “the same thing” in this or that regard; they are 
“the same thing” tout court. Similar efforts are at play when Guo likens 
the metaphysical positions of Daoism and Confucianism, which works 
only by a series of claims: that Confucius studied the Yijing 易经 in his 
mature years, that the Analects (Lunyu 论语) and related documents such 
as the Xiaojing 孝经 record the authentic words of Confucius and, most 
importantly, that Confucius is the author of the Xici, which then func-
tions as something like the missing metaphysical link. Inversely, Guo 
contends that Lao Dan, his presumed author of the Guodian Laozi, did 
also embrace ren 仁, yi 义, xiao 孝, ci 慈, li 礼 (which are usually taken to be 
as ‘Confucian’ as it gets) and that the Zhuangzi draws on Lao Dan and 
Confucius alike when incorporating dao and tian 天 in its metaphysics.8 
Finally, when Guo introduces three different ancient Chinese cos-
mological models, they again turn out to be not so different, but are 
unified by holding “that the universe comes from an original point and 
undergoes a process of development or expansion” (p. 21). In this pas-
sage, where the three cosmological models are not only likened to each 
other, but also to the Big Bang Theory, the level of abstraction on which 
Guo operates finally is in the open. For the commonality which under-
lies this comparative claim relies on considerable abstraction. How else 
could one argue that the sense, say, of “expansion” in the “philosophical 
cosmology in ancient China” and in Big Bang Theory is “similar” (p. 19), 
and at it “similar” in a substantial sense and not at all merely as the result 
of “coincidence” or “forced interpretation” (p. 21)? 
As Guo’s unified conception of Chinese philosophy is abstract 
enough to subsume all difference that could possibly be invoked on tex-
tual grounds, so is his metaphysical system abstract enough to subsume 
major differences across “civilizations” on normative grounds. When 
8 Cf. Martin Lu, 2004, 299–300.
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speaking of Dao, Guo claims that “we can induce an a priori world from 
the empirical world, as well as infer the empirical world from the a priori 
world” and points out that “on this issue, the Western tradition main-
tains the opposite view” (p. 37). Opposite views such as this, which 
seems to demarcate a rather far-reaching difference in terms of meta-
physics, are again later levelled by a leap of an all-subsuming abstraction, 
when Guo explains that “various transcendental concepts” such as tian 
or dao (both subsumable under Dao) and the Christian God (which Guo 
at several instances takes as central to ‘Western tradition’) are “all the 
realization of the sphere of Dao from different standpoints and angles by 
different civilizations” (p. 46). 
Yet other unifying efforts are more implicitly carried out by changes 
in a matrix which involves both mentioned comparative settings, i. e. 
the one of tradition and modernity and the one of Western and Chinese 
philosophy. Guo begins his essay with a statement qualifying “moderni-
ty” as “rational” and “traditional philosophies” as “more value-oriented” 
(p. 15). “Traditional philosophies”, “Western philosophy” and “Chinese 
philosophy” in Guo’s view share “key issues”, although he finds a differ-
ence regarding the interest in “knowledge of natural science”, which is 
almost completely absent in “traditional Chinese philosophy”. With the 
advent of modernity, “Western philosophy” has embraced “instrumental 
rationality” and turned all attention to the world of knowledge to the 
complete neglect of the world of value. The matrix that Guo draws up 
may be visualized as follows:
Chinese philosophy Western philosophy
traditional theory of value
no theory of knowledge
theory of value
theory of knowledge
modern ? theory of knowledge
no theory of value
future world philosophy = ‘Daoic’ philosophy
Guo is hence very explicit about the deficiency of “modern Western phi-
losophy”, but there is nothing explicit about “modern Chinese philoso-
phy”. When he states that “the major flaw of Western philosophy is the 
breakdown of its theory of value”, then the word “breakdown” makes it 
clear that the statement identifies the difference between “traditional” 
and “modern Western philosophy”, but when he claims that “the major 
flaw of Chinese philosophy is the absence of a theory of knowledge”, 
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it is unclear whether the statement relates to “traditional Chinese phi-
losophy” only or also to “modern Chinese philosophy”. Modernity, Guo 
asserts, has altered both Western and Chinese philosophy as both have 
“suffered under the impact of modernization and capitalism” (p. 15). The 
only change that Guo explicitly notes with regard to what he must take to 
be “modern Chinese philosophy” is that due to the influence of “Western 
philosophy … Chinese metaphysics was discarded” (p. 18), but it is un-
clear what that means in terms of theories of knowledge and value. Given 
that Guo continues by pointing out that it is now time “to reconsider 
traditional Chinese metaphysics”, one might even speculate whether or 
not for him there is such a thing as “modern Chinese philosophy”. 
Be that as it may, Guo is explicit about where to look for a future 
“world philosophy”. “Traditional Chinese metaphysics”, he writes, has 
“none of the aforementioned drawbacks of Western philosophy” (he 
must mean “modern Western philosophy”) and moreover “could rectify 
these drawbacks” (he could mean the drawbacks of “modern Western 
philosophy” in “Chinese philosophy” or in “modern philosophy” more 
generally). It is a paradoxical situation that results from Guo’s charac-
terizations of traditional and modern Western and Chinese philosophies. 
For (modern) “Western philosophy” the task is to “reconstruct its theory 
of value to govern its theory of knowledge”, Guo writes, which hence 
seems to be a task completely internal to “Western philosophy” and in no 
need of ‘Daoic philosophy’ as constructed from ‘Chinese philosophy’. For 
“Chinese philosophy”, the task is “to construct a theory of knowledge to 
support its theory of value”, which seems to say that such a construction 
should proceed on the basis of traditional Chinese philosophy (which is 
what Guo sets out to do). 
Although he agrees that modernity cuts across civilizations, he stays 
in these passages firmly committed to an approach that upholds civili-
zational differences in the sense that there is “Chinese philosophy” here 
and “Western philosophy” there. Meanwhile, speaking of “tasks”, Guo 
is already operating on a normative level, which is also what he does at 
the end of the essay when drawing out normative implications of Daoic 
philosophy with a view to different civilizations. There, however, the 
salient point seems to be that Daoic philosophy transcends all civiliza-
tional differences. Although “Western philosophy” could simply engage 
in reconstruction of its theory of value, Guo seems to suggest that it 
would thus only reconstruct an approach to “the peak state of life” that 
is inferior to the “Chinese” (and “Indian”) approach based on the “real-
ization of the mind itself ”, which involves “the immediate and thorough 
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understanding and insight of Dao” (p. 40). In a normative perspective, 
‘Daoic philosophy’ is what any civilization eventually should embrace.
In sum, Guo’s reconstruction of Chinese philosophy relies on a se-
ries of comparative claims, most importantly on a unified conception 
of ‘Chinese philosophy’ (and, as could be shown, equally and no less 
problematically of ‘Western philosophy’), which works only on a level of 
abstractness that overrides all claims of internal difference. Yet, Guo’s 
use of a highly abstract and unified conception of ‘Chinese philosophy’ 
might find its justification in the purpose for which he uses it. In other 
words, the purpose of reconstructing Chinese philosophy might justify 
what to my mind are rather shaky comparative claims, for the reconstruc-
tion might not primarily be about the claims but about something else.
I I I . CONCLUS IONS :  WHY  DRAW ON  A  COMPARAT I VE  SET T ING?
Guo sketches the problem to the solution of which his ‘Daoic philosophy’ 
means to contribute in terms of a derailed rationalistic modernity. Mod-
ernization and capitalism have led to a world of “previously unknown 
material pleasures” at the cost of environmental pollution, civilizational 
clashes, a gap between rich and poor (pinfu xuanshu 贫富悬殊), alienated 
science and technology (keji yihua 科技异化), threat of nuclear warheads 
(hedan weixie 核弹威胁), excess of material desire (wuyu hengliu 物欲横流), 
loss of spirit (jingshen chenlun 精神沉沦) and decline of value (p. 16).9 
There is a major “crisis of humanity and philosophy” (p. 16), which in 
Guo’s view boils down not only to a decline, but to a “crisis of value” 
(p. 14). What is needed is “a new philosophical system that places its the-
ory of value in the lead role and its theory of knowledge in a supporting 
role”; only thus can a “spiritual home” be rebuilt for humanity (pp. 16–
17). To offer such a “new philosophical system” in order to fill the great 
void of value in modernity is the purpose of Guo’s ‘Daoic philosophy’. 
To conclude, let me raise one specific challenge regarding the com-
parative setting into which Guo embeds his ‘Daoic philosophy’. As an 
aside, I should mention that I have a number of reservations about other 
parts of Guo’s project, for instance, about his depiction of science, de-
mocracy, and the contemporary state of affairs generally, and about the 
9 In this list, I draw on both the English and the Chinese version of Guo’s 
essay. The Chinese expressions in brackets make it clear which is taken 
from which version. 
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promises he sees in a return to traditional metaphysics. But, as I have 
not engaged in analysis of these parts, I therefore abstain from comment-
ing upon them any further. My main concern is with the comparative 
setting of Guo’s discussion of Chinese and Western philosophy. What 
is the function of the comparative setting for Guo’s ‘Daoic philosophy’? 
Does his ‘Daoic philosophy’ in some sense require that setting or could 
it do without it? In my opinion, if I may put it polemically, it could and 
also should do without it.
For one thing, there seems to be a tension between the goal of es-
tablishing a ‘world philosophy’ and calling the philosophy proposed to 
do the job ‘Daoic’. Guo clearly states that other, i. e. non-Chinese, “value 
systems in the world have also developed their own Dao” (p. 45), but he 
is as clear, as I have already mentioned, that the approach favoured by 
Chinese (and Indian) civilization is in some sense superior to the ones 
relying on the aid of the gods. It seems that Western civilization is able 
almost fully to grasp Dao (by way of the “knowing ability of the life of 
mind”) — almost, but not quite. If this is what Guo suggests, then we are 
faced with an irony since the other term in the expression ‘Daoic philos-
ophy’, that is ‘philosophy’, has been used for long along similar lines, as 
denoting something which ‘Chinese civilization’ also might have — might 
have, but not quite. I do not think that any future ‘world philosophy’ 
should rely on assertions of this kind, which establish a philosophical 
ranking among civilizations.
If ‘Daoic philosophy’ is to be a persuasive new philosophy fit for 
the ambitious task that Guo wants it to do, then it should not rely on a 
comparative setting in terms of Chinese and Western philosophy which 
unavoidably ties philosophical points to differentiations such as “Chi-
nese” vs. “Western”. That differentiation, to my mind, is not required 
and philosophically dubious. Mind that Guo does not speak of “Chinese 
philosophy” as a textual tradition, even if he writes that he sets out to 
reconstruct metaphysics “following traditional Chinese metaphysics”, 
which might give the impression that he might mean some part of the 
textual tradition. His reliance on a unified conception shows that he 
does not. Also, towards the end of the essay, in what might be a slip of 
the tongue, Guo suddenly speaks of “the belief of most Chinese” (p. 46). 
But how do the “Chinese” and their “belief ” on the one hand and Chi-
nese philosophy on the other hand hang together? My contention is that 
Guo’s ‘Daoic philosophy’ in terms of its philosophical import does not 
require making the comparative claim of philosophical difference that 
comes with the difference between “Chinese” and “Western”. 
R ICHARD  N . S T ICHLER  (READ ING)
HUMAN NATURE AND CULTURES OF WAR
Those who have cultural business must have mili-
tary preparations.
Confucius
The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, 
must divide. Thus it has ever been.
Luo Guanzhong, The Romance of the Three Kingdoms
 
INTRODUCT ION
The return of China to its former status as a leading power among the 
world’s civilizations has many people today thinking and speculating 
about the potential for future conflict between China and the West. In 
the past, rapid shifts in the balance of power have often resulted in wars 
between the established hegemon and the rising power. As China’s de-
mand for and control over the earth’s resources continues to grow, its 
interests will increasingly clash with those of the West thus setting the 
stage for the possibility of armed conflict. In the United States there is 
already a swelling tide of resentment toward China. As economic con-
ditions in the United States continue to decline, China is increasingly 
seen as the culprit, and China’s rapid advances in the field of military 
technology are viewed with increasing alarm. A war between China and 
the United States would truly be a most catastrophic crisis of civiliza-
tion. But given the current trajectories of the two nations, how can such 
a catastrophe be averted? 
Guo Yi sees the contemporary “clash of civilizations” as rooted 
in a decline of human values due to the rise of a culture of material- 
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ism.1 By focusing on the satisfaction of our physical needs and desires, 
he argues, we have allowed the inferior to injure the superior part of 
our nature. He calls for a revival of a neo-Confucian metaphysics and 
theory of value as a foundation on which to build a more humane cul-
ture, a culture that would be based on universal human values rather 
than ethnocentric values tied to the narrow and exclusive interests of 
material needs. With peace as the supreme value, conflict among the 
diverse cultures of the world could be harmonized and secure conditions 
established for all to live better, more humane lives.
Attractive as this prospect may sound, neo-Confucianism pacifism 
does not seem particularly well suited to providing practical solutions 
to contemporary problems arising from the conflict of cultures. The 
growth of capitalism and materialism may foster greed, decadence, and 
increased conflict among nations, but a more likely and practicable solu-
tion to the problem for both China and the rest of the world, would seem 
to lie elsewhere. In the past neo-Confucian pacifism and distain for the 
military led to serious problems for Chinese civilization, leaving China 
unprepared to cope with the threat of invasion by northern and western 
nomadic tribes. First invaded and conquered by Mongol and later by 
Manchurian warlords, China was humiliated and thoroughly devastated 
in the 19th and 20th centuries when it was partitioned and colonized by the 
West and then invaded and occupied by Japan. Having finally emerged 
from this dreadful experience, it is highly unlikely that China’s leaders 
will revert to the neo-Confucian pacifism of the past. 
In contemporary China there is an intense and growing interest in 
the ancient and long neglected military classics, which as Ralph Sawyer 
observes, are today playing an important role in the PRC’s effort to create 
a “contemporary military science with unique Chinese characteristics.” 
PRC think tanks, Sawyer reports, “are examining every passage for con-
cepts and tactical principles that can be adapted to the contemporary 
battlefield so as to ensure that China’s comparatively deficient armed 
forces will, through unexpected and unorthodox measures, be able to 
wrest a localized advantage and prevail”.2 As the earliest records of his-
tory indicate, war and its attendant military culture have long been an 
1 Guo, Yi. Metaphysics, Nature and Mind: The Main Idea of Daoic Philosophy, 
in this volume.
2 Sawyer, Ralph. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. Basic Books, 
New York: 1993, x.
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inseparable part of civilization, and, human nature being what it is, it is 
unlikely that warfare can ever be completely abolished from human life. 
Recognizing the inescapable necessity of war, the ancient Chinese mili-
tary classics seek to strategically limit war’s damage while protecting and 
advancing the values of civilized life. Thus, the reflections they contain 
on human nature and the perpetual problems of war are as relevant today 
as they were for times in which they were written. 
WAR  AS  A  COSMIC  NECESS I TY  IN  ANC IENT  C I V I L I ZAT IONS
Warrior-elites first established and ruled the civilizations of the ancient 
world, and the military has ever since played an enduring and vital role 
in shaping the values, institutional structures, and habits of thought of 
both Eastern and Western civilizations. Throughout its long history, the 
civil and military spheres of Chinese cultural life, Wen and Wu, have 
been viewed as interdependent forces of nature, much like Yin and Yang, 
constantly pushing and pulling the empire in opposite directions. As 
stated in the opening and closing lines of The Romance of the Three King-
doms, the empire perpetually divides and then again unites. Enmeshed 
in the eternal cosmic tension between Wen and Wu, humans perpetually 
seek a stable equilibrium. 
In the early myths of India and Greece we find a similar view of the 
cosmic forces that govern both nature and human nature. Within the 
Hindu trinity that rules the cosmos, Brahman creates new forms of life, 
Vishnu protects and preserves the established order, and Shiva, the war-
god, destroys the old forms of life, preparing the way for a new creation. 
In this eternal cycle of creation and destruction, the cosmos grows old, 
loses its vitality, is swept away, and upon the ashes of its destruction a 
new world is born. In the words of the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore: 
“From the heart of all matter 
Comes the anguished cry – 
‘Wake, wake, great Shiva, 
Our body grows weary 
Of its law-fixed path, 
Give us new form. 
Sing our destruction, 
That we gain new life…”
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In Homer too, war is a cosmic necessity, and the destruction of human 
life which it entails is unavoidable. Throughout the Iliad war is con-
stantly compared with the destructive forces of nature. Similar views of 
the necessity of war are also found in the early Greek philosophers. For 
Heraclitus, war is the logos that governs the creation and destruction of 
all things. “Fire,” he said, “lives the death of earth, and air lives the death 
of fire; water lives the death of air, earth that of water.” The cosmos is a 
constant process of the creation and destruction of life-forms, and war 
is the agent that moves the process. Thus, he states: “It is necessary to 
understand that war is universal and justice is strife, and that all things 
take place in accordance with strife and necessity” (DK 22 B80).3 With-
out war and constant strife, Heraclitus asserted, the world order could 
not exist. Empedocles modified the Heraclitean world-view and held that 
two opposing forces of nature, love and strife, rule the universe, uniting 
and separating the elemental substances.
The idea of war as cosmic necessity has played a predominant role 
in shaping the cultures and values of the ancient world. To understand 
the cosmos was to understand how to live in accordance with its natu-
ral laws. Philosophers, poets, and priests sought practical wisdom in 
observing and understanding the natural rhythms of the cosmos and in 
establishing human laws in accordance with the divine laws of nature. 
As the human analog of nature’s destructive forces, it was thought that 
war could not be eliminated but at best only be managed and controlled 
so as to minimize destruction and harm to human life. War may produce 
the most vicious and inhuman savagery, but it can also bring forth the 
heroic virtues in defense of civilization. Thus, among the virtues of civi-
lized life were included those essential military skills and capacities for 
conducting the art of war. Courage, loyalty, and obedience are just a few 
of the indispensible virtues that war and conflict were held to engender.
Crises of civilizations often arise from either of two opposite ex-
tremes, uncontrolled violence and war-lust or indolence and the torpor of 
cultural lethargy. War, considered as an antidote to cultural lethargy and 
stagnation, has thus been acclaimed as being not merely a necessary evil 
but as actually having positive value in itself. On such grounds Hegel ob-
jected to Kant’s proposals for perpetual peace, saying that war “preserves 
the ethical health of peoples … just as the blowing of the winds preserves 
3 Diels, Hermann. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und Deutsch. 
Walther Kranz Publisher: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. Berlin: 1903.
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the sea from stagnation which would be the result of a prolonged calm, 
so also stagnation in peoples would be the result of a prolonged, let alone, 
perpetual peace” (Hegel, 306–7).4 He went on to add: “As a result of war, 
peoples are strengthened, but nations involved in civil strife make peace 
at home through making wars abroad” (307–8). Even friendly families 
of nations, he held, need to create conflict and fight one another if only 
to strengthen their moral fiber (Hegel, 307).
Pacifist movements have continually risen up throughout history to 
challenge the militaristic world-view, generally arguing against its basic 
assumptions concerning the laws of nature and human nature. Bud-
dhism was the first great religious tradition to renounce all forms of 
violence and warfare. Though it accepted the traditional Hindu view of 
nature’s cyclical process of creation and destruction, Buddhism held that 
the human mind can overcome the natural desires that bind it to the con-
stant process of rebirth, death and suffering. In principle, this dualistic 
separation of the human mind from the natural laws that govern the cos-
mos allowed Buddhists to reject all forms of violence, though in practice 
they often made concessions to the necessity of war, finding it difficult 
to consistently apply the principle of non-violence in all circumstances. 
The dilemma confronting the Buddhist principle of non-violence 
is well illustrated by Thich Nhat Hanh’s claim that he would allow an 
aggressor to kill him rather than kill the aggressor in self-defense. Even 
if his death would bring the end of Buddhism as cultural institution, 
Hanh said he would allow Buddhism to perish rather than violate its 
principles. Such martyrdom may be an inspiring example of moral cour-
age; yet if all Buddhists had followed the same path, it seems unlikely 
that the religion would have survived to the present day.
In its most extreme form, pacifism rejects the concept of just war, 
holding that all warfare is unnecessary and evil. Less extreme forms of 
pacifism allow limited warfare in defense of a just cause. Moderate forms 
of pacifism typically hold that although war is in principle unnecessary 
and contrary to human nature, it may at times be unavoidable and thus 
justified as a means for achieving peace. War, on this view, arises not 
from nature and the natural tendencies of men but from the cultural 
conditions to which they are accustomed. Cultures of war, it is argued, 
nurture and glorify violence and war-like dispositions; thus, war arises 
4 Hegel, G. W. F. Outlines of the Philosophy of Right. T. M. Knox and Stephen 
Houlgate, trans. Oxford UP, Oxford: 2008.
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from contingent cultural conditions that can be modified and improved 
through education and by building cultures of peace. Warrior cultures 
are thought uncivilized and barbaric, and civilization is defined as a pro-
gressive historical process of peace-making, its ultimate goal being per-
petual peace among peoples and nations. Moderate pacifists thus view 
war as at best a necessary evil that is tolerable only to the extent that it 
contributes to the progress of civilization and world peace.
Even though the abolition of war may be desirable, Hobbesian real-
ists respond that in a world rife with conflict, individual nations need to 
be adequately prepared to protect their own interests against potentially 
hostile aggressors. Thus, policies that weaken the military and a nation’s 
ability to pursue and secure its self-interest are dismissed as impractical 
and utopian. Disarmament is rejected as source of weakness and cultural 
decay, or a lack of commitment to the values that sustain a nation’s 
culture and way of life. Moreover, insecurity and distrust among nations 
drives the incessant quest for ever greater military advantage. Hence, 
political realists consider military strength and preparedness for war an 
essential component of a culture’s ability to maintain its existence. Given 
the inherent conflict of human interests, peace-time is thus viewed as 
being for the most part a time of preparation for the next war. 
WILL I AM JAMES :  ON  PAC I F ISM AND  HUMAN NATURE 
In 1906 William James gave his last public lecture, The Moral Equivalent 
of War. James put forward a rather paradoxical defense of pacifism when 
he proposed fighting a “war against war.” His purpose in using this odd 
expression was to concede the point to the political realist that humans 
are by nature warlike, that the heroic fighting spirit is vital to civilization, 
and that it thus needs to be cultivated and maintained. But instead of 
expending our energies in fighting destructive wars, James proposed that 
we find more constructive battles to fight, battles that might contribute 
to the progress of civilization instead of its destruction.5
However, before going on to discuss the constructive battles to 
fought, James cautioned that the war against war “is going to be no holi-
day excursion,” for he says, we have inherited all of the pugnacity and 
5 James, William. The Moral Equivalent of War. http://www.constitution.
org/wj/meow.html (November 2012).
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love of glory of our ancestors. Thus, showing the horror and irrationality 
of war is no deterent, for the facination of war lies in its horror. Though 
our history is a bath of blood, says James, we relish the memories and 
stories of past wars as “a sacred spiritual possession worth more than 
all the blood poured out.” We look back on ancient Greece and Rome as 
the source of our cultural legacy, yet says James, “Greek history is a pan-
orama of jingoism and imperialism—war for war’s sake, all the citizen’s 
being warriors. It is horrible reading—because of the irrationality of it 
all.” The Trojan and Peloponnesian wars “were purely piratical. Pride, 
gold, women, slaves, excitement were their only motives.” The career 
of Alexander of the Great was “piracy pure and simple, nothing but an 
orgy of power and plunder, made romantic by the character of the hero. 
There was no rational purpose in it, and the moment [Alexander] died 
his generals and governors attacked one another. The cruelty of those 
times is incredible.” James goes on to describe Roman history in similar 
terms and  ends by saying:
“We inherit the warlike type; and for most of the capacities of hero-
ism that the human race is full of we have to thank this cruel histo-
ry. … Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, 
and thousands of years of peace won’t breed it out of us. The popular 
imagination fairly fattens on the thought of wars. Let public opinion 
once reach a certain fighting pitch, and no ruler can withstand it.”
But unlike our ancestors, said James, we moderns now prefer to conceal 
our barbaric motives behind a mask of civility, and while preparing for 
war, we talk incessantly of peace:
“Pure loot and mastery seem no longer morally allowable motives, 
and pretexts must be found for attributing them solely to the enemy. 
England and we, our army and navy authorities repeat without ceas-
ing, are solely for ‘peace.’ Germany and Japan it is who are bent on 
loot and glory. ‘Peace’ in military mouths today is a synonym for ‘war 
expected.’ The word has become a pure provocative, and no govern-
ment wishing peace sincerely should allow it ever to be printed in a 
newspaper. Every up-to-date dictionary should say that ‘peace’ and 
‘war’ mean the same thing … It may even reasonably be said that the 
intensely sharp preparation for war by the nations is the real war, 
permanent, unceasing; and that the battles are only a sort of public 
verification of the mastery gained during the ‘peace’-interval. ”
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Given our inherent warlike disposition and love of fighting, how then 
is human nature to be diverted to more constructive ends? If war is to 
be abolished, James asked, how shall we avoid falling into “a sheep’s 
paradise” and continue to maintain the vital military virtues of fidel-
ity, cohesiveness, tenacity, and heroism? It is no use to dwell on the 
horrors of war, he said. To persuade our opponent, we must enter into 
“the aesthetic and ethical point of view” of the warrior mind. We must 
acknowledge the values of the martial spirit but devise other constructive 
means to cultivate and develop it. Yet James’s proposal, in the light of our 
current environmental crisis, may well seem incredible, for he claimed 
that the spirit and values of the warrior culture could best be maintained 
by declaring a war against nature. James actually proposed that instead 
of compulsory military service, the youth of America should be required 
to serve for a prescribed number of years in an “army enlisted against 
nature.” 
“To coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in De-
cember, to dishwashing, clothes washing, and window washing, to 
road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and 
to the frames of skyscrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted 
off, according to their choice, to get the childishness knocked out of 
them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and 
soberer ideas. They would have paid their blood-tax, done their own 
part in the immemorial human warfare against nature; they would 
tread the earth more proudly … they would be better fathers and 
teachers of the following generation.”
In the following years, many American Presidents enthusiastically en-
dorsed James’s idea of fighting a war against nature. During the depres-
sion of the 1930’s, Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt began comparing 
the nation’s economic problems with the battles of the First World War, 
seeking to thus arouse the spirit of unity, cooperation and determination 
that the war had inspired in an effort to rebuild the nation’s economy. 
When Roosevelt later announced a public works program in 1933 to pro-
vide work for unemployed young men, he spoke of the spiritual values 
of the program as far outweighing its economic benefits. In 1961, under 
President Kennedy, the Peace Corps was founded. The Peace Corps was 
initially an alternative to military service and embodied many of the 
ideals specifically proposed by William James. Under the Peace Corps 
program, in place of compulsory military service, volunteers were sent to 
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developing countries to fight disease and poverty. Again, in 1964, Presi-
dent Johnson announced a bill for comprehensive welfare legislation by 
declaring “a war on poverty,” and President Nixon proclaimed “a war on 
cancer” in proposing the National Cancer Act of 1971. 
Initially, the American war against nature seemed headed for unprec-
edented success; the nation soon recovered from the Great Depression 
and the Second World War and seemed well on its way to bringing the 
forces of nature under control. But it was not long before nature struck 
back. New diseases and economic problems soon began to emerge, creat-
ing ever new battles to be fought. 
Nevertheless, in 1977, with the prospect of dwindling energy resourc-
es on the horizon, President Carter invoked the war metaphor once again 
in challenging Americans to reduce their consumption of oil and natural 
gas. In a televised speech to the nation he specifically alluded to James’s 
well-known essay, saying: 
“Our decision about energy will test the character of the American 
people and the ability of the President and the Congress to govern. 
This difficult effort will be the ‘moral equivalent of war’—except that 
we will be uniting our efforts to build and not destroy.”6
But President Carter’s use of the war metaphor took a distinctly new 
turn and was extremely unpopular, for instead of encouraging Americans 
to fight against either nature or some foreign enemy he asked them to 
fight against their own desires and to consume less instead of more! For 
this he was by severely criticized in the next election by his challenger, 
Ronald Reagan, as painting a bleak and pessimistic portrait of America’s 
future, and thus Carter was overwhelmingly defeated. When President 
Reagan took office, one of his first official acts was to dismantle Carter’s 
alternative energy programs, and, as a symbolic gesture of defiance, he 
removed the solar panels Carter had installed on the roof of the White 
House.
In America, talking about fighting for constructive, peaceful causes 
can be a political liability. Presidents who do so are often viewed as weak 
and cowardly; to appear strong and courageous, they must be willing to 
fight destructive wars against foreign enemies. Furthermore, calls for 
6 Carter, Jimmy. Televised Speech, April 18, 1977: http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/american experience/features/primary-resources/carter-energy/ (No-
vember 2012).
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wars against drug addiction, disease, energy consumption, and childhood 
obesity, fail to inspire the heroic martial spirit and toughness that Wil-
liam James sought to instill in the American people. In 2010, President 
Obama was mocked and derided when he compared the oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico to the attack of 9/11. He used the comparison as a pretext 
for saying, “This is an assault on our shores, and we’re gonna fight back 
with everything that we’ve got!” But the analogy was weak and brought 
him little credit. However, when he ordered the killing of Osama bin 
Laden, the alleged architect of 9/11, he was widely applauded and his 
popularity ratings significantly improved. 
Despite the fact that many American Presidents have endorsed 
James’s proposed war against nature, the policy has not served to dis-
place traditional warfare in the slightest. America’s foreign policy has 
grown more aggressive and warlike than it was 100 years ago, and today 
its military has more power and political influence than ever before. 
Having by far the largest military in world, it patrols every corner of 
the earth, seeking by every conceivable means to protect and secure its 
national interest.
For obvious reasons traditional warfare can never be replaced by 
pacifistic wars against poverty, disease, and natural disasters. Wars be-
tween peoples and nations arise from feelings of anger and righteous 
indignation; when nations feel that their honor, dignity, and security 
have been attacked or threatened in ways that are perceived as inten-
tional, malicious, and unjust, they seek revenge in one form or another 
for the injustice done to them. Though nature may harm and destroy us, 
we never imagine that it does so with malicious intent. Thus, we cannot 
summon the feelings of anger and indignation toward nature that we 
feel toward our fellow man when we think that he has maliciously and 
unjustly harmed us. 
If we fight against nature, we do so only in a derivative sense; we do 
not seek vengeance nor do we seek to punish nature or make it suffer 
to compensate for the pain it has caused us. But when we fight against 
those who have maliciously and unjustly harmed us, we seek revenge 
and the satisfaction of knowing that we have caused our enemy to suffer 
in return. If feelings of anger, righteous indignation, and the desire for 
revenge are part of human nature, it seems evident that they can neither 
be expressed nor satisfied by fighting against nature. Thus, there is noth-
ing in our struggle with nature that can truly be considered the moral 
equivalent of war. 
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WAR  AS  COSMIC  NECESS I TY  IN  HOMER , PLATO, AND  AR ISTOTLE
William James observed that our modern attitudes toward war have been 
shaped by a cultural tradition that originated in ancient Greece—a dys-
functional culture, marred by senseless violence and mayhem. He de-
scribed the Iliad as “one long recital of how Diomedes and Ajax, Sarpe-
don and Hector killed.” Apparently he thought that Homer had no other 
aim than to record the death of each warrior and describe in the most 
gruesome detail all the wounds inflicted. He seems to have missed the 
deeper significance of the story.
Homer does in fact treat war and conflict as an inevitable and inex-
tricable part of human life, and, like Heraclitus, he gives war a central 
place in the cosmic order. Again and again he invokes the image of the 
destructive forces of nature which he likens to the horror of war.7 He 
dwells constantly on the cruelty and horror of war, but the horror is made 
all the more vivid by its contrast with the peace and tranquility of do-
mestic life. Thus, woven throughout the tale are two contrasting attitudes 
toward war and two distinctly different ways of fighting: symbolized by 
the twin gods of war, Ares and Athena, one is mad and excessive, the 
other wise and moderate.
Ares, the male god of war, is described repeatedly as “man-slaugh-
tering,” “blood-stained,” and “murderous,” and Zeus reviles him, saying: 
“You are the most hateful to me of the gods who hold Olympus, forever 
strife is dear to you and wars and slaughter” (Iliad 5.890). By contrast, 
his sister Athena, the goddess of war, is dearest of all the gods to Zeus, 
and she is extolled as an exemplar of strategic wisdom and moderation. 
Athena is the daughter of Métis from whom she inherits her cunning 
wisdom. She fights only when necessary and with skillful means, using 
cunning and deception to avoid useless slaughter. Zeus often employs 
her to thwart the mad violence and wanton killing of her brother Ares. 
A similar contrast is drawn between Achilles and Odysseus. Achil-
les is called “iron-hearted,” and like Ares he kills in blind fury. His 
7 Homer, The Iliad of Homer. Richmond Lattimore, trans. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago: 1951. The following passage may serve as a typi-
cal example: “As when a swollen river hurls its water, large with rain down 
the mountains to the flat land following rain from the sky-god, and sweeps 
down with it cumbers of dry oaks and pine trees … so now gleaming Aias 
cumbered the plain as he chased them, slaughtering men and horses alike” 
(Iliad 11.492–5).
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 unyielding pride and mad rage cause immense suffering to his fellow 
Achaeans. Moreover, he shows no appreciation or desire for the comforts 
of domestic life. When Agamemnon proposes that the Achaean warriors 
eat and rest before returning again to battle the Trojans, Achilles fumes 
with anger, “You talk of food! I have no taste for food, what I crave is 
slaughter and blood and the choking groans of men” (Iliad, 19.213–4). 
Although Achilles kills Hector, he is unable to finally defeat the Trojans. 
When the Trojans take refuge behind the high walls of their city, it is 
Odysseus who devises the Trojan horse, the clever stratagem that brings 
the war to an end. Odysseus fights at Troy only because he is bound by 
an oath,8 and he yearns constantly to return to his wife and home in 
Ithaca. The epithet for Odysseus is “polymetis,” a term that refers to his 
many-sided, cunning wisdom and links him specifically with Athena. He 
is devoted Athena, and when the war is over, she aids and protects him 
through the trials and tribulations of his long journey home. Disguised 
as a shepherd boy she finally leads him back to Ithaca, and upon reveal-
ing her true identity, she says to Odysseus:
“Two of a kind, we are, contrivers, both. Of all living men you are the 
best in plots and storytelling. My own fame is for wisdom among the 
gods—deceptions too. Would even you have guessed that I am Pallas 
Athena, daughter of Zeus, I that am always with you in times of trial, 
a shield to you in battle” (Odyssey 13.350).9 
The Iliad ends with the funeral of Hector, and it is he who is the true 
hero of the story. Hector fights to save his city from destruction, and 
most of all he fights for his wife and son whom he loves dearly. He dies 
a hero’s death, for far more than any Achaean warrior, Hector displays 
the military virtues in defense of civilized life.10 In his final battle, know-
ing that his fate is sealed, he summons the courage to fight Achilles, 
saying: “let me not die ingloriously without a fight, but in some great 
8 Odysseus actually tried to break his oath to defend Menelaus by feigning 
madness and thus avoid fighting in the Trojan War, but at the request of 
Agamemnon, Palamedes exposed his deception and thus forced Odysseus 
to honor his oath. 
9 Homer, The Odyssey. Robert Fitzgerald, trans. Doubleday & Company, 
New York: 1963.
10 That Athena deceives Hector and helps Achilles to kill him is one of the 
great ironies of the Iliad. Disguising herself as Hector’s divine protector, 
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action that men yet to come will hear about” (Iliad 22.384–6). After he 
has killed Hector, Achilles again displays his unrelenting brutality as he 
attempts to defile Hector’s body, and only after his mother Thetis pleads 
with him does he allow Priam to ransom Hector for burial. At Hector’s 
funeral, the entire city of Troy comes out to mourn the fallen hero. He 
is praised by his parents and by his wife, Andromache, for his steadfast 
virtue and his unfailing devotion to the defense of his city. And finally 
he is praised by Helen, for his kindness and compassion; she tearfully 
recalls how Hector alone defended and protected her when other Trojans 
spoke of her with contempt. 
So the story ends, evoking admiration for the courage and compas-
sion of Hector and pity for the doomed city of Troy. It is worth noting 
that the Asiatic people of Troy are portrayed as far more civilized and hu-
mane than the merciless Achaeans—both Achilles and others like him. 
Though war and its destructive power are unavoidable, Homer shows its 
horror by revealing the humanity of its victims and all that is lost. The 
best and most civil of the Achaean warriors is the cunning Odysseus 
who accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit its damage. But 
even he is flawed and is thus punished by the god he has offended on 
his long journey home.
Plato was extremely critical of the effect of Homeric poetry on the 
moral character of the young, but he fully accepted Homer’s cosmic 
conception of war and applied it to politics. His Republic or ideal state 
is founded on the premise that warfare is a natural phenomenon that is 
embedded in the nature and structure of the human soul. Moreover, the 
love of war, according to Plato, was most deeply embedded in the Athe-
nian soul, for the city of Athens, he claims, was founded and especially 
nurtured to excel in war by the goddess Athena.
In his dialogue on cosmology, the Timeaus, Plato begins with the 
story of the founding of Athens as told to Solon by an Egyptian priest. 
The priest relates how Athena first raised up on Athenian soil “the no-
blest and most perfect race of men” (to kalliston kai ariston genos ep’ 
anthropous) who were “bravest in war” and who “possessed the most 
splendid works of art and the noblest polity of any city under heaven” 
Deiphoebus, she persuades Hector to believe that he will defeat Achilles in 
combat. When he fails, Hector then realizes that he has been deceived and 
prepares to meet his fate.
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(Plato, 23c).11 She furnished the Athenians with laws derived from the 
Cosmic Order and she established their city, “choosing that spot where 
[they] were born since she perceived there a climate duly blended that 
would produce men of supreme wisdom. So it was that the goddess, be-
ing herself both a lover of war and a lover of wisdom (philopolemos te kai 
philosophos), chose the spot which was most likely to bring forth men 
like herself, and this she first established” (Plato, 24d).
The Platonic Athena, it should be noted, is not a lover of metis or 
the cunning wisdom of disguises and deceptive strategies; she is a lover 
of sophia, that is, a lover alethia or unconcealed truth. In the Republic 
Plato rejects the Homeric notion that the gods go about in false disguises 
deceiving people. The gods are good, he argues, and hence they must 
be truthful in every way. The Platonic Athena thus resembles Apollo far 
more than the cunning Athena of traditional Homeric mythology.12
Like the Platonic Athena, the rulers of Plato’s perfect city must be 
both warriors and philosophers (525a) or lovers of both war and wisdom. 
Although philosopher-kings are not specifically referred to as ‘lovers of 
war’ in the Republic, they must be supremely courageous, and since the 
possession of every virtue requires the enjoyment of its corresponding 
activity, it is clear that philosophers must be fond of war. Moreover, phi-
losopher-kings are to be chosen exclusively from the ranks of the war-
rior-guardians or professional military class, a class of men and women 
repeatedly described as “athletes of war.” Those who are chosen to rule 
“the most beautiful city” must be guardians “who have proven them-
selves best in philosophy and war” (543a). The elite warrior-guardians 
have been raised since childhood in a military culture that has trained 
them to prefer “death in battle over defeat and slavery” (386b). Even as 
youths they have accompanied their parents to the battlefield to watch 
them fight—in this way being habituated at an early age to sight of death 
and the terror of war. 
By nature the guardians are “fearless and indomitable,” (375b) and 
their souls have been nurtured by musical rhythms that “imitate the 
sounds and accents of one who is courageous in warlike deeds and in 
11 Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2005.
12 For a comparative study of wisdom and cunning in ancient Greek and 
Chinese literature see Lisa Raphals. Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning 
in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece. Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca: 1992.
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every violent work” (399a); they have also received the discipline of gym-
nastic training that is akin to this music “especially concerning things of 
war” (404b). Furthermore, every subject studied by the guardians must 
be “useful to warlike men” (Plato, 521d). Arithmetic is to be studied 
“for war and for turning the soul around from Becoming to Being and 
Truth” (525c). Geometry and astronomy are also studied both for their 
philosophical and military applications (526d-527d).
As protectors of the state, guardians must have the character of watch 
dogs; they must be both friendly to those who are familiar and hostile 
toward strangers. Combining these opposed characteristics requires the 
proper education of the soul. The soul’s natural capacity for war is cul-
tivated by gymnastic; but gymnastic alone renders the soul excessively 
fierce and warlike thus turning it against both friends and enemies alike. 
The soul’s warlike impulses must thus be counterbalanced and tamed by 
a music that renders it amenable to rational persuasion. 
The soul’s principal parts are desire (epithumia), spirit (thumos), and 
reason (logos), and all three must work together in harmonious unity in 
order for the soul to perform its natural function and achieve its intended 
goals. Hence, the rational part must rule the desiring and spirited parts, 
setting the goals and limits of action. To govern the soul wisely, the 
reasoning part must be cultivated by philosophy—described by Plato as 
“the supreme music.” The soul’s spirited part is the natural ally of the 
reasoning part in ruling and enforcing its decrees upon the wayward 
desires of the soul. The capacity for anger and indignation resides in the 
spirited part, and insofar as it is ruled by reason, the spirit is the locus 
of the military virtues—courage, tenacity, and pride. Irrational anger de-
stroys these virtues and makes the soul savage and brutal. Desire seeks 
satisfaction in the physical pleasures of life, and when restricted to the 
moderate enjoyment of necessary pleasures, the soul acquires the “mind-
saving” virtue called sophrosune or temperance; sophrosune constrains the 
desires of the soul and prevents it from becoming dissipated, soft, and 
self-indulgent.
The true philosopher is thus distinguished from the sophist or false 
philosopher both by his toughness and love of war as well as his love of 
wisdom.  Plato ascribes to the sophist all of the metic or deceptive quali-
ties traditionally associated with Athena—duplicity, cunning, and am-
biguity. Though the sophist pretends to be a lover of wisdom, in reality 
he is a lover of metis or of deception and disguise. Thus, it is the work of 
the true philosopher to reveal the truth and expose the frauds for what 
they really are—a job that the Platonic Socrates appears to relish as he 
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displays all the toughness and tenacity of a champion fighter in forcing 
his opponents to show their true nature and submit to his logos. At his 
trial Socrates claimed that his work was “a service to the god” and a great 
gift to the city of Athens. But apparently his service was dedicated not 
to Athena, the cunning and deceptive goddess of Athens, but to Apollo, 
the god of the oracle at Delphi.
In the Republic the sophist cross-examined is given the ironic name 
Thrasymachus or “Bold-fighter.” Though Thrasymachus brashly rep-
resents himself as a bold and tough-minded opponent in the dialogue, 
Socrates soon compels him to retreat from his belligerent claim that 
justice is ‘the advantage of the stronger’ and shows him to be in real-
ity a rather pathetic, macho-boaster. But the dialogue also shows that 
Socrates himself uses deception and the pretence of ignorance and ti-
midity in order to gain a strategic advantage in this battle of wits. Here 
we encounter the paradox of Socrates and are left to wonder whether he 
is really a trickster and sophist who hides behind a mask of ignorance 
or the wise warrior-philosopher of Plato’s ideal state. With the exit of 
Thrasymachus, Glaucon and the other followers of Socrates express their 
dissatisfaction with his evasive tactics and challenge him to state his own 
views on the nature of justice and injustice. Socrates agrees to do so, and 
thus begins his Platonic account of the perfect state.
After Socrates has given his account of the education of the guard-
ians, he asks how the guardians of the perfect city ought to treat their 
enemies in war. He specifically asks whether it is permissible to enslave 
one’s enemies (Plato, 469b) and burn their crops and homes ( Plato, 470a). 
It is agreed on all sides that members of the Greek race (Hellennikon 
genos) should neither enslave other Greeks nor destroy their property, 
for in this way “they will be more likely to turn against the barbarians 
and keep their hands from one another” (469e). The justification of this 
policy is that Greeks are “by nature friends” whereas Greeks and barbar-
ians are “enemies by nature” (470c). 
Given this distinction between Greeks and barbarians, enmity and 
fighting between Greeks is declared to be ‘faction’ rather than war, for 
fighting between those who are friends by nature is a division of the state 
against itself that should be treated as a kind of sickness or disease that 
needs the remedy of reconciliation. However, “the enmity and hatred” 
between Greeks and barbarians, who are enemies by nature, is properly 
called war (470d), and war, unlike faction, is not subject to constraints. In 
war, Socrates concludes, Greeks “ought to treat barbarians as Greeks now 
treat Greeks” (471b). This reference to the tactics employed by Greeks 
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against Greeks during the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath spe-
cifically implies that in war it is right and proper for Greeks to enslave 
barbarians, burn their homes and destroy the agricultural base of their 
economy. Reconciliation between natural enemies is neither mentioned 
nor considered. Between Greeks and barbarians, total war is both the law 
of nature and the entire foreign policy of Plato’s ideal city.
Aristotle approaches the topic of war in much the same manner as 
Plato, but he expands the Platonic account to include a distinction be-
tween just and unjust war. Aristotle’s discussion of just war arises within 
the context of his analysis of the disputed question concerning the jus-
tice of slavery. The dispute is between those who affirm that slavery is 
just and exists by nature and those who hold that it is unjust and exists 
merely by convention. Between the two extremes Aristotle holds the 
intermediate view that some forms of slavery are natural and just while 
others are merely conventional and unjust. He attempts to resolve the 
dispute between the two sides by drawing a distinction between the just 
use of slaves (which belongs to the art of rulership) and the just acquisi-
tion of slaves (which belongs to the art of war). 
The just use of slaves is predicated on the distinction between hu-
mans who are slaves by nature and those who are masters by nature. 
Aristotle states that “from the hour of their birth, some are marked out 
for subjection, others for rule” (Aristotle, 1254a 23).13 Thus, he claims that 
it is natural and just for those who are masters by nature to rule those 
who are slaves by nature. Moreover, when the practice of slavery is just, 
master and slave are said to be friends by nature since both benefit from 
the relationship.
Turning to the question of the acquisition of slaves, Aristotle states 
that he means the art “of justly acquiring them” which he says is “a spe-
cies of hunting or war” (1255b 37). He further explains that “what we gain 
in war is in a certain manner a natural acquisition; for hunting is a part 
of it, which it is necessary for us to employ against wild beasts; and those 
men who being intended by nature for slavery are unwilling to submit to 
it, on which occasion such a war is by nature just” (1256b 23–25). 
Although Aristotle refers to unjust wars on several occasions, he 
does not specifically explain how unjust wars differ from just wars. But if 
just wars are wars waged by natural masters against natural slaves, it may 
13 Aristotle. Politics. H. Rackham, trans. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge: 1944.
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be inferred that an unjust war would be a war of natural slaves waged 
against natural masters. If natural slaves should then defeat  natural 
 masters and by the conventions of warfare enslave them, we might then 
say that the acquisition of such slaves could be considered just by the 
conventions of warfare but unjust by nature. Of course, we should add 
that warfare of any kind waged against natural masters, whether waged 
by natural slaves or by other natural masters, would be, according to 
Aristotle, by nature an unjust war. Also, the use of natural masters for 
slavery, whether by natural masters or natural slaves, would also be by 
definition an unjust use of slaves.
If, as Aristotle claims, some are marked out by nature “from the hour 
of their birth” for slavery and others for ruling, what are the identifying 
marks of natural slaves and natural masters? Aristotle clearly answers 
this question in Politics, Book 7, where he draws a distinction between 
“the Greek race” (ton Hellenon genos) and the rest of humanity that is 
specifically based on nature rather than convention. Much like Plato in 
the Timeaus, he attributes the natural superiority of the Greek race to 
the geographical location and climate within which the Greek city-states 
were situated. Europeans who live in a cold climate, according to Aris-
totle, are full of spirit (thumou) and free but lacking in intelligence and 
skill (dianoia kai techne). Thus, they are deficient in political organization 
and ability to rule. Asians, on the other hand, are intelligent and skillful 
but lacking in spirit and thus live in perpetual subjection and slavery. 
The Greek race, by virtue of the fact that it occupies the middle position 
geographically and climatically, possesses both spirit and intelligence. 
Hence, Aristotle concludes, the Greek race is not only free and politically 
well organized, but “if it could be formed into one state, it would be able 
to rule the world” (Aristotle, 1327b 23–33). 
Aristotle’s views on the arts of rulership and war leave little room 
for doubt as to how he thought Greek governance of the world should 
be exercised and by what means acquired. Based on the fact that “nature 
produces nothing in vain,” the proper mode of governance of natural 
slaves, according to Aristotle, is despotic—natural slaves being designed 
by nature as tools to serve the interests and well-being of their natural 
masters. The acquisition of this power over natural slaves belongs to the 
art of war. Thus, if natural slaves refuse to submit to the despotic rule 
of their Greek masters, they may be justly conquered and enslaved by 
military force. 
After the Macedonians had formed the Greek city-states into a uni-
fied state, Aristotle’s student, Alexander embarked on just such a cam-
R ICHARD  N . S T ICHLER :  HUMAN NATURE  AND  CULTURES  OF  WAR 233
paign to rule the world, using military force to conquer all who refused 
to submit. On his campaign he is said to have carried with him a copy 
of Homer’s Iliad, and the hero he wished most of all to emulate was 
Achilles. Like Achilles, Alexander was disinclined to use deceptive tactics 
and strategies designed to minimize human suffering either of his own 
troops or of the enemy. He considered surprise attacks cowardly and 
demeaning. Though a brilliant strategist, he preferred to win glory in 
direct and open combat using overwhelming force and extreme violence 
to strike terror into the heart of his opponents. Alexander was quoted 
by Arrian as saying, “It is a lovely thing to live with courage and to die 
leaving behind an everlasting renown.” “His dreadful legacy,” wrote John 
Keegan, “was to ennoble savagery in the name of glory and to leave a 
model of command that far too many men of ambition sought to act 
out in the centuries to come”.14 Moreover, the expansive imperial ambi-
tions that characterized the Western way of war throughout medieval and 
modern eras owed much not only to the example of Alexander but to the 
military theories of Plato and Aristotle as well. 
HUMAN NATURE  AND  THE  WAR  CULTURE  OF  ANC IENT  CH INA
Throughout the history of China, war has played an essential and pivotal 
role in overthrowing and replacing dynasties that allegedly had lost the 
mandate of Heaven. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States 
periods, rival states fought one another almost constantly in an effort 
to stabilize and secure their kingdoms. Military strategy was studied 
extensively and numerous treatises were written on the subject. In addi-
tion, questions related to the nature, morality, and necessity of war were 
rigorously discussed and debated by the “Hundred Schools.” Though 
opinions on war and human nature were invariably supported by refer-
ence to the Dao of Heaven, a wide variety of conflicting views were held 
on the justification of war, proper conduct in prosecuting a war, and the 
moral qualities of human nature. 
During the Warring States period, most scholars accepted the ne-
cessity of war and argued only against unjust warfare. Early Chinese 
conceptions of just and unjust war, however, differed widely from views 
14 Keegan, John. The Mask of Command. Penguin Books, New York: 1988, 
p. 91.
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commonly held in Ancient Greece—particularly those of Aristotle. Un-
just wars were generally viewed as wars fought for land, profit and power 
at the expense of the people. Just wars were fought for the liberation of 
the people from the rule of cruel and oppressive tyrants. A few scholars 
viewed all war as morally repugnant and argued for its abolition. As early 
as 545 BCE a proposal was drafted to end the conflict between the major 
states of Jin, Chu, Qi, and Qin and 10 other minor states. Initially, all 
fourteen states agreed to sign a covenant abolishing war, but disputes 
about formalities at the signing resulted in the eventual breakdown of 
the agreement.15 Scholars who opposed the abolition of war argued that 
war is needed to coerce those who violate the law and to allow civilized 
virtue (wen de) to flourish.
Confucius himself acknowledged the necessity of war16 and included 
the military skills of archery and chariot-driving among the six arts to 
be mastered by superior men (junzi);17 he also demanded courage18 and 
resoluteness in the pursuit of righteousness. Living in an age of cultural 
transition in which a rising bureaucracy of profit-oriented artisans and 
palace officials was merging with the older service-oriented military elite, 
Confucius lamented the loss of the values of the old feudal-system and 
despised the values of the rising class of profit-seeking ‘small men’ ( xiao 
ren). He sought to revive the old values of the feudal society of Zhou 
Kings Wen and Wu. The foundation of that society “was a warrior-elite 
whose weapons were the compound bow and the horse-drawn chariot. 
15 Hanafin, John. Philosophy of War: Chinese and Western Perspectives. (Un-
published paper presented at the Fifteenth International Conference on 
Chinese Philosophy, Wuhan University: 2007), p. 5.
16 Knoblock, John and Jeffrey Reigal. The Annals of Lü Buwei. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford: 2000, p. 474. Knoblock cites a passage from the 
Records of Ritual Matters (Da Dai Li Ji), according to which Confucius said, 
“Men are born possessing the emotions of joy and anger. This is the reason 
why weapons were invented and why all men have produced them.” 
17 Legge, James, trans. The Book of Rites: Li Ji, Kessinger Publishing, New 
York: 2003. The text contains several references to military affairs such as: 
“The son of Heaven orders his leaders and commanders to give instruction 
on military operations, and to exercise (the soldiers) in archery and chariot-
driving, and in trials of strength” (p. 244).
18 Much like Plato and Aristotle, Confucius (according to the Li Ji 47.8A) 
viewed courage as “fullness of spirit.” The ancient Chinese, as John Kno-
block points out, generally regarded courage as an abundance of chi or the 
vital ethers of nature (see Knoblock and Reigal, op. cit., pp. 188–9). 
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[Warriors] lived on separate farmholds and assembled at the order of the 
Prince … They were trained in martial skills and a service ethic based on 
ideals of duty, courage, selflessness, and comradeship”.19
In the biography of the “grand historian” Sima Qian, Confucius is 
portrayed not as the gentle teacher of the Analects20 but as a severe and 
demanding leader who frightened disorderly rulers. According to Sima 
Qian, when Confucius assisted Duke Ding of Lu at a conference with 
the Duke of Qi at Jiagu, he anticipated a plot against the duke’s life and 
advised him to bring military troops to ensure his safety, saying: “Those 
who have cultural (wen) business must have military (wu) preparations.” 
Confucius also demanded harsh punishment for those who violate the 
rules of ritual propriety. At the end of the meeting with the Duke of Qi, 
jesters and dwarfs were ordered to perform in order to create disorder and 
an opportunity to attack Duke Ding. Confucius immediately rushed for-
ward to object: “When a commoner throws feudal lords into confusion, 
the crime deserves execution. I request that you so order the official.” 
The law was applied and the performers were cut in half at the waist.21
After the death of Confucius, Confucian scholars began to develop 
a strong aversion to war. Some claimed that the need to resort to arms 
was a result of poor rulership and that war only made bad conditions 
worse. To engage in fighting and risk one’s life in combat, according to 
the Classic of Filial Piety (c. 350–222 BCE), would be an act of impiety, 
as it stipulated in the first paragraph: “Our bodies—every hair and bit of 
skin—are received by us from our parents, and we must not presume to 
injure or wound them. This is the beginning of filial piety”.22 
19 Brooks, E. Bruce and A. Taeko Brooks. The Original Analects: Sayings of 
Confucius and His Successors. Columbia UP, New York: 1998, p. 3.
20 In The Original Analects, Bruce Brooks maintains that the nearest sem-
blance to the original teaching of Confucius is to be found in books 4–6. 
The sayings contained in these three books, he argues, were originally re-
corded and compiled shortly after Confucius’s death. Books 1–3 and 7–20 
contain the views of later Confucians and were written over a 230 year 
period after the death of Confucius by various members of the Confucian 
school at Qufu. The later books concern issues debated during the Warring 
States period but were not considered during the lifetime of Confucius (see 
Brooks, Appendices 1–4).
21 Durrant, Stephen. The Cloudy Mirror: Tension and Conflict in the Writings 
of Sima Qian. SUNY Press, Albany: 1995, p. 38.
22 Xiao Jing. The Classic of Filial Piety, http://www.chinapage.com/confu-
cius/xiaojing-be.html (November 2012).
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Ignoring the teaching of Confucius, Mencius condemned war unequivo-
cally, and claimed that Confucius “would have rejected those who are 
vehement to fight for their prince” (Mencius, 4A:14.2).23 He argued that 
a benevolent ruler has no enemies under Heaven and thus no need to 
engage in warfare. Faced with the fact that the Book of History (Shijing) 
recorded a brutal and bloody battle when the Sage-King Wu of Zhou 
attacked the corrupt King Zhou of Shang, Mencius simply rejected the 
truth of the story. “It would be better to have no Book of History,” he said, 
“than to believe all of it. In its ‘Completion of War’ section, I accept only 
two or three passages. A man of humanity has no enemy in the world. 
When a most humane person (King Wu) punished a most inhumane 
ruler (King Zhou), how could the blood (of the people) have flowed till 
it floated the pestles of the mortars?” (Chan, 7B:3).24
Mencius then offered his own a priori and bloodless account of what 
really happened: “When King Wu punished the Shang, he had three 
hundred war chariots and three thousand infantry. But the King said, 
‘Fear not! I bring you peace! I am no enemy of the people.’ Then the 
people bowed their heads, like animals shedding their horns. To launch a 
‘punitive attack’ means to correct. If each wishes to correct itself, of what 
use is war?” (7B:4.4–6). Violent wars are never fought by Sage-Kings, 
according to Mencius, because they only need correct or rectify those 
who have neglected and failed to cultivate the goodness of their original 
nature. Since people naturally wish to rectify themselves and dwell in 
the peace and tranquility of their original goodness (4A:10), they “turn 
to a benevolent ruler as water flows downward, and as wild beasts fly to 
the wilderness” (4A:9.1). 
Mencius thus vehemently condemned warfare and rejected in the 
strongest terms the more moderate views of Mozi, Sunzi, and others 
who supported just war and tactics designed to minimize its destructive 
effects. He called those who are skillful in military strategy “great crimi-
nals” (7B:4.1) and said that wars fought for the control of cities and land 
should be called “devouring human flesh for the sake of territory” (Chan, 
23 Mencius. Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Bryan 
W. Van Norden, trans. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis: 2008.
24 Wing-Tsit Chan notes that the Book of History actually says that the 
bloodshed was caused by Shang forces turning against one another. But 
Mencius evidently thought that there should have been no bloodshed at 
all. See Wing-Tsit Chan. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton: 1963, p. 81.
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4A:14.2). Though Mencius did not recommend rectifying people with 
harsh punishments, he did advocate the most severe penalties for those 
involved in warfare, particularly generals, military strategists, and states-
men. He said, “Death is an insufficient punishment for such crimes. 
Those who are skillful in war deserve the greatest punishment, and those 
who form strategic alliances among states deserve the next greatest pun-
ishment” (4A:14.2–3). Though the purpose of inflicting such punish-
ments is not mentioned, it does not seem to be corrective or benevolent.
People are naturally attracted to benevolent rulers, according to 
Mencius, because of the innate goodness of their Heaven-endowed na-
ture. This nature consists of the feelings of compassion, shame, humility, 
and right and wrong. Mencius claimed that all humans are naturally en-
dowed with these feelings (or four beginnings) just as they are endowed 
with four limbs. Thus he claimed that “all men have a mind that cannot 
bear to see the suffering of others,” and “a man without the feeling of 
compassion is not a man” (2A:6). When cultivated these inborn feelings 
become the four core virtues, benevolence (ren), righteousness (yi), ritual 
propriety (li), and wisdom (zhi).
Mencius’s theory of the innate goodness of human nature is fur-
ther clarified in his debate with Gaozi. Mencius claims that benevolence 
and righteousness (which originate from the feelings of compassion and 
shame) are innate rather than determined by outside social influences. 
Gaozi argues that human nature is not innately good but that it acquires 
these virtues from outside social factors. Gaozi maintains that human 
nature consists of desires for things like food and sex which are neither 
good nor evil. He compares human nature to a willow tree and benevo-
lence and righteousness to cups and bowls that are shaped from the 
tree. Thus, in holding that benevolence and righteousness are acquired 
he evidently means that they are externally imposed on morally neutral 
human desires.25 Mencius replies by saying that making cups and bowls 
of a willow tree is a violation of the tree’s nature. Thus, on Gaozi’s view 
says Mencius, benevolence and righteousness would be a violation of hu-
man nature and a calamity (6A:1). This way of distorting his opponent’s 
analogy is fairly typical. Gaozi intends the willow tree to be understood 
as a kind of raw material comparable to the raw material of human na-
ture. Just as the willow tree has no natural tendency to become or not 
25 The view later attributed to Gaozi (in 6A:4) that benevolence is internal 
and righteousness external is inconsistent with the argument of the earlier 
passages, and its supporting argument is obviously confused. 
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become cups and bowls, so too human nature has no natural tendency 
toward good or evil. Since human nature, on Gaozi’s view, is morally 
neutral with respect to benevolence and righteousness, the acquisition 
of these virtues could not be a violation of one’s natural human desires.
It is easy to see why Xunzi, the more realistic and empirically ori-
ented Confucian, found Mencius’s theory of human nature and his to-
tal condemnation of war unacceptable. If human nature flows towards 
virtue and goodness as naturally as water flows downward, what could 
be the use and function of ritual?26 According to Mencius, man’s innate 
inner humility naturally tends toward ritual propriety. Thus, he consid-
ered external constraint a useless and unnecessary impediment. But on 
Xunzi’s view the world is full of weak, degenerate people who need to 
be disciplined, not set free to follow their subjective inclinations. For 
Xunzi ritual is an external convention and a constraint on men’s natural 
desires which are ego-centric and tend toward evil. According to Xunzi, 
men are not humble by nature; on the contrary, they are arrogant and 
proud. Thus, if a man follows his natural inclinations, says Xunzi, “they 
will lead him into license and wantonness, and all ritual principles and 
correct forms will be lost. Hence, any man who follows his nature and 
indulges his emotions will inevitably become involved in wrangling and 
strife, will violate the forms and rules of society, and will end as a crimi-
nal” (Xunzi 161).27
Ritual propriety disciplines and corrects the disordered chaos of 
conflicting human desires. Therefore, ritual propriety is the core and 
foundation of Xunzi’s theory of good government; by means of ritual 
the virtuous ruler establishes order and transforms the people: “The 
violent and daring are transformed to sincerity; the prejudiced and self-
ish-minded are transformed to fairness; and the quick-tempered and 
contentious are transformed to harmony” (Xunzi 78). 
Given the inherent tendency of human nature toward evil, wars are 
at times unavoidable, and thus it is necessary to fight against evil rulers 
of aggressive war-loving states; but Xunzi said that wars should only be 
fought for a righteous cause and “to put an end to violence and to do 
away with harm, not in order to contend with others for spoil” (Xun-
zi 72). Thus Xunzi seeks to minimize the destructive effects of war by 
26 See Dubs, Homer. Nature in the Teaching of Confucius, Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, Vol. 50: 1930, pp. 233–237.
27 Xunzi. Xunzi: Basic Writings. Burton Watson, trans. Columbia Univer-
sity Press, New York: 2003.
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careful strategic planning. He sees the underlying key to success in war 
as the ruler’s ability to win the support of the people, and this can be 
obtained only by adhering to the rules of ritual propriety. The inherent 
weakness of states governed by rash and arrogant rulers is their lack of 
unity and cohesiveness. Thus, the competent general must carefully ob-
serve the disposition of the enemy, examine the enemy’s strengths and 
weaknesses, and obtain reliable intelligence. Most importantly, he should 
seek to imbue his soldiers with a sense of honor and propriety, in this 
way ensuring their loyalty and commitment (Xunzi, 64–68). 
Although Xunzi’s discussion of military strategy has many things in 
common with the military classics of the Warring States period, he spe-
cifically rejects the tactics of stealth and deception advocated by Sunzi 
and Wuzi (Xunzi, 60). He offers two arguments against the use of de-
ception in war: the first is that deceptive tactics are ineffective against 
benevolent rulers; the second is that such tactics are demoralizing. In 
both cases his objective is to emphasize the superiority of governance 
by ritual propriety over other forms of governance. In arguing that de-
ception is ineffective, he claims that any attempt to practice deception 
against a sage ruler would be immediately detected. The sage ruler, being 
widely loved and admired by loyal subjects, has eyes and ears everywhere. 
Thus, secret plots and deceptive strategies cannot work against him; they 
can work only against corrupt and arrogant rulers whose subjects are in 
conflict and at odds with one another. 
The problem with the first argument is that Sunzi and Wuzi do not 
advocate attacking sage rulers. Their strategies are designed for the most 
part to enable virtuous rulers of smaller states with limited resources to 
defend themselves and to defeat aggressive rulers of large and powerful 
neighboring states. The classics of Chinese military strategy repeatedly 
emphasize that the only legitimate purpose of war is to aid the people 
and to eliminate evil rulers; also, any military action that would increase 
the suffering of the people should be strictly avoided. Thus, there is 
no justification to be found in Sunzi or Wuzi for attacking a just and 
benevolent ruler.
Xunzi’s second argument, however, has more weight. To sustain the 
loyalty of the military and to attract worthy men to military service, he 
maintains, it is necessary to cultivate a sense of honor and duty. The 
use of deceptive plots, however, appeals to men’s lower motives and the 
desire for rewards and profit. This tends to weaken military discipline 
and leads to faction. The sage ruler, therefore, will rely instead on “ritual 
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principles and moral education” to unite the people and reject deception 
as a military tactic (Xunzi, 66). 
Ritual propriety or li is a practice that harmonizes all elements 
of society, both civil and military, thus producing unity of spirit and 
like-mindedness between the ruler and the people as a whole. Xunzi’s 
emphasis on the overriding importance of ritual propriety in military 
strategy is thus in complete agreement with many other important Con-
fucian documents of the period. The Book of Rites (liji), for example, 
states: “The army has li [ritual propriety]; therefore, it achieves military 
merit” and the Zuo Zhuan asserts: “Having li, there will be no defeat” 
(Mair, 48).28 On this view, propriety is the moral and social bond that 
holds the military together and enables it to function as a coordinated 
whole. Similarly, Xunzi treats wen and wu, the civil and military spheres, 
as interdependent parts of a social fabric that mutually support and 
strengthen one another. As the virtue that renders the aim and purpose 
of warfare righteous and just, li strengthens the bonds of courage, loyalty 
and duty that allow the military to act in unison with the decrees of a 
benevolent and righteous ruler.
Although Xunzi rejected deception as a military strategy, his integra-
tion of wu within wen was in complete agreement with Sunzi and Wuzi as 
well as the views of many other military strategists of the Warring States 
period. In The Art of War, Sunzi stated that the first criterion for victory 
in battle is the Dao, and the Dao of war is like-mindedness or complete 
concord between the ruler and the people. Thus, Xunzi and Sunzi agree 
that the internal harmony of the state is the key to military success and 
that faction and conflict undermine the ruler’s ability to prevail in war. 
But Sunzi’s Dao of war is not the Dao of li or Confucian propriety; it is 
the elusive, formless Dao of Laozi’s Dao de jing. As Victor Mair points 
out, the Sunzi has long been considered a Daoist text and was included 
in the Daoist canons of the late eleventh century. “The chief difference 
between the Dao de jing and the Sun Zi,” Mair writes, “is that the former 
focuses on how to use a wuwei (“non-action”) approach to rule the state, 
whereas the latter concentrates on applying a similar attitude toward the 
prosecution of war … Thus, the Dao de jing is a manual for the wuwei-
minded ruler, and the Sun Zi is a handbook for the wuwei-minded gen-
eral” (Mair, 49). The wuwei-minded general is one who rejects the rigid 
28 Sunzi. The Art of War: Sunzi’s Military Methods. Victor Mair, trans. Co-
lumbia University Press, New York: 2007.
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forms of li and as far as possible avoids direct conflict, using instead the 
formless art of deception to foil the plans of the enemy and thus “win 
without fighting.” Finally, it may be noted that while Xunzi and Sunzi 
both stress the importance of like-minded agreement between the ruler 
and his subordinates, they also insist on the autonomy of the general and 
his duty to disobey orders that conflict with righteous military objectives.
The military strategy of Wuzi, on the other hand, presents a rather 
different response to Xunzi’s objection to the use of deception in warfare. 
Unlike the legendary Sunzi, Wuzi—or Wu Qi, as he was known, was a 
real historical figure and a Confucian general who allegedly never lost a 
battle. He served the embattled state of Wei in defeating the more pow-
erful states of Han and Qin, and next to Sunzi, he was the most highly 
regarded military strategist of the Warring States period. In regard to 
the foundations of successful military strategy, there is actually little 
difference between the views of Wuzi and Xunzi. Wuzi supported the 
Confucian principle that rulers who have comprehended the Dao will 
harmonize the state by observing and maintaining “the forms of propri-
ety (li) between themselves and their ministers” (Sawyer, op. cit., 209). 
He stated that the Dao “is the means by which one turns back to the 
foundation and returns to the beginning.” Thus, he said that “the Sage 
rests the people in the [Dao], orders them with righteousness, moves 
them with the forms of propriety (li), and consoles them with benevo-
lence. Cultivate these four virtues and you will flourish. Neglect them 
and you will decline” (Sawyer, op. cit., 207).
Unlike Sunzi, Wuzi did not advocate deception as a strategic prin-
ciple to be employed in all types of warfare; he actually recommended 
deception as a tactic to be used only against a specific type of enemy—an 
enemy that he described as “fierce.” Since the armies of different states 
have different motives for waging war, Wuzi said that a variety of differ-
ent strategies or Ways (Dao) of fighting should be employed to defeat the 
various types of enemy one may encounter. The enemy’s characteristic 
form or way of fighting being determined by its motive for fighting, there 
is a particular Dao or appropriate form of response that must be used 
exploit the enemy’s specific weakness. Hence, propriety should be used 
against those who fight for fame, deference against those who fight for 
profit, persuasion against those who fight from hatred, and deception 
against those who are “fierce” or motivated by internal disorder within 
their own state (Sawyer, op. cit., 210). 
Wuzi thus advocated only limited use of deception and apparently 
did not see it as demoralizing violation of propriety; on the contrary, 
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seeing the strength and moral purpose of the military as dependent on 
Confucian virtue, Wuzi sought to infuse the military with a sense of pro-
priety. His view of the function of the military as a protector of the civil 
culture is thus in all other respects in complete agreement with Xunzi. 
To those who object that war is immoral and disregard the necessity of 
military preparation, Wuzi offered the following advice: “In antiquity 
the ruler of the Cheng Sang clan cultivated Virtue but neglected military 
affairs, thereby leading to the extinction of his state … When the dead 
lie stiff and you grieve for them, you have not attained benevolence” 
(Sawyer, op. cit., 206).
The writings of Han Feizi, Lü Buwei, and the Huainanzi all attribute 
similar views on warfare and the righteous use of weapons to Confucius. 
But these writings along with those of Xunzi and Wuzi were later dis-
credited due in large part to the draconian military methods and civil 
policies of the first Emperor of China, Qin Shi Huangdi. His barbaric 
cruelty and ruthlessness being attributed to the influence of military 
strategists and advocates of warfare, pacifistically-minded Confucians 
would later classify those texts as belonging to the so-called “legalist” 
school of thought which they considered barbaric, crude, and diametri-
cally opposed to the teachings of Mencius and Confucius.
During the Song dynasty, the neo-Confucian school led by Zhu Xi, 
officially adopted the Mencian version of Confucianism and declared 
Xunzi unorthodox. This further reinforced the growing separation and 
fragmentation of the schools of civil and military education and has-
tened the social and intellectual decline of the military class. Formerly 
admired as the elite protectors and patrons of civility, military officers 
came to be looked down upon as savage and illiterate by the elite class 
of neo-Confucian civil-servants. Examinations for entry into the pres-
tigious field of civil service were centered primarily on the Mencius and 
the three core texts attributed to Confucius; tests for military service, 
however, focused on the seven ancient military classics. While the most 
accomplished young scholars competed for highly honored positions in 
civil-service, the less accomplished had no other option than to take the 
less demanding military service examinations. The declining prestige 
of the military thus fostered a simultaneous decline in the intellectual 
competence of candidates for military service as well as reliance upon 
non-Chinese mercenaries to do the actual fighting needed to protect the 
northern and western frontiers against attacks by nomadic tribes. 
The neo-Confucian devaluation and separation of the military from 
the higher sphere of civil culture thus put Chinese civilization at a great 
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disadvantage in its efforts to defend itself against external attacks. Al-
though Zhu Xi’s policies and principles contributed to China’s military 
weakness, in later life he became greatly troubled by increasing barbarian 
incursions on the northern and western fronts. As a solution to the prob-
lem he proposed educational reforms that were intended to reintegrate 
civil and military education by encouraging elite Confucian scholars to 
study the military classics and serve as military advisors and strategists. 
But his proposals had little effect, and not long after his death the Mon-
gols, led by the Genghis and Kublai Khan, invaded China and toppled 
the Song dynasty.
A few centuries later, toward the end of the Ming dynasty, with 
Manchu warlords threatening to invade China another illustrious neo-
Confucian scholar, Wang Yangming, faced the same problem once again. 
In his early twenties, as a young idealistic Confucian intent on protect-
ing the northern frontier, Wang Yangming studied the ancient military 
classics and sought to devise a strategy to pacify and civilize the barbaric 
northern tribes. But the only relevant teaching he could find in the works 
of Mencius was the following military advice which Mencius gave to the 
war-loving King Hui of Liang:
“If your Majesty applies benevolent government to the people, less-
ens punishments, reduces taxes, and assures that there is deep plow-
ing and careful weeding, then the strong, in their free time will cul-
tivate their filial piety, brotherliness, sincerity, and truthfulness. At 
home they will serve their fathers and elder brothers. When they 
go out they will serve their elders and superiors. Then they can be 
ordered to fend off the hard armor and sharp blades of Qin and Chu 
even with mere sticks” (Mencius, op. cit., 1A:5.3).
Although Mencius had never before been considered a military strate-
gist, Wang Yangming explicitly recommended Mencius’s strategy in his 
first memorial to the Emperor, Chenyan bianwu shu (Recommendations 
on Borderland Affairs), written in 1499.29 Similar notions had long been 
ridiculed for their naivety by military theorists of the Warring States pe-
riod. In the Lü Shi Chun Qiu, Lü Buwei specifically notes that there are 
some who hold the doctrine that untrained farmers armed with nothing 
29 For further discussion of this topic see S. R. Gilbert, Mengzi’s Art of War, 
in Nicola DiCosmo. Military Culture in Imperial China, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge: 2009, pp. 243–56.
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but hoes, barrows and clubs can defeat the long spears and sharp swords 
of well trained armies. In response he disdainfully dismisses such no-
tions by remarking that these people have no understanding of military 
affairs (Lü, 8/3.1).30
Wang Yangming, however, sought to combine Mencius’ pacifistic 
methods with those of Sunzi and Wuzi. Thus, he advocated training lo-
cal farmers and civilians in the martial arts and placing them under the 
command of the military. He implemented these ideas with some success 
during his first active involvement in military service which began in 
1517—some 18 years after his first memorial to the Emperor. But later in 
his career, when he was appointed Supreme Commander of the military 
forces in the southern provinces, he apparently abandoned the methods 
of Mencius and resorted solely to the more practical and primitive strat-
egies of Sunzi, Wuzi, and other military strategists. In his last military 
campaign of 1528, Wang Yangming ordered an attack on Yao rebels in 
Guangxi province. According to the report he submitted to the Emperor 
3,000 rebels were decapitated and 1,000 family members were captured. 
In addition to those captured and beheaded thousands more drowned or 
died of starvation, and many villages were completely destroyed. Though 
the operation was considered a great military success, the forces Wang 
Yangming used in this assault on the rebels consisted not of coura-
geous Chinese farmer-civilians but 13,000 non-Chinese mercenaries 
(Shin, 101–2).31 Wang may have been unsettled in his own mind as a 
result of the conflict between his teachings on civil and military virtue. 
In his later years he sought unsuccessfully to avoid military service, ap-
parently having lost his youthful enthusiasm for military affairs.
The moral dilemma of Wang Yangming clearly illustrates the practi-
cal problems associated with the neo-Confucian doctrines on human na-
ture and war. As a military commander faced with the reality of barbar-
ian attacks on the empire, Wang Yangming evidently had no alternative 
other than to resort to traditional military methods that were specifically 
rejected by Mencius as immoral and criminal. However, the firmly en-
trenched position of Mencius within the educational system was a strong 
impediment to reinstating Xunzi’s realistic view of human nature as a 
coherent basis for restoring the military to its former prestige. 
30 Knoblock, John and Reigal, Jeffrey. The Annals of Lü Büwei. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford: 2000.
31 Shin, Leo K. The Last Campaign of Wang Yangming, http://www.history.
ubc.ca/faculty/ lshin/research/pdf/06_shin_tp.pdf (November 2012).
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After the fall of the Ming Dynasty, the unresolved conflict between the 
military culture and neo-Confucian idealism frustrated the efforts of 
Qing Emperors to strengthen the martial virtues within the dominant 
neo-Confucian culture. When the Qing dynasty was finally unable to 
respond to the invasion of Western and Japanese imperialism, Confu-
cianism was held largely to blame for the military weakness and lack 
of technological expertise that rendered the empire defenseless. In the 
early 20th Century China’s loss of confidence in its Confucian tradition 
resulted in an extended period of internal turmoil and cultural conflict. 
But the rejection of neo-Confucian pacifism and the subsequent revital-
ization of the military laid the foundation for China’s ability to reclaim 
its political independence and rebuild its economy. As China now seeks 
to restore the values of its Confucian legacy, the realism of Xunzi may 
once again play a timely role in mending the neo-Confucian breach be-
tween China’s military and civil cultures. 
CONCLUS ION
Given the inherent tendencies of human nature, Xunzi and other early 
Confucians viewed war as a necessary evil that can be contained but 
never totally eliminated. The perennial necessity of military prepared-
ness was thus rooted in the need to protect civilized society from op-
pressive rulers and barbarian warlords. Unlike the expansive Western 
military tradition that originated in ancient Greece, both Confucian and 
Daoist military strategies sought not to impose their cultural values on 
other societies by force but to function as a means for circumventing war 
and alleviating human suffering. The need for military strategies that 
can avoid and diminish the destructive effects of war is more vital today 
than ever before. Confucianism has long sought to lead by setting a high 
moral standard that “all under heaven” might be inspired to emulate. If 
China’s political leaders can employ such strategic military principles ef-
fectively, China may well play a leading role in avoiding potential clashes 
of civilizations that may lie ahead.
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